On Tue, Apr 22, 2014 at 8:19 AM, David Herrmann <[email protected]> wrote: > Hi > > On Tue, Apr 22, 2014 at 4:31 PM, Pavel Machek <[email protected]> wrote: >> Such as here? >> >> http://www.securityfocus.com/archive/1/507386 > > Thanks, that's the first real example someone mentioned. > > Quoted from your link: > >> The reopen does check the inode permission, but it does not require >> you have any reachable path to the file. Someone _might_ use that as >> a traditional unix security mechanism, but if so it's probably quite rare. > > In other words, the bug you describe is that /proc/pid/fd/ allows > access to objects without a reachable path to the only _real_ > filesystem link. But isn't the same true for openat()?
I don't think so. openat doesn't work on fds for things that aren't directories. --Andy -- To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-kernel" in the body of a message to [email protected] More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html Please read the FAQ at http://www.tux.org/lkml/
