On Thu, Jan 27, 2005 at 09:13:04PM +0100, Arjan van de Ven wrote: > On Thu, 2005-01-27 at 20:34 +0100, Julien TINNES wrote: > > > > > > Yeah, if it came from PaX the randomization would actually be useful. > > > Sorry, I've just woken up and already explained in another post. > > > > > > > Please, no hard feelings. > > > > Speaking about implementation of the non executable pages semantics on > > IA32, PaX and Exec-Shield are very different (well not that much since > > 2.6 in fact because PAGEEXEC is now "segmentation when I can"). > > But when it comes to ASLR it's pretty much the same thing. > > > > The only difference may be the (very small) randomization of the brk() > > managed heap on ET_EXEC (which is probably the more "hackish" feature of > > PaX ASLR) but it seems that Arjan is even going to propose a patch for > > that (Is this in ES too ?). > > Exec shield randomized brk() too yes. > However that is a both more dangerous and more invasive change to do > correctly (you have no idea how hard it is to get that right for > emacs...) so that's reserved for the second batch of patches once this > first batch is dealt with.
Oh, so you mean that we can both get a more secure system, *and* make emacs stop working? A win-win situation! =) Regards: David Weinehall -- /) David Weinehall <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> /) Northern lights wander (\ // Maintainer of the v2.0 kernel // Dance across the winter sky // \) http://www.acc.umu.se/~tao/ (/ Full colour fire (/ - To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-kernel" in the body of a message to [EMAIL PROTECTED] More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html Please read the FAQ at http://www.tux.org/lkml/