Am Donnerstag, 3. Juli 2014, 07:18:06 schrieb Neil Horman: >On Wed, Jul 02, 2014 at 03:37:30PM -0400, Jarod Wilson wrote: >> Per further discussion with NIST, the requirements for FIPS state >> that >> we only need to panic the system on failed kernel module signature >> checks for crypto subsystem modules. This moves the fips-mode-only >> module signature check out of the generic module loading code, into >> the crypto subsystem, at points where we can catch both algorithm >> module loads and mode module loads. At the same time, make >> CONFIG_CRYPTO_FIPS dependent on CONFIG_MODULE_SIG, as this is >> entirely necessary for FIPS mode. >> >> v2: remove extraneous blank line, perform checks in static inline >> function, drop no longer necessary fips.h include. >> >> CC: Herbert Xu <[email protected]> >> CC: "David S. Miller" <[email protected]> >> CC: Rusty Russell <[email protected]> >> CC: Stephan Mueller <[email protected]> >> CC: [email protected] >> Signed-off-by: Jarod Wilson <[email protected]> > >Acked-by: Neil Horman <[email protected]> Acked-by: Stephan Mueller <[email protected]>
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