On Thu, 14 Jan 2021 21:26:28 +0100 Andrea Parri (Microsoft) wrote: > For additional robustness in the face of Hyper-V errors or malicious > behavior, validate all values that originate from packets that Hyper-V > has sent to the guest. Ensure that invalid values cannot cause indexing > off the end of an array, or subvert an existing validation via integer > overflow. Ensure that outgoing packets do not have any leftover guest > memory that has not been zeroed out. > > Reported-by: Juan Vazquez <juv...@microsoft.com> > Signed-off-by: Andrea Parri (Microsoft) <parri.and...@gmail.com> > Cc: "David S. Miller" <da...@davemloft.net> > Cc: Jakub Kicinski <k...@kernel.org> > Cc: Alexei Starovoitov <a...@kernel.org> > Cc: Daniel Borkmann <dan...@iogearbox.net> > Cc: Andrii Nakryiko <and...@kernel.org> > Cc: Martin KaFai Lau <ka...@fb.com> > Cc: Song Liu <songliubrav...@fb.com> > Cc: Yonghong Song <y...@fb.com> > Cc: John Fastabend <john.fastab...@gmail.com> > Cc: KP Singh <kpsi...@kernel.org> > Cc: net...@vger.kernel.org > Cc: b...@vger.kernel.org > --- > Applies to 5.11-rc3 (and hyperv-next).
So this is for hyperv-next or should we take it via netdev trees? > Changes since v1 (Juan Vazquez): > - Improve validation in rndis_set_link_state() and rndis_get_ppi() > - Remove memory/skb leak in netvsc_alloc_recv_skb()
