On Fri, Oct 4, 2013 at 2:38 PM, Richard Weinberger
<richard.weinber...@gmail.com> wrote:
>>>> > ...
>>>> > [1] yes, yes, I know - the mere mention of security should've prevented
>>>> > such
>>>> > arrogant requests. It's an imperfect universe.
>>>>
>>>> I want to attempt to disassemble what you've communicating here:
>>>>
>>>> a) I'm not thinking.
>>>> b) Requesting that someone think when they mention security is arrogant.
>>>
>>> Not really.
>>>
>>> It's just that all too often completely pointless changes are touted
>>> as security hardening. With replies along the lines of "it doesn't
>>> really buy you anything" countered with indignant "but what if
>>> <impossible situation>" and/or references to "defense in depth" (used
>>> as a magical incantation), etc.
>>>
>>> You've posted a provably pointless patch. Happens to all of us. And in
>>> reply to "it's pointless for the following reasons" (with moderate
>>> level of sarcasm) you responded pretty much with "but what if allocator
>>> changes? It's more robust that way". OK, but if you go for that
>>> kind of arguments (and they can be valid), you'd better be correct.
>>> You were not, and for very obvious reasons. Let me repeat, this
>>> time with sarcasm level down to zero:
>>>
>>> Let n be some integer between 32 and 4096 and N be equal to n rounded up
>>> to word size. If kmalloc(n) returns a pointer such that fetch from
>>> (char *)p[N - 1] triggers an exception, we have a badly broken kernel.
>>> It can happen only if there is a page boundary between p[n-1] and p[N-1],
>>> which means that p is not word-aligned.
>>> Consider the following code:
>>> struct foo {
>>> unsigned long n;
>>> char a[];
>>> } *p = kmalloc(offsetof(struct foo, a) + 33);
>>> if (p)
>>> p->n = 1;
>>> and note that it will result in an exception on any architecture that
>>> prohibits
>>> unaligned accesses in the kernel. Even on architectures where those are
>>> allowed, misaligned structures mean serious correctness problems (atomicity
>>> of
>>> stores, etc.)
>>>
>>> In other words, kmalloc() (or, indeed, userland malloc()) demonstrating
>>> such behaviour would need immediate fixing. The only exception I can
>>> think of is something with byte granularity of memory protection; in such
>>> case we can have that without unaligned return values returned by allocator.
>>> Which would require a lot of changes in mm/*, at the very least, and
>>> probably
>>> would violate a lot of assumptions elsewhere in the kernel (starting with
>>> sizeof(void *) == sizeof(unsigned long)).
>>>
>>>> What the patch does help with, though, is dynamic analysis tools that
>>>> are looking for out-of-bound reads, which this clearly is. It should
>>>> be considered a violation of the API to attempt to access a range
>>>> beyond what was requested for the allocation. Fixing this means lots
>>>> of noise vanishes from such analysis of the allocation API, letting
>>>> other tools besides just KASAN do work to find other more serious
>>>> problems in heap usage.
>>>>
>>>> Does fixing this to help dynamic analysis tools somehow make the
>>>> kernel worse? I think that fixing this makes it easier to find further
>>>> bugs that might be much more serious.
>>>
>>> Possibly true. But then I'd suggest wrapping that into a different ifdef;
>>> grep for ifdef __CHECKER__, with comment along the lines of "to simplify
>>> analysis of potential out-of-bounds accesses".
>>
>>
>> Hi,
>>
>> Any single reason to not just fix the code?
>>
>> With this patch:
>> + sticks with "do not access beyond request size", which is a good
>> thing all others equal
>> + makes static and dynamic verification tools happy
>> - ???
>
> - It does not fix anything, it only shuts up the checker
> - It adds another ifdef where it is not obvious why it's needed
>
> Therefore it makes more sense to add a ifdef __CHECKER__ such that
> everyone immediately knows that the issue is only false positive.
OK, is it explicitly documented somewhere that it's legal to access
memory blocks beyond requested size? Is it a deliberate decision made
by community? Or just an ad-hoc argument based on details of current
implementation?
If it's the former then we will need to teach the tools to understand
it. But IMVHO it's a very unfortunate decision, because it will hide
real harmful bugs. And this is the only place where I observed such
out-of-bounds access after months of stress testing, so we are not
talking about hundreds and thousands of precedents. We are talking
about this particular case vs ability of tools to catch harmful
off-by-one accesses to variable-length strings and buffers.
What are the exact rules for memory accesses? Is there anything else?
Looking at the current allocator implementation I can infer lots of
other cases that are "safe"; e.g. in some single-threaded scenarios
it's perfectly fine to access memory blocks after kfree.
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