On 6/5/26 4:12 AM, Pedro Falcato wrote:
> On Thu, Jun 04, 2026 at 02:30:34PM +0900, Harry Yoo wrote:
>>
>>
>> On 6/3/26 3:31 AM, Pedro Falcato wrote:
>>> SKB data area allocations (as done from alloc_skb()) use kmalloc().
>>> These allocations can be variably sized and their contents can be more
>>> or less controlled from userspace, which makes them useful for attackers
>>> that want to overwrite a use-after-free'd object from the same kmalloc slab
>>> (which often just requires the sizes to roughly match into the same kmalloc
>>> bucket). [0] is an easy example of an exploit that uses netlink skb
>>> allocation to target another similarly-sized accidentally freed object.
>>>
>>> While other mitigations like CONFIG_RANDOM_KMALLOC_CACHES exist, these are
>>> probabilistic. Use the existing kmem buckets API to further isolate these
>>> allocations in a guaranteed fashion, when CONFIG_SLAB_BUCKETS=y.
>>>
>>> Link: 
>>> https://github.com/google/security-research/blob/master/pocs/linux/kernelctf/CVE-2023-4207_lts_cos_mitigation_2/docs/exploit.md
>>>  [0]
>>> Signed-off-by: Pedro Falcato <[email protected]>
>>> ---
>>>  net/core/skbuff.c | 5 ++++-
>>>  1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
>>>
>>> diff --git a/net/core/skbuff.c b/net/core/skbuff.c
>>> index 44a7f8401468..1f6c6b531ece 100644
>>> --- a/net/core/skbuff.c
>>> +++ b/net/core/skbuff.c
>>> @@ -594,6 +594,8 @@ static void *kmalloc_pfmemalloc(size_t obj_size, gfp_t 
>>> flags, int node)
>>>     return kmalloc_node_track_caller(obj_size, flags, node);
>>>  }
>>>  
>>> +static kmem_buckets *skb_data_buckets __ro_after_init;
>>> +
>>>  /*
>>>   * kmalloc_reserve is a wrapper around kmalloc_node_track_caller that tells
>>>   * the caller if emergency pfmemalloc reserves are being used. If it is and
>>> @@ -632,7 +634,7 @@ static void *kmalloc_reserve(unsigned int *size, gfp_t 
>>> flags, int node,
>>>      * Try a regular allocation, when that fails and we're not entitled
>>>      * to the reserves, fail.
>>>      */
>>> -   obj = kmalloc_node_track_caller(obj_size,
>>> +   obj = kmem_buckets_alloc_node_track_caller(skb_data_buckets, obj_size,
>>>                                     flags | __GFP_NOMEMALLOC | __GFP_NOWARN,
>>>                                     node);
>>>     if (likely(obj))
>>
>> What about kmalloc_pfmemalloc()?
> 
> Good point, that looks free as well.
> 
> Sidenote: isolating kmem_cache_alloc for possibly-aliasing caches could also
> be useful. skb allocation has net_hotdata.skb_small_head_cache. It doesn't 
> merge
> with anything for $raisins (odd size, plus I don't think usercopy caches are
> getting merged?) but it feels too... accidental?

Right, we never merge caches with useroffset/usersize.

Hmm...

/* SKB_SMALL_HEAD_CACHE_SIZE is the size used for the skbuff_small_head
 * kmem_cache. The non-power-of-2 padding is kept for historical reasons and
 * to avoid potential collisions with generic kmalloc bucket sizes.
 */
#define SKB_SMALL_HEAD_CACHE_SIZE                                       \
        (is_power_of_2(SKB_SMALL_HEAD_SIZE) ?                   \
                (SKB_SMALL_HEAD_SIZE + L1_CACHE_BYTES) :        \
                SKB_SMALL_HEAD_SIZE)


What are "historical reasons" other than avoiding collisions with
kmalloc caches?

> Maybe passing something like SLAB_NO_MERGE and making the size
> standard-looking would be nice. I have a size of 704 bytes per object, and
> this probably causes some weird wastage for each slab.

Yes, unless the "historical reasons" do not make it infeasible to do that.

And I wonder if net/core/skbuff.c intends to always prevent merging, or
only with hardening configs like SLAB_BUCKETS.

-- 
Cheers,
Harry / Hyeonggon

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