We must terminate the speculative analysis if the just-analyzed insn had
nospec_result set. Using cur_aux() here is wrong because insn_idx might
have been incremented by do_check_insn(). Therefore, introduce and use
prev_aux().
Also change cur_aux(env)->nospec in case do_check_insn() ever manages to
increment insn_idx but still fail.
Change the warning to check the insn class (which prevents it from
triggering for ldimm64, for which nospec_result would not be
problematic) and use verifier_bug_if().
Fixes: d6f1c85f2253 ("bpf: Fall back to nospec for Spectre v1")
Reported-by: Paul Chaignon <paul.chaig...@gmail.com>
Reported-by: Eduard Zingerman <eddy...@gmail.com>
Reported-by: syzbot+dc27c5fb8388e38d2...@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/685b3c1b.050a0220.2303ee.0010....@google.com/
Link:
https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/4266fd5de04092aa4971cbef14f1b4b96961f432.ca...@gmail.com/
Signed-off-by: Luis Gerhorst <luis.gerho...@fau.de>
---
kernel/bpf/verifier.c | 20 ++++++++++++++++----
1 file changed, 16 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
diff --git a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
index 3b24055117bc..9d066e4b8248 100644
--- a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
+++ b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
@@ -11216,6 +11216,11 @@ static struct bpf_insn_aux_data *cur_aux(const struct
bpf_verifier_env *env)
return &env->insn_aux_data[env->insn_idx];
}
+static struct bpf_insn_aux_data *prev_aux(const struct bpf_verifier_env *env)
+{
+ return &env->insn_aux_data[env->prev_insn_idx];
+}
+
static bool loop_flag_is_zero(struct bpf_verifier_env *env)
{
struct bpf_reg_state *regs = cur_regs(env);
@@ -19955,11 +19960,11 @@ static int do_check(struct bpf_verifier_env *env)
/* Prevent this speculative path from ever reaching the
* insn that would have been unsafe to execute.
*/
- cur_aux(env)->nospec = true;
+ prev_aux(env)->nospec = true;
/* If it was an ADD/SUB insn, potentially remove any
* markings for alu sanitization.
*/
- cur_aux(env)->alu_state = 0;
+ prev_aux(env)->alu_state = 0;
goto process_bpf_exit;
} else if (err < 0) {
return err;
@@ -19968,7 +19973,7 @@ static int do_check(struct bpf_verifier_env *env)
}
WARN_ON_ONCE(err);
- if (state->speculative && cur_aux(env)->nospec_result) {
+ if (state->speculative && prev_aux(env)->nospec_result) {
/* If we are on a path that performed a jump-op, this
* may skip a nospec patched-in after the jump. This can
* currently never happen because nospec_result is only
@@ -19977,8 +19982,15 @@ static int do_check(struct bpf_verifier_env *env)
* never skip the following insn. Still, add a warning
* to document this in case nospec_result is used
* elsewhere in the future.
+ *
+ * All non-branch instructions have a single
+ * fall-through edge. For these, nospec_result should
+ * already work.
*/
- WARN_ON_ONCE(env->insn_idx != prev_insn_idx + 1);
+ if (verifier_bug_if(BPF_CLASS(insn->code) == BPF_JMP ||
+ BPF_CLASS(insn->code) == BPF_JMP32,
env,
+ "speculation barrier after jump
instruction may not have the desired effect"))
+ return -EFAULT;
process_bpf_exit:
mark_verifier_state_scratched(env);
err = update_branch_counts(env, env->cur_state);
--
2.49.0
