On 7/30/2013 12:05 PM, Kees Cook wrote:
I'd like to propose the topic of catching up to x86 exploit
mitigations and security features, and potentially identifying
ARM-unique mitigations/features that could be implemented. Several
years ago, with Nicolas Pitre doing all the real work, I coordinated
getting ARM caught up on things like userspace ASLR and
stack-protector. Recently, based on work by Will Drewry, I ported
seccomp-bpf to ARM. I'd like to continue this kind of thing, and I
think it's overdue to examine this area again. A lot of work has
already been done by grsecurity in this area (see
http://forums.grsecurity.net/viewtopic.php?f=7&t=3292), so it would be
good to start there.
While it may expose my current ignorance of low level ARM mechanics,
I'd like to examine and discuss:
- RO and W^X kernel page table protections (similar to x86's
DEBUG_RODATA and DEBUG_SET_MODULE_RONX; it's not clear to me how much
LPAE and PXN is already handling this, if at all)
We've had support for RO/NX on our tree for a while. I'm interested in
attending the summit to share what we've done and to see how much of it
could be mainlined.
- something like x86's SMEP and SMAP (to deter kernel exploitation
from userspace)
- vector table protections (needs to be protected like the x86_64
vsyscall table, RO, etc)
- kernel ASLR (I'm close to having this upstreamable for x86)
- fuzzing (is anyone running trinity or similar on the ARM tree?)
- any other things ... ?
I'd add getting something similar to CONFIG_ARCH_RANDOM for ARM. It
wouldn't be a direct drop in to x86 but we have some usecases for a
framework to hook into the arch_get_random_{int,long}. This is mostly
useful for cases where we need random numbers before the kernel's
entropy source is completely initialized. The last point is a separate
discussion all together.
Thanks,
-Kees
Thanks,
Laura
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