Insert a nospec before the access to prevent it from ever using a index
that is subject to speculative scalar-confusion.
Signed-off-by: Luis Gerhorst <luis.gerho...@fau.de>
Acked-by: Henriette Herzog <henriette.her...@rub.de>
Cc: Maximilian Ott <o...@cs.fau.de>
Cc: Milan Stephan <milan.step...@fau.de>
---
kernel/bpf/verifier.c | 15 ++++++++-------
1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)
diff --git a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
index aee49f8da0c1..06c2f929d602 100644
--- a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
+++ b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
@@ -7638,6 +7638,8 @@ static int check_atomic(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int
insn_idx, struct bpf_i
return 0;
}
+static struct bpf_insn_aux_data *cur_aux(struct bpf_verifier_env *env);
+
/* When register 'regno' is used to read the stack (either directly or through
* a helper function) make sure that it's within stack boundary and, depending
* on the access type and privileges, that all elements of the stack are
@@ -7677,18 +7679,17 @@ static int check_stack_range_initialized(
if (tnum_is_const(reg->var_off)) {
min_off = max_off = reg->var_off.value + off;
} else {
- /* Variable offset is prohibited for unprivileged mode for
+ /* Variable offset requires a nospec for unprivileged mode for
* simplicity since it requires corresponding support in
* Spectre masking for stack ALU.
* See also retrieve_ptr_limit().
*/
if (!env->bypass_spec_v1) {
- char tn_buf[48];
-
- tnum_strn(tn_buf, sizeof(tn_buf), reg->var_off);
- verbose(env, "R%d variable offset stack access
prohibited for !root, var_off=%s\n",
- regno, tn_buf);
- return -EACCES;
+ /* Allow the access, but prevent it from using a
+ * speculative offset using a nospec before the
+ * dereference op.
+ */
+ cur_aux(env)->nospec = true;
}
/* Only initialized buffer on stack is allowed to be accessed
* with variable offset. With uninitialized buffer it's hard to
--
2.48.1
