On 2021/03/24 20:10, Mimi Zohar wrote: > On Wed, 2021-03-24 at 19:10 +0900, Tetsuo Handa wrote: >> On 2021/03/24 1:13, Mimi Zohar wrote: >>> On Wed, 2021-03-24 at 00:14 +0900, Tetsuo Handa wrote: >>>> On 2021/03/23 23:47, Mimi Zohar wrote: >>>>> Initially I also questioned making "integrity" an LSM. Perhaps it's >>>>> time to reconsider. For now, it makes sense to just fix the NULL >>>>> pointer dereferencing. >>>> >>>> Do we think calling panic() as "fix the NULL pointer dereferencing" ? >>> >>> Not supplying "integrity" as an "lsm=" option is a user error. There >>> are only two options - allow or deny the caller to proceed. If the >>> user is expecting the integrity subsystem to be properly working, >>> returning a NULL and allowing the system to boot (RFC patch version) >>> does not make sense. Better to fail early. >> >> What does the "user" mean? Those who load the vmlinux? >> Only the "root" user (so called administrators)? >> Any users including other than "root" user? >> >> If the user means those who load the vmlinux, that user is explicitly asking >> for disabling "integrity" for some reason. In that case, it is a bug if >> booting with "integrity" disabled is impossible. >> >> If the user means something other than those who load the vmlinux, >> is there a possibility that that user (especially non "root" users) is >> allowed to try to use "integrity" ? If processes other than global init >> process can try to use "integrity", wouldn't it be a DoS attack vector? >> Please explain in the descripotion why calling panic() does not cause >> DoS attack vector. > > User in this case, is anyone rebooting the system and is intentionally > changing the default values, dropping the "integrity" option on the > boot command line.
OK. Then, I expect that the system boots instead of calling panic(). That user is explicitly asking for disabling "integrity" for some reason.