* Andrea Arcangeli <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > This is the seccomp patch ported to 2.6.11-rc1-bk8, that I need for > Cpushare (until trusted computing will hit the hardware market). > [...]
why do you need any kernel code for this? This seems to be a limited ptrace implementation: restricting untrusted userspace code to only be able to exec read/write/sigreturn. So this patch, unless i'm missing something, duplicates in essence what ptrace can do already here and today, on any Linux box, on any CPU. You can implement your client based on ptrace alone, just like UML does it - and UML has much more complex needs than secure isolation. ptrace ought to be perfectly fine for this, it traps every attempt to do something privileged. [ptrace had its share of security problems but _not_ many (if any at all) security problems that allowed a ptrace client to _break out_ of a ptrace jail.] Ingo - To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-kernel" in the body of a message to [EMAIL PROTECTED] More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html Please read the FAQ at http://www.tux.org/lkml/