On 10/08/2013 10:22 PM, Ryan Mallon wrote:
> Ah, I misread it. It does however check when kptr_restrict != 0, not
> just when kptr_restrict is 1. I've left the in_irq test as-is, but used
> a switch as suggested. I don't really care either way, I think the
> original check is quite readable. Anyway, updated patch below:
>
> ~Ryan
This seems mostly fine to me, except the "proccess" -> "process" nit Joe
already identified.
I think I also prefer Joe's style of having an explicit "case 2" in the
switch statement in addition to the default case for clarity.
Also, isn't the default value of kptr_restrict 0 now, unless I'm missing
something? If I recall it was 1 when originally written, and then
changed to 0 at some point. Could the documentation be updated to
reflect that?
-Dan
> ---
>
> diff --git a/Documentation/sysctl/kernel.txt b/Documentation/sysctl/kernel.txt
> index 9d4c1d1..eac53d5 100644
> --- a/Documentation/sysctl/kernel.txt
> +++ b/Documentation/sysctl/kernel.txt
> @@ -290,13 +290,15 @@ Default value is "/sbin/hotplug".
> kptr_restrict:
>
> This toggle indicates whether restrictions are placed on
> -exposing kernel addresses via /proc and other interfaces. When
> -kptr_restrict is set to (0), there are no restrictions. When
> -kptr_restrict is set to (1), the default, kernel pointers
> +exposing kernel addresses via /proc and other interfaces.
> +
> +When kptr_restrict is set to (0), there are no restrictions.
> +When kptr_restrict is set to (1), the default, kernel pointers
> printed using the %pK format specifier will be replaced with 0's
> -unless the user has CAP_SYSLOG. When kptr_restrict is set to
> -(2), kernel pointers printed using %pK will be replaced with 0's
> -regardless of privileges.
> +unless the user has CAP_SYSLOG and effective user and group ids
> +are equal to the real ids.
> +When kptr_restrict is set to (2), kernel pointers printed using
> +%pK will be replaced with 0's regardless of privileges.
>
> ==============================================================
>
> diff --git a/lib/vsprintf.c b/lib/vsprintf.c
> index 26559bd..6dd8c5d 100644
> --- a/lib/vsprintf.c
> +++ b/lib/vsprintf.c
> @@ -27,6 +27,7 @@
> #include <linux/uaccess.h>
> #include <linux/ioport.h>
> #include <linux/dcache.h>
> +#include <linux/cred.h>
> #include <net/addrconf.h>
>
> #include <asm/page.h> /* for PAGE_SIZE */
> @@ -1312,11 +1313,36 @@ char *pointer(const char *fmt, char *buf, char *end,
> void *ptr,
> spec.field_width = default_width;
> return string(buf, end, "pK-error", spec);
> }
> - if (!((kptr_restrict == 0) ||
> - (kptr_restrict == 1 &&
> - has_capability_noaudit(current, CAP_SYSLOG))))
> +
> + switch (kptr_restrict) {
> + case 0:
> + /* Always print %pK values */
> + break;
> + case 1: {
> + /*
> + * Only print the real pointer value if the current
> + * proccess has CAP_SYSLOG and is running with the
> + * same credentials it started with. This is because
> + * access to files is checked at open() time, but %pK
> + * checks permission at read() time. We don't want to
> + * leak pointer values if a binary opens a file using
> + * %pK and then elevates privileges before reading it.
> + */
> + const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
> +
> + if (!has_capability_noaudit(current, CAP_SYSLOG) ||
> + !uid_eq(cred->euid, cred->uid) ||
> + !gid_eq(cred->egid, cred->gid))
> + ptr = NULL;
> + break;
> + }
> + default:
> + /* Always print 0's for %pK */
> ptr = NULL;
> + break;
> + }
> break;
> +
> case 'N':
> switch (fmt[1]) {
> case 'F':
>
>
>
>
>
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