Implement RSA public key cryptography [PKCS#1 / RFC3447].  At this time, only
the signature verification algorithm is supported.  This uses the asymmetric
public key subtype to hold its key data.

Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowe...@redhat.com>
---

 security/keys/crypto/Kconfig      |    7 +
 security/keys/crypto/Makefile     |    1 
 security/keys/crypto/crypto_rsa.c |  267 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 security/keys/crypto/public_key.h |    2 
 4 files changed, 277 insertions(+)
 create mode 100644 security/keys/crypto/crypto_rsa.c


diff --git a/security/keys/crypto/Kconfig b/security/keys/crypto/Kconfig
index 5f2b8ac..4e3777e 100644
--- a/security/keys/crypto/Kconfig
+++ b/security/keys/crypto/Kconfig
@@ -15,3 +15,10 @@ config CRYPTO_KEY_PUBLIC_KEY_SUBTYPE
          If signature generation and/or verification are to be used,
          appropriate hash algorithms (such as SHA-1) must be available.
          ENOPKG will be reported if the requisite algorithm is unavailable.
+
+config CRYPTO_KEY_PKEY_ALGO_RSA
+       tristate "RSA public-key algorithm"
+       depends on CRYPTO_KEY_PUBLIC_KEY_SUBTYPE
+       select MPILIB_EXTRA
+       help
+         This option enables support for the RSA algorithm (PKCS#1, RFC3447).
diff --git a/security/keys/crypto/Makefile b/security/keys/crypto/Makefile
index 6384306..b6b1a5a 100644
--- a/security/keys/crypto/Makefile
+++ b/security/keys/crypto/Makefile
@@ -6,3 +6,4 @@ obj-$(CONFIG_CRYPTO_KEY_TYPE) += crypto_keys.o
 crypto_keys-y := crypto_type.o crypto_verify.o
 
 obj-$(CONFIG_CRYPTO_KEY_PUBLIC_KEY_SUBTYPE) += public_key.o
+obj-$(CONFIG_CRYPTO_KEY_PKEY_ALGO_RSA) += crypto_rsa.o
diff --git a/security/keys/crypto/crypto_rsa.c 
b/security/keys/crypto/crypto_rsa.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..6e95e60
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/keys/crypto/crypto_rsa.c
@@ -0,0 +1,267 @@
+/* RSA asymmetric public-key algorithm [RFC3447]
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 2011 Red Hat, Inc. All Rights Reserved.
+ * Written by David Howells (dhowe...@redhat.com)
+ *
+ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
+ * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public Licence
+ * as published by the Free Software Foundation; either version
+ * 2 of the Licence, or (at your option) any later version.
+ */
+
+#define pr_fmt(fmt) "RSA: "fmt
+#include <linux/module.h>
+#include <linux/kernel.h>
+#include "public_key.h"
+
+MODULE_LICENSE("GPL");
+
+#define kenter(FMT, ...) \
+       pr_devel("==> %s("FMT")\n", __func__, ##__VA_ARGS__)
+#define kleave(FMT, ...) \
+       pr_devel("<== %s()"FMT"\n", __func__, ##__VA_ARGS__)
+
+/*
+ * Hash algorithm OIDs plus ASN.1 DER wrappings [RFC4880 sec 5.2.2].
+ */
+static const u8 RSA_digest_info_MD5[] = {
+       0x30, 0x20, 0x30, 0x0C, 0x06, 0x08,
+       0x2A, 0x86, 0x48, 0x86, 0xF7, 0x0D, 0x02, 0x05, /* OID */
+       0x05, 0x00, 0x04, 0x10
+};
+
+static const u8 RSA_digest_info_SHA1[] = {
+       0x30, 0x21, 0x30, 0x09, 0x06, 0x05,
+       0x2B, 0x0E, 0x03, 0x02, 0x1A,
+       0x05, 0x00, 0x04, 0x14
+};
+
+static const u8 RSA_digest_info_RIPE_MD_160[] = {
+       0x30, 0x21, 0x30, 0x09, 0x06, 0x05,
+       0x2B, 0x24, 0x03, 0x02, 0x01,
+       0x05, 0x00, 0x04, 0x14
+};
+
+static const u8 RSA_digest_info_SHA224[] = {
+       0x30, 0x2d, 0x30, 0x0d, 0x06, 0x09,
+       0x60, 0x86, 0x48, 0x01, 0x65, 0x03, 0x04, 0x02, 0x04,
+       0x05, 0x00, 0x04, 0x1C
+};
+
+static const u8 RSA_digest_info_SHA256[] = {
+       0x30, 0x31, 0x30, 0x0d, 0x06, 0x09,
+       0x60, 0x86, 0x48, 0x01, 0x65, 0x03, 0x04, 0x02, 0x01,
+       0x05, 0x00, 0x04, 0x20
+};
+
+static const u8 RSA_digest_info_SHA384[] = {
+       0x30, 0x41, 0x30, 0x0d, 0x06, 0x09,
+       0x60, 0x86, 0x48, 0x01, 0x65, 0x03, 0x04, 0x02, 0x02,
+       0x05, 0x00, 0x04, 0x30
+};
+
+static const u8 RSA_digest_info_SHA512[] = {
+       0x30, 0x51, 0x30, 0x0d, 0x06, 0x09,
+       0x60, 0x86, 0x48, 0x01, 0x65, 0x03, 0x04, 0x02, 0x03,
+       0x05, 0x00, 0x04, 0x40
+};
+
+static const struct {
+       const u8 *data;
+       size_t size;
+} RSA_ASN1_templates[PKEY_HASH__LAST] = {
+#define _(X) { RSA_digest_info_##X, sizeof(RSA_digest_info_##X) }
+       [PKEY_HASH_MD5]         = _(MD5),
+       [PKEY_HASH_SHA1]        = _(SHA1),
+       [PKEY_HASH_RIPE_MD_160] = _(RIPE_MD_160),
+       [PKEY_HASH_SHA256]      = _(SHA256),
+       [PKEY_HASH_SHA384]      = _(SHA384),
+       [PKEY_HASH_SHA512]      = _(SHA512),
+       [PKEY_HASH_SHA224]      = _(SHA224),
+#undef _
+};
+
+/*
+ * RSAVP1() function [RFC3447 sec 5.2.2]
+ */
+static int RSAVP1(const struct public_key *key, MPI s, MPI *_m)
+{
+       MPI m;
+       int ret;
+
+       /* (1) Validate 0 <= s < n */
+       if (mpi_cmp_ui(s, 0) < 0) {
+               kleave(" = -EBADMSG [s < 0]");
+               return -EBADMSG;
+       }
+       if (mpi_cmp(s, key->rsa.n) >= 0) {
+               kleave(" = -EBADMSG [s >= n]");
+               return -EBADMSG;
+       }
+
+       m = mpi_alloc(0);
+       if (!m)
+               return -ENOMEM;
+
+       /* (2) m = s^e mod n */
+       ret = mpi_powm(m, s, key->rsa.e, key->rsa.n);
+       if (ret < 0) {
+               mpi_free(m);
+               return ret;
+       }
+
+       *_m = m;
+       return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Integer to Octet String conversion [RFC3447 sec 4.1]
+ */
+static int RSA_I2OSP(MPI x, size_t xLen, u8 **_X)
+{
+       unsigned X_size, x_size;
+       int X_sign;
+       u8 *X;
+
+       /* Make sure the string is the right length.  The number should begin
+        * with { 0x00, 0x01, ... } so we have to account for 15 leading zero
+        * bits not being reported by MPI.
+        */
+       x_size = mpi_get_nbits(x);
+       pr_devel("size(x)=%u xLen*8=%zu\n", x_size, xLen * 8);
+       if (x_size != xLen * 8 - 15)
+               return -ERANGE;
+
+       X = mpi_get_buffer(x, &X_size, &X_sign);
+       if (!X)
+               return -ENOMEM;
+       if (X_sign < 0) {
+               kfree(X);
+               return -EBADMSG;
+       }
+       if (X_size != xLen - 1) {
+               kfree(X);
+               return -EBADMSG;
+       }
+
+       *_X = X;
+       return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Perform the RSA signature verification.
+ * @H: Value of hash of data and metadata
+ * @EM: The computed signature value
+ * @k: The size of EM (EM[0] is an invalid location but should hold 0x00)
+ * @hash_size: The size of H
+ * @asn1_template: The DigestInfo ASN.1 template
+ * @asn1_size: Size of asm1_template[]
+ */
+static int RSA_verify(const u8 *H, const u8 *EM, size_t k, size_t hash_size,
+                     const u8 *asn1_template, size_t asn1_size)
+{
+       unsigned PS_end, T_offset, i;
+
+       kenter(",,%zu,%zu,%zu", k, hash_size, asn1_size);
+
+       if (k < 2 + 1 + asn1_size + hash_size)
+               return -EBADMSG;
+
+       /* Decode the EMSA-PKCS1-v1_5 */
+       if (EM[1] != 0x01) {
+               kleave(" = -EBADMSG [EM[1] == %02u]", EM[1]);
+               return -EBADMSG;
+       }
+
+       T_offset = k - (asn1_size + hash_size);
+       PS_end = T_offset - 1;
+       if (EM[PS_end] != 0x00) {
+               kleave(" = -EBADMSG [EM[T-1] == %02u]", EM[PS_end]);
+               return -EBADMSG;
+       }
+
+       for (i = 2; i < PS_end; i++) {
+               if (EM[i] != 0xff) {
+                       kleave(" = -EBADMSG [EM[PS%x] == %02u]", i - 2, EM[i]);
+                       return -EBADMSG;
+               }
+       }
+
+       if (memcmp(asn1_template, EM + T_offset, asn1_size) != 0) {
+               kleave(" = -EBADMSG [EM[T] ASN.1 mismatch]");
+               return -EBADMSG;
+       }
+
+       if (memcmp(H, EM + T_offset + asn1_size, hash_size) != 0) {
+               kleave(" = -EKEYREJECTED [EM[T] hash mismatch]");
+               return -EKEYREJECTED;
+       }
+
+       kleave(" = 0");
+       return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Perform the verification step [RFC3447 sec 8.2.2].
+ */
+static int RSA_verify_signature(const struct public_key *key,
+                               const struct public_key_signature *sig)
+{
+       size_t tsize;
+       int ret;
+
+       /* Variables as per RFC3447 sec 8.2.2 */
+       const u8 *H = sig->digest;
+       u8 *EM = NULL;
+       MPI m = NULL;
+       size_t k;
+
+       kenter("");
+
+       if (!RSA_ASN1_templates[sig->pkey_hash_algo].data)
+               return -ENOTSUPP;
+
+       /* (1) Check the signature size against the public key modulus size */
+       k = (mpi_get_nbits(key->rsa.n) + 7) / 8;
+
+       tsize = (mpi_get_nbits(sig->rsa.s) + 7) / 8;
+       pr_devel("step 1: k=%zu size(S)=%zu\n", k, tsize);
+       if (tsize != k) {
+               ret = -EBADMSG;
+               goto error;
+       }
+
+       /* (2b) Apply the RSAVP1 verification primitive to the public key */
+       ret = RSAVP1(key, sig->rsa.s, &m);
+       if (ret < 0)
+               goto error;
+
+       /* (2c) Convert the message representative (m) to an encoded message
+        *      (EM) of length k octets.
+        *
+        *      NOTE!  The leading zero byte is suppressed by MPI, so we pass a
+        *      pointer to the _preceding_ byte to RSA_verify()!
+        */
+       ret = RSA_I2OSP(m, k, &EM);
+       if (ret < 0)
+               goto error;
+
+       ret = RSA_verify(H, EM - 1, k, sig->digest_size,
+                        RSA_ASN1_templates[sig->pkey_hash_algo].data,
+                        RSA_ASN1_templates[sig->pkey_hash_algo].size);
+
+error:
+       kfree(EM);
+       mpi_free(m);
+       kleave(" = %d", ret);
+       return ret;
+}
+
+const struct public_key_algorithm RSA_public_key_algorithm = {
+       .name           = "RSA",
+       .n_pub_mpi      = 2,
+       .n_sec_mpi      = 3,
+       .n_sig_mpi      = 1,
+       .verify         = RSA_verify_signature,
+};
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(RSA_public_key_algorithm);
diff --git a/security/keys/crypto/public_key.h 
b/security/keys/crypto/public_key.h
index 228090d..947817b 100644
--- a/security/keys/crypto/public_key.h
+++ b/security/keys/crypto/public_key.h
@@ -61,6 +61,8 @@ struct public_key_algorithm {
                      const struct public_key_signature *sig);
 };
 
+extern const struct public_key_algorithm RSA_public_key_algorithm;
+
 /*
  * Asymmetric public key data
  */

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