Eduard Zingerman <eddy...@gmail.com> writes:
> On Sat, 2025-06-28 at 16:50 +0200, Luis Gerhorst wrote:
>
> [...]
>
>> @@ -19955,11 +19960,11 @@ static int do_check(struct bpf_verifier_env *env)
>> /* Prevent this speculative path from ever reaching the
>> * insn that would have been unsafe to execute.
>> */
>> - cur_aux(env)->nospec = true;
>> + prev_aux(env)->nospec = true;
>
> I don't like the prev_aux() call in this position, as one needs to
> understand that after do_check_insn() call what was current became
> previous. This at-least requires a comment. Implementation with a
> temporary variable (as at the bottom of this email), imo, is less
> cognitive load.
I think I agree. I will send a v3 with the variable.
>> /* IF it was an ADD/SUB insn, potentially remove any
>> * markings for alu sanitization.
>> */
>> - cur_aux(env)->alu_state = 0;
>> + prev_aux(env)->alu_state = 0;
>> goto process_bpf_exit;
>> } else if (err < 0) {
>> return err;
>
> [...]
>
> ---
>
> diff --git a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
> index a136d9b1b25f..a923614b7104 100644
> --- a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
> +++ b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
> @@ -19953,6 +19953,7 @@ static int do_check(struct bpf_verifier_env *env)
> bool pop_log = !(env->log.level & BPF_LOG_LEVEL2);
> struct bpf_verifier_state *state = env->cur_state;
> struct bpf_insn *insns = env->prog->insnsi;
> + struct bpf_insn_aux_data *insn_aux;
> int insn_cnt = env->prog->len;
> bool do_print_state = false;
> int prev_insn_idx = -1;
> @@ -19972,6 +19973,7 @@ static int do_check(struct bpf_verifier_env *env)
> }
>
> insn = &insns[env->insn_idx];
> + insn_aux = &env->insn_aux_data[env->insn_idx];
>
> if (++env->insn_processed > BPF_COMPLEXITY_LIMIT_INSNS) {
> verbose(env,
> @@ -20048,7 +20050,7 @@ static int do_check(struct bpf_verifier_env *env)
> /* Reduce verification complexity by stopping speculative path
> * verification when a nospec is encountered.
> */
> - if (state->speculative && cur_aux(env)->nospec)
> + if (state->speculative && insn_aux->nospec)
> goto process_bpf_exit;
>
> err = do_check_insn(env, &do_print_state);
> @@ -20056,11 +20058,11 @@ static int do_check(struct bpf_verifier_env *env)
> /* Prevent this speculative path from ever reaching the
> * insn that would have been unsafe to execute.
> */
> - cur_aux(env)->nospec = true;
> + insn_aux->nospec = true;
> /* If it was an ADD/SUB insn, potentially remove any
> * markings for alu sanitization.
> */
> - cur_aux(env)->alu_state = 0;
> + insn_aux->alu_state = 0;
> goto process_bpf_exit;
> } else if (err < 0) {
> return err;
> @@ -20069,7 +20071,7 @@ static int do_check(struct bpf_verifier_env *env)
> }
> WARN_ON_ONCE(err);
>
> - if (state->speculative && cur_aux(env)->nospec_result) {
> + if (state->speculative && insn_aux->nospec_result) {
> /* If we are on a path that performed a jump-op, this
> * may skip a nospec patched-in after the jump. This can
> * currently never happen because nospec_result is only
