On 08/14/2013 10:42 AM, Miklos Szeredi wrote: > There's a simple and effective way to prevent unlink(2) and rename(2) > from operating on any file or directory by simply mounting something > on it. In any mount instance in any namespace. > > Was this considered in the unprivileged mount design? > > The solution is also theoretically simple: mounts in unpriv namespaces > are marked "volatile" and are dissolved on an unlink type operation.
I'd actually prefer the reverse: unprivileged mounts don't prevent unlink and rename. If the dentry goes away, then the mount could still exist, sans underlying file. (This is already supported on network filesystems.) --Andy -- To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-kernel" in the body of a message to majord...@vger.kernel.org More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html Please read the FAQ at http://www.tux.org/lkml/
