On Tue, Apr 22, 2014 at 3:50 PM, Michael Kerrisk (man-pages) <mtk.manpa...@gmail.com> wrote: > On Tue, Apr 22, 2014 at 3:40 PM, Jan Kara <j...@suse.cz> wrote: >> On Sat 19-04-14 22:53:53, Heinrich Schuchardt wrote: >>> When monitoring a directory or a mount with the fanotify API >>> the call to fanotify_init checks, >>> * the process has cap_sys_admin capability >>> >>> The call to fanotify_mark checks, >>> * the process has read authorization for directory or mount >>> >>> A directory or mount may contain files for which the process >>> has no read or write authorization. >>> Yet when reading from the fanotify file descriptor, structures >>> fanotify_event_metadata are returned, which contain a file >>> descriptor for these files, and will allow to read or write. >>> >>> The patch adds an authorization check for read and write >>> permission. In case of missing permission, reading from the >>> fanotify file descriptor returns EACCES. >> OK, am I right you are concerned about a situation where fanotify group >> descriptor is passed to an unpriviledged process which handles all the >> incoming events? I'm asking because the permission checking can be >> relatively expensive (think of acls) so we better do it for a reason. >> I'd prefer to hear from Eric what the original intention regarding >> permissions was... > > If I understand correctly, passing to an unprivileged process is the
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