RFC 5961 Section 5.2 validates an incoming segment's ACK value
against the range [SND.UNA - MAX.SND.WND, SND.NXT] and states:
"All incoming segments whose ACK value doesn't satisfy the above
condition MUST be discarded and an ACK sent back."
Commit 354e4aa391ed ("tcp: RFC 5961 5.2 Blind Data Injection Attack
Mitigation") opted Linux into this mitigation and implements the
challenge ACK on the lower side (SEG.ACK < SND.UNA - MAX.SND.WND),
but the symmetric upper side (SEG.ACK > SND.NXT) still takes the
pre-RFC-5961 path and silently returns
SKB_DROP_REASON_TCP_ACK_UNSENT_DATA, even though RFC 793 Section 3.9
(now RFC 9293 Section 3.10.7.4) has always required:
"If the ACK acknowledges something not yet sent (SEG.ACK > SND.NXT)
then send an ACK, drop the segment, and return."
Complete the mitigation by sending a challenge ACK on that branch,
reusing the existing tcp_send_challenge_ack() path which already
enforces the per-socket RFC 5961 Section 7 rate limit via
__tcp_oow_rate_limited(). FLAG_NO_CHALLENGE_ACK is honoured for
symmetry with the lower-edge case.
Fixes: 354e4aa391ed ("tcp: RFC 5961 5.2 Blind Data Injection Attack Mitigation")
Signed-off-by: Jiayuan Chen <[email protected]>
---
I'm not sure if 'blamed commit' is appropriate, because I think
it's due to missing parts of the implementation, or it might be
directly targeted to net-next.
---
net/ipv4/tcp_input.c | 10 +++++++---
1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
diff --git a/net/ipv4/tcp_input.c b/net/ipv4/tcp_input.c
index 021f745747c5..c2b6f05acdfa 100644
--- a/net/ipv4/tcp_input.c
+++ b/net/ipv4/tcp_input.c
@@ -4284,11 +4284,15 @@ static int tcp_ack(struct sock *sk, const struct
sk_buff *skb, int flag)
goto old_ack;
}
- /* If the ack includes data we haven't sent yet, discard
- * this segment (RFC793 Section 3.9).
+ /* If the ack includes data we haven't sent yet, drop the
+ * segment. RFC 793 Section 3.9 and RFC 5961 Section 5.2
+ * require us to send an ACK back in that case.
*/
- if (after(ack, tp->snd_nxt))
+ if (after(ack, tp->snd_nxt)) {
+ if (!(flag & FLAG_NO_CHALLENGE_ACK))
+ tcp_send_challenge_ack(sk, false);
return -SKB_DROP_REASON_TCP_ACK_UNSENT_DATA;
+ }
if (after(ack, prior_snd_una)) {
flag |= FLAG_SND_UNA_ADVANCED;
--
2.43.0
