On Sun, Jul 08, 2012 at 02:06:46AM +0100, Ben Hutchings wrote: > > Surely the number of random bytes being added is i * sizeof(long), not > sizeof(u.hwrand)? >
Meh; Kees Cook has made the same observation. Basically, in the unlikely case where RDRAND fails, we'll end up mixing in stack garbage. It's not a security vulnerability, since the contents of the entropy pool never gets exposed. In fact, one could argue that mixing in some unknown garbage from the kernel stack might actually help a little; but it can't hurt. - Ted -- To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-kernel" in the body of a message to majord...@vger.kernel.org More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html Please read the FAQ at http://www.tux.org/lkml/