On Wed, Apr 24, 2013 at 02:30:53PM -0700, Linus Torvalds wrote: > On Wed, Apr 24, 2013 at 1:35 PM, Kees Cook <[email protected]> wrote: > > > > That said, I much prefer doing the privilege test at read time since > > that means passing a file descriptor to another process doesn't mean > > the new process can just continue reading. > > Bullshit. > > That's exactly the wrong kind of thinking. If you had privileges to > open something, and you pass it off, it's *your* choice. > > In contrast, the "anybody can open, but some people can read/write" > has several times resulted in real security issues. Notably the whole > "open something, then fool a suid program to write its error message > to it". > > This whole discussion has been f*cking moronic. The "security" > arguments have been utter shite with clearly no thinking behind it, > the feature is total crap (people need dmesg to do basic bug > reporting), and I'm seriously considering just getting rid of this > idiotic dmesg_restrict thing entirely. Your comment is the very > epitome of bad security thinking.
I was just trying to get the 3 interfaces all honoring the same thing. Let this be a lesson to you all: I am the harbinger of security features removal. If you see me sending patches, run away or I might accidentally cross the streams and make your feature undergo total protonic reversal. Now if only I could use this power for good, like somehow getting Linus to remove capabilities entirely... josh -- To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-kernel" in the body of a message to [email protected] More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html Please read the FAQ at http://www.tux.org/lkml/
