Hi Manuel,

On Sun, 10 May 2026 at 18:52, Manuel Ebner <[email protected]> wrote:
> add strlcat and alternatives

Thanks for your patch!

> --- a/Documentation/process/deprecated.rst
> +++ b/Documentation/process/deprecated.rst
> @@ -162,6 +162,12 @@ if a source string is not NUL-terminated. The safe 
> replacement is strscpy(),
>  though care must be given to any cases where the return value of strlcpy()
>  is used, since strscpy() will return negative errno values when it truncates.
>
> +strlcat()
> +---------
> +strlcat() must re-scan the destination string from the beginning on each
> +call (O(n^2) behavior). Alternatives are seq_buf_puts(), seq_buf_printf(),
> +snprintf() and scnprintf()

The last two not only require the caller to keep track of the offset
in the buffer, but also using "%s" when storing passed strings.

I hope we won't see mindless conversions lacking the "%s",
introducing new security issues:

    -strlcat(buf, s, size);
    +scnprintf(buf + off, size - off, s);

> +
>  %p format specifier
>  -------------------
>  Traditionally, using "%p" in format strings would lead to regular address

Gr{oetje,eeting}s,

                        Geert

-- 
Geert Uytterhoeven -- There's lots of Linux beyond ia32 -- [email protected]

In personal conversations with technical people, I call myself a hacker. But
when I'm talking to journalists I just say "programmer" or something like that.
                                -- Linus Torvalds

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