Pinging on this too. Any feedback?

-Kees

On Sat, Sep 21, 2013 at 03:59:59PM -0700, Kees Cook wrote:
> On systems where certain filesystem contents cannot be entirely trusted,
> it is beneficial to block mounts on symlinks. This makes sure that
> malicious filesystem contents cannot trigger the over-mounting of trusted
> filesystems. (For example, a bind-mounted subdirectory of /var cannot be
> redirected to mount on /etc via a symlink: a daemon cannot elevate privs
> to uid-0.)
> 
> Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keesc...@chromium.org>
> ---
>  security/Kconfig                   |    6 ++++
>  security/Makefile                  |    2 ++
>  security/mntrestrict/Kconfig       |   13 ++++++++
>  security/mntrestrict/Makefile      |    1 +
>  security/mntrestrict/mntrestrict.c |   63 
> ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
>  5 files changed, 85 insertions(+)
>  create mode 100644 security/mntrestrict/Kconfig
>  create mode 100644 security/mntrestrict/Makefile
>  create mode 100644 security/mntrestrict/mntrestrict.c
> 
> diff --git a/security/Kconfig b/security/Kconfig
> index e9c6ac7..84d41f4 100644
> --- a/security/Kconfig
> +++ b/security/Kconfig
> @@ -121,6 +121,7 @@ source security/selinux/Kconfig
>  source security/smack/Kconfig
>  source security/tomoyo/Kconfig
>  source security/apparmor/Kconfig
> +source security/mntrestrict/Kconfig
>  source security/yama/Kconfig
>  
>  source security/integrity/Kconfig
> @@ -131,6 +132,7 @@ choice
>       default DEFAULT_SECURITY_SMACK if SECURITY_SMACK
>       default DEFAULT_SECURITY_TOMOYO if SECURITY_TOMOYO
>       default DEFAULT_SECURITY_APPARMOR if SECURITY_APPARMOR
> +     default DEFAULT_SECURITY_MNTRESTRICT if SECURITY_MNTRESTRICT
>       default DEFAULT_SECURITY_YAMA if SECURITY_YAMA
>       default DEFAULT_SECURITY_DAC
>  
> @@ -150,6 +152,9 @@ choice
>       config DEFAULT_SECURITY_APPARMOR
>               bool "AppArmor" if SECURITY_APPARMOR=y
>  
> +     config DEFAULT_SECURITY_MNTRESTRICT
> +             bool "MntRestrict" if SECURITY_MNTRESTRICT=y
> +
>       config DEFAULT_SECURITY_YAMA
>               bool "Yama" if SECURITY_YAMA=y
>  
> @@ -164,6 +169,7 @@ config DEFAULT_SECURITY
>       default "smack" if DEFAULT_SECURITY_SMACK
>       default "tomoyo" if DEFAULT_SECURITY_TOMOYO
>       default "apparmor" if DEFAULT_SECURITY_APPARMOR
> +     default "mntrestrict" if DEFAULT_SECURITY_MNTRESTRICT
>       default "yama" if DEFAULT_SECURITY_YAMA
>       default "" if DEFAULT_SECURITY_DAC
>  
> diff --git a/security/Makefile b/security/Makefile
> index c26c81e..33f38b1 100644
> --- a/security/Makefile
> +++ b/security/Makefile
> @@ -7,6 +7,7 @@ subdir-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX)     += selinux
>  subdir-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_SMACK)              += smack
>  subdir-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_TOMOYO)        += tomoyo
>  subdir-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_APPARMOR)   += apparmor
> +subdir-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_MNTRESTRICT)        += mntrestrict
>  subdir-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_YAMA)               += yama
>  
>  # always enable default capabilities
> @@ -22,6 +23,7 @@ obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_SMACK)                += 
> smack/built-in.o
>  obj-$(CONFIG_AUDIT)                  += lsm_audit.o
>  obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_TOMOYO)                += tomoyo/built-in.o
>  obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_APPARMOR)              += apparmor/built-in.o
> +obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_MNTRESTRICT)   += mntrestrict/built-in.o
>  obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_YAMA)          += yama/built-in.o
>  obj-$(CONFIG_CGROUP_DEVICE)          += device_cgroup.o
>  
> diff --git a/security/mntrestrict/Kconfig b/security/mntrestrict/Kconfig
> new file mode 100644
> index 0000000..9a7310d
> --- /dev/null
> +++ b/security/mntrestrict/Kconfig
> @@ -0,0 +1,13 @@
> +config SECURITY_MNTRESTRICT
> +     bool "Restrict mounts on symlinks system-wide"
> +     depends on SECURITY
> +     help
> +       Enforces that rule that symlinks cannot be used as mount
> +       destinations across the entire system. This is to make sure
> +       it is never possible to redirect locations using symlinks
> +       when the process doing the mount may not be able to strictly
> +       trust the contents of the filesystem where it is happening. For
> +       example, making sure a bind mounted subdirectory in /var is not
> +       redirected into /etc: stops a daemon without full privileges
> +       from elevating to uid-0 by tricking the system init filesystem
> +       mounting infrastructure.
> diff --git a/security/mntrestrict/Makefile b/security/mntrestrict/Makefile
> new file mode 100644
> index 0000000..340be1f
> --- /dev/null
> +++ b/security/mntrestrict/Makefile
> @@ -0,0 +1 @@
> +obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_MNTRESTRICT) += mntrestrict.o
> diff --git a/security/mntrestrict/mntrestrict.c 
> b/security/mntrestrict/mntrestrict.c
> new file mode 100644
> index 0000000..257ae69
> --- /dev/null
> +++ b/security/mntrestrict/mntrestrict.c
> @@ -0,0 +1,63 @@
> +/*
> + * Mount Restriction Security Module
> + *
> + * Copyright 2011-2013 Google Inc.
> + *
> + * Authors:
> + *      Stephan Uphoff  <u...@google.com>
> + *      Kees Cook       <keesc...@chromium.org>
> + *
> + * This software is licensed under the terms of the GNU General Public
> + * License version 2, as published by the Free Software Foundation, and
> + * may be copied, distributed, and modified under those terms.
> + *
> + * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
> + * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
> + * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the
> + * GNU General Public License for more details.
> + */
> +
> +#define pr_fmt(fmt) "MntRestrict LSM: " fmt
> +
> +#include <linux/module.h>
> +#include <linux/security.h>
> +#include <linux/sched.h>
> +#include <linux/fs.h>
> +#include <linux/fs_struct.h>
> +#include <linux/mount.h>
> +#include <linux/path.h>
> +#include <linux/root_dev.h>
> +
> +static int mntrestrict_sb_mount(const char *dev_name, struct path *path,
> +                             const char *type, unsigned long flags,
> +                             void *data)
> +{
> +     int error = current->total_link_count ? -ELOOP : 0;
> +
> +     if (error) {
> +             pr_notice("Mount path with symlinks prohibited - pid=%d\n",
> +                     task_pid_nr(current));
> +     }
> +
> +     return error;
> +}
> +
> +static struct security_operations mntrestrict_ops = {
> +     .name   = "mntrestrict",
> +     .sb_mount = mntrestrict_sb_mount,
> +};
> +
> +static int __init mntrestrict_init(void)
> +{
> +     int error;
> +
> +     error = register_security(&mntrestrict_ops);
> +
> +     if (error)
> +             panic("Could not register MntRestrict security module");
> +
> +     pr_info("symlink destinations will be blocked.\n");
> +
> +     return error;
> +}
> +security_initcall(mntrestrict_init);
> -- 
> 1.7.9.5
> 
> 
> -- 
> Kees Cook
> Chrome OS Security
> --
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-- 
Kees Cook                                            @outflux.net
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