Hi David,

I just took latest #next branch from James's security tree which
includes latest KEYs patches and noticed following:

[    9.812332] Request for unknown module key 'Magrathea: Glacier
signing key: 926305d6dda66f47139eb4e3cb25a6adef527f08' err -11

Also I noticed that output of 'keyctl show' and 'cat /proc/keys' output
also has changed in respect of certificate ids..

Those ids does not look any close to my kernel X509 X509v3 Subject Key
Identifier, which is:
92:63:05:D6:DD:A6:6F:47:13:9E:B4:E3:CB:25:A6:AD:EF:52:7F:08

proc/keys shows

symmetri Magrathea: Glacier signing key: d9e2e4c6951f1e83: X509.RSA
6865612e68326732 []

Very different ids..

How could I match certificate now?
Module verification code cannot find needed key..

- Dmitry

On 08/09/14 18:38, David Howells wrote:
> Make use of the new match string preparsing to overhaul key identification
> when searching for asymmetric keys.  The following changes are made:
> 
>  (1) Use the previously created asymmetric_key_id struct to hold the following
>      key IDs derived from the X.509 certificate or PKCS#7 message:
> 
>       id: serial number + issuer
>       skid: subjKeyId + subject
>       authority: authKeyId + issuer
> 
>  (2) Replace the hex fingerprint attached to key->type_data[1] with an
>      asymmetric_key_ids struct containing the id and the skid (if present).
> 
>  (3) Make the asymmetric_type match data preparse select one of two searches:
> 
>      (a) An iterative search for the key ID given if prefixed with "id:".  The
>        prefix is expected to be followed by a hex string giving the ID to
>        search for.  The criterion key ID is checked against all key IDs
>        recorded on the key.
> 
>      (b) A direct search if the key ID is not prefixed with "id:".  This will
>        look for an exact match on the key description.
> 
>  (4) Make x509_request_asymmetric_key() take a key ID.  This is then converted
>      into "id:<hex>" and passed into keyring_search() where match preparsing
>      will turn it back into a binary ID.
> 
>  (5) X.509 certificate verification then takes the authority key ID and looks
>      up a key that matches it to find the public key for the certificate
>      signature.
> 
>  (6) PKCS#7 certificate verification then takes the id key ID and looks up a
>      key that matches it to find the public key for the signed information
>      block signature.
> 
> Additional changes:
> 
>  (1) Multiple subjKeyId and authKeyId values on an X.509 certificate cause the
>      cert to be rejected with -EBADMSG.
> 
>  (2) The 'fingerprint' ID is gone.  This was primarily intended to convey PGP
>      public key fingerprints.  If PGP is supported in future, this should
>      generate a key ID that carries the fingerprint.
> 
>  (3) Th ca_keyid= kernel command line option is now converted to a key ID and
>      used to match the authority key ID.  Possibly this should only match the
>      actual authKeyId part and not the issuer as well.
> 
> Signed-off-by: David Howells <[email protected]>
> ---
> 
>  crypto/asymmetric_keys/asymmetric_keys.h  |    4 -
>  crypto/asymmetric_keys/asymmetric_type.c  |  133 
> ++++++++++++-----------------
>  crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_parser.c     |   38 ++++++--
>  crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_parser.h     |    5 -
>  crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_trust.c      |    6 -
>  crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_verify.c     |   44 ++++------
>  crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_cert_parser.c |   55 +++++++-----
>  crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_parser.h      |    5 +
>  crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_public_key.c  |   89 +++++++++++--------
>  include/crypto/public_key.h               |    5 +
>  10 files changed, 198 insertions(+), 186 deletions(-)
> 
> diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/asymmetric_keys.h 
> b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/asymmetric_keys.h
> index 917be6b985e7..fd21ac28e0a0 100644
> --- a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/asymmetric_keys.h
> +++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/asymmetric_keys.h
> @@ -9,13 +9,13 @@
>   * 2 of the Licence, or (at your option) any later version.
>   */
>  
> -int asymmetric_keyid_match(const char *kid, const char *id);
>  extern bool asymmetric_match_key_ids(const struct asymmetric_key_ids *kids,
>                                    const struct asymmetric_key_id *match_id);
>  
>  extern struct asymmetric_key_id *asymmetric_key_hex_to_key_id(const char 
> *id);
>  
> -static inline const char *asymmetric_key_id(const struct key *key)
> +static inline
> +const struct asymmetric_key_ids *asymmetric_key_ids(const struct key *key)
>  {
>       return key->type_data.p[1];
>  }
> diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/asymmetric_type.c 
> b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/asymmetric_type.c
> index 3bc71b4e1eed..6f16f647d21b 100644
> --- a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/asymmetric_type.c
> +++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/asymmetric_type.c
> @@ -105,76 +105,15 @@ struct asymmetric_key_id 
> *asymmetric_key_hex_to_key_id(const char *id)
>  }
>  
>  /*
> - * Match asymmetric key id with partial match
> - * @id:              key id to match in a form "id:<id>"
> - */
> -int asymmetric_keyid_match(const char *kid, const char *id)
> -{
> -     size_t idlen, kidlen;
> -
> -     if (!kid || !id)
> -             return 0;
> -
> -     /* make it possible to use id as in the request: "id:<id>" */
> -     if (strncmp(id, "id:", 3) == 0)
> -             id += 3;
> -
> -     /* Anything after here requires a partial match on the ID string */
> -     idlen = strlen(id);
> -     kidlen = strlen(kid);
> -     if (idlen > kidlen)
> -             return 0;
> -
> -     kid += kidlen - idlen;
> -     if (strcasecmp(id, kid) != 0)
> -             return 0;
> -
> -     return 1;
> -}
> -EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(asymmetric_keyid_match);
> -
> -/*
> - * Match asymmetric keys on (part of) their name
> - * We have some shorthand methods for matching keys.  We allow:
> - *
> - *   "<desc>"        - request a key by description
> - *   "id:<id>"       - request a key matching the ID
> - *   "<subtype>:<id>" - request a key of a subtype
> + * Match asymmetric keys by ID.
>   */
>  static bool asymmetric_key_cmp(const struct key *key,
>                              const struct key_match_data *match_data)
>  {
> -     const struct asymmetric_key_subtype *subtype = 
> asymmetric_key_subtype(key);
> -     const char *description = match_data->raw_data;
> -     const char *spec = description;
> -     const char *id;
> -     ptrdiff_t speclen;
> -
> -     if (!subtype || !spec || !*spec)
> -             return 0;
> -
> -     /* See if the full key description matches as is */
> -     if (key->description && strcmp(key->description, description) == 0)
> -             return 1;
> -
> -     /* All tests from here on break the criterion description into a
> -      * specifier, a colon and then an identifier.
> -      */
> -     id = strchr(spec, ':');
> -     if (!id)
> -             return 0;
> -
> -     speclen = id - spec;
> -     id++;
> -
> -     if (speclen == 2 && memcmp(spec, "id", 2) == 0)
> -             return asymmetric_keyid_match(asymmetric_key_id(key), id);
> +     const struct asymmetric_key_ids *kids = asymmetric_key_ids(key);
> +     const struct asymmetric_key_id *match_id = match_data->preparsed;
>  
> -     if (speclen == subtype->name_len &&
> -         memcmp(spec, subtype->name, speclen) == 0)
> -             return 1;
> -
> -     return 0;
> +     return asymmetric_match_key_ids(kids, match_id);
>  }
>  
>  /*
> @@ -191,8 +130,30 @@ static bool asymmetric_key_cmp(const struct key *key,
>   */
>  static int asymmetric_key_match_preparse(struct key_match_data *match_data)
>  {
> -     match_data->lookup_type = KEYRING_SEARCH_LOOKUP_ITERATE;
> +     struct asymmetric_key_id *match_id;
> +     const char *spec = match_data->raw_data;
> +     const char *id;
> +
> +     if (!spec || !*spec)
> +             return -EINVAL;
> +     if (spec[0] == 'i' &&
> +         spec[1] == 'd' &&
> +         spec[2] == ':') {
> +             id = spec + 3;
> +     } else {
> +             goto default_match;
> +     }
> +
> +     match_id = asymmetric_key_hex_to_key_id(id);
> +     if (!match_id)
> +             return -ENOMEM;
> +
> +     match_data->preparsed = match_id;
>       match_data->cmp = asymmetric_key_cmp;
> +     match_data->lookup_type = KEYRING_SEARCH_LOOKUP_ITERATE;
> +     return 0;
> +
> +default_match:
>       return 0;
>  }
>  
> @@ -201,6 +162,7 @@ static int asymmetric_key_match_preparse(struct 
> key_match_data *match_data)
>   */
>  static void asymmetric_key_match_free(struct key_match_data *match_data)
>  {
> +     kfree(match_data->preparsed);
>  }
>  
>  /*
> @@ -209,8 +171,10 @@ static void asymmetric_key_match_free(struct 
> key_match_data *match_data)
>  static void asymmetric_key_describe(const struct key *key, struct seq_file 
> *m)
>  {
>       const struct asymmetric_key_subtype *subtype = 
> asymmetric_key_subtype(key);
> -     const char *kid = asymmetric_key_id(key);
> -     size_t n;
> +     const struct asymmetric_key_ids *kids = asymmetric_key_ids(key);
> +     const struct asymmetric_key_id *kid;
> +     const unsigned char *p;
> +     int n;
>  
>       seq_puts(m, key->description);
>  
> @@ -218,13 +182,16 @@ static void asymmetric_key_describe(const struct key 
> *key, struct seq_file *m)
>               seq_puts(m, ": ");
>               subtype->describe(key, m);
>  
> -             if (kid) {
> +             if (kids && kids->id[0]) {
> +                     kid = kids->id[0];
>                       seq_putc(m, ' ');
> -                     n = strlen(kid);
> -                     if (n <= 8)
> -                             seq_puts(m, kid);
> -                     else
> -                             seq_puts(m, kid + n - 8);
> +                     n = kid->len;
> +                     p = kid->data;
> +                     if (n > 8) {
> +                             p += n - 8;
> +                             n = 8;
> +                     }
> +                     seq_printf(m, "%*phN", n, p);
>               }
>  
>               seq_puts(m, " [");
> @@ -275,6 +242,7 @@ static int asymmetric_key_preparse(struct 
> key_preparsed_payload *prep)
>  static void asymmetric_key_free_preparse(struct key_preparsed_payload *prep)
>  {
>       struct asymmetric_key_subtype *subtype = prep->type_data[0];
> +     struct asymmetric_key_ids *kids = prep->type_data[1];
>  
>       pr_devel("==>%s()\n", __func__);
>  
> @@ -282,7 +250,11 @@ static void asymmetric_key_free_preparse(struct 
> key_preparsed_payload *prep)
>               subtype->destroy(prep->payload[0]);
>               module_put(subtype->owner);
>       }
> -     kfree(prep->type_data[1]);
> +     if (kids) {
> +             kfree(kids->id[0]);
> +             kfree(kids->id[1]);
> +             kfree(kids);
> +     }
>       kfree(prep->description);
>  }
>  
> @@ -292,13 +264,20 @@ static void asymmetric_key_free_preparse(struct 
> key_preparsed_payload *prep)
>  static void asymmetric_key_destroy(struct key *key)
>  {
>       struct asymmetric_key_subtype *subtype = asymmetric_key_subtype(key);
> +     struct asymmetric_key_ids *kids = key->type_data.p[1];
> +
>       if (subtype) {
>               subtype->destroy(key->payload.data);
>               module_put(subtype->owner);
>               key->type_data.p[0] = NULL;
>       }
> -     kfree(key->type_data.p[1]);
> -     key->type_data.p[1] = NULL;
> +
> +     if (kids) {
> +             kfree(kids->id[0]);
> +             kfree(kids->id[1]);
> +             kfree(kids);
> +             key->type_data.p[1] = NULL;
> +     }
>  }
>  
>  struct key_type key_type_asymmetric = {
> diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_parser.c 
> b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_parser.c
> index 459d2077c61b..ad6ae9d7c884 100644
> --- a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_parser.c
> +++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_parser.c
> @@ -29,6 +29,10 @@ struct pkcs7_parse_context {
>       enum OID        last_oid;               /* Last OID encountered */
>       unsigned        x509_index;
>       unsigned        sinfo_index;
> +     const void      *raw_serial;
> +     unsigned        raw_serial_size;
> +     unsigned        raw_issuer_size;
> +     const void      *raw_issuer;
>  };
>  
>  /*
> @@ -39,6 +43,7 @@ static void pkcs7_free_signed_info(struct pkcs7_signed_info 
> *sinfo)
>       if (sinfo) {
>               mpi_free(sinfo->sig.mpi[0]);
>               kfree(sinfo->sig.digest);
> +             kfree(sinfo->signing_cert_id);
>               kfree(sinfo);
>       }
>  }
> @@ -256,10 +261,10 @@ int pkcs7_extract_cert(void *context, size_t hdrlen,
>       if (IS_ERR(x509))
>               return PTR_ERR(x509);
>  
> -     pr_debug("Got cert for %s\n", x509->subject);
> -     pr_debug("- fingerprint %s\n", x509->fingerprint);
> -
>       x509->index = ++ctx->x509_index;
> +     pr_debug("Got cert %u for %s\n", x509->index, x509->subject);
> +     pr_debug("- fingerprint %*phN\n", x509->id->len, x509->id->data);
> +
>       *ctx->ppcerts = x509;
>       ctx->ppcerts = &x509->next;
>       return 0;
> @@ -348,8 +353,8 @@ int pkcs7_sig_note_serial(void *context, size_t hdrlen,
>                         const void *value, size_t vlen)
>  {
>       struct pkcs7_parse_context *ctx = context;
> -     ctx->sinfo->raw_serial = value;
> -     ctx->sinfo->raw_serial_size = vlen;
> +     ctx->raw_serial = value;
> +     ctx->raw_serial_size = vlen;
>       return 0;
>  }
>  
> @@ -361,8 +366,8 @@ int pkcs7_sig_note_issuer(void *context, size_t hdrlen,
>                         const void *value, size_t vlen)
>  {
>       struct pkcs7_parse_context *ctx = context;
> -     ctx->sinfo->raw_issuer = value;
> -     ctx->sinfo->raw_issuer_size = vlen;
> +     ctx->raw_issuer = value;
> +     ctx->raw_issuer_size = vlen;
>       return 0;
>  }
>  
> @@ -395,10 +400,21 @@ int pkcs7_note_signed_info(void *context, size_t hdrlen,
>                          const void *value, size_t vlen)
>  {
>       struct pkcs7_parse_context *ctx = context;
> -
> -     ctx->sinfo->index = ++ctx->sinfo_index;
> -     *ctx->ppsinfo = ctx->sinfo;
> -     ctx->ppsinfo = &ctx->sinfo->next;
> +     struct pkcs7_signed_info *sinfo = ctx->sinfo;
> +     struct asymmetric_key_id *kid;
> +
> +     /* Generate cert issuer + serial number key ID */
> +     kid = asymmetric_key_generate_id(ctx->raw_serial,
> +                                      ctx->raw_serial_size,
> +                                      ctx->raw_issuer,
> +                                      ctx->raw_issuer_size);
> +     if (IS_ERR(kid))
> +             return PTR_ERR(kid);
> +
> +     sinfo->signing_cert_id = kid;
> +     sinfo->index = ++ctx->sinfo_index;
> +     *ctx->ppsinfo = sinfo;
> +     ctx->ppsinfo = &sinfo->next;
>       ctx->sinfo = kzalloc(sizeof(struct pkcs7_signed_info), GFP_KERNEL);
>       if (!ctx->sinfo)
>               return -ENOMEM;
> diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_parser.h 
> b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_parser.h
> index d25f4d15370f..91949f92bc72 100644
> --- a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_parser.h
> +++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_parser.h
> @@ -33,10 +33,7 @@ struct pkcs7_signed_info {
>       const void      *authattrs;
>  
>       /* Issuing cert serial number and issuer's name */
> -     const void      *raw_serial;
> -     unsigned        raw_serial_size;
> -     unsigned        raw_issuer_size;
> -     const void      *raw_issuer;
> +     struct asymmetric_key_id *signing_cert_id;
>  
>       /* Message signature.
>        *
> diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_trust.c 
> b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_trust.c
> index e666eb011a85..4e8dd7214753 100644
> --- a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_trust.c
> +++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_trust.c
> @@ -49,8 +49,7 @@ int pkcs7_validate_trust_one(struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7,
>               /* Look to see if this certificate is present in the trusted
>                * keys.
>                */
> -             key = x509_request_asymmetric_key(trust_keyring, x509->subject,
> -                                               x509->fingerprint);
> +             key = x509_request_asymmetric_key(trust_keyring, x509->id);
>               if (!IS_ERR(key))
>                       /* One of the X.509 certificates in the PKCS#7 message
>                        * is apparently the same as one we already trust.
> @@ -82,8 +81,7 @@ int pkcs7_validate_trust_one(struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7,
>               return -ENOKEY;
>       }
>  
> -     key = x509_request_asymmetric_key(trust_keyring, last->issuer,
> -                                       last->authority);
> +     key = x509_request_asymmetric_key(trust_keyring, last->authority);
>       if (IS_ERR(key))
>               return PTR_ERR(key) == -ENOMEM ? -ENOMEM : -ENOKEY;
>       x509 = last;
> diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_verify.c 
> b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_verify.c
> index c62cf8006e1f..57e90fa17f2b 100644
> --- a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_verify.c
> +++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_verify.c
> @@ -131,8 +131,7 @@ static int pkcs7_find_key(struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7,
>       struct x509_certificate *x509;
>       unsigned certix = 1;
>  
> -     kenter("%u,%u,%u",
> -            sinfo->index, sinfo->raw_serial_size, sinfo->raw_issuer_size);
> +     kenter("%u", sinfo->index);
>  
>       for (x509 = pkcs7->certs; x509; x509 = x509->next, certix++) {
>               /* I'm _assuming_ that the generator of the PKCS#7 message will
> @@ -140,21 +139,11 @@ static int pkcs7_find_key(struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7,
>                * PKCS#7 message - but I can't be 100% sure of that.  It's
>                * possible this will need element-by-element comparison.
>                */
> -             if (x509->raw_serial_size != sinfo->raw_serial_size ||
> -                 memcmp(x509->raw_serial, sinfo->raw_serial,
> -                        sinfo->raw_serial_size) != 0)
> +             if (!asymmetric_key_id_same(x509->id, sinfo->signing_cert_id))
>                       continue;
>               pr_devel("Sig %u: Found cert serial match X.509[%u]\n",
>                        sinfo->index, certix);
>  
> -             if (x509->raw_issuer_size != sinfo->raw_issuer_size ||
> -                 memcmp(x509->raw_issuer, sinfo->raw_issuer,
> -                        sinfo->raw_issuer_size) != 0) {
> -                     pr_warn("Sig %u: X.509 subject and PKCS#7 issuer don't 
> match\n",
> -                             sinfo->index);
> -                     continue;
> -             }
> -
>               if (x509->pub->pkey_algo != sinfo->sig.pkey_algo) {
>                       pr_warn("Sig %u: X.509 algo and PKCS#7 sig algo don't 
> match\n",
>                               sinfo->index);
> @@ -164,8 +153,10 @@ static int pkcs7_find_key(struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7,
>               sinfo->signer = x509;
>               return 0;
>       }
> +
>       pr_warn("Sig %u: Issuing X.509 cert not found (#%*ph)\n",
> -             sinfo->index, sinfo->raw_serial_size, sinfo->raw_serial);
> +             sinfo->index,
> +             sinfo->signing_cert_id->len, sinfo->signing_cert_id->data);
>       return -ENOKEY;
>  }
>  
> @@ -184,7 +175,9 @@ static int pkcs7_verify_sig_chain(struct pkcs7_message 
> *pkcs7,
>               p->seen = false;
>  
>       for (;;) {
> -             pr_debug("verify %s: %s\n", x509->subject, x509->fingerprint);
> +             pr_debug("verify %s: %*phN\n",
> +                      x509->subject,
> +                      x509->raw_serial_size, x509->raw_serial);
>               x509->seen = true;
>               ret = x509_get_sig_params(x509);
>               if (ret < 0)
> @@ -192,7 +185,8 @@ static int pkcs7_verify_sig_chain(struct pkcs7_message 
> *pkcs7,
>  
>               pr_debug("- issuer %s\n", x509->issuer);
>               if (x509->authority)
> -                     pr_debug("- authkeyid %s\n", x509->authority);
> +                     pr_debug("- authkeyid %*phN\n",
> +                              x509->authority->len, x509->authority->data);
>  
>               if (!x509->authority ||
>                   strcmp(x509->subject, x509->issuer) == 0) {
> @@ -218,13 +212,14 @@ static int pkcs7_verify_sig_chain(struct pkcs7_message 
> *pkcs7,
>               /* Look through the X.509 certificates in the PKCS#7 message's
>                * list to see if the next one is there.
>                */
> -             pr_debug("- want %s\n", x509->authority);
> +             pr_debug("- want %*phN\n",
> +                      x509->authority->len, x509->authority->data);
>               for (p = pkcs7->certs; p; p = p->next) {
> -                     pr_debug("- cmp [%u] %s\n", p->index, p->fingerprint);
> -                     if (p->raw_subject_size == x509->raw_issuer_size &&
> -                         strcmp(p->fingerprint, x509->authority) == 0 &&
> -                         memcmp(p->raw_subject, x509->raw_issuer,
> -                                x509->raw_issuer_size) == 0)
> +                     if (!p->skid)
> +                             continue;
> +                     pr_debug("- cmp [%u] %*phN\n",
> +                              p->index, p->skid->len, p->skid->data);
> +                     if (asymmetric_key_id_same(p->skid, x509->authority))
>                               goto found_issuer;
>               }
>  
> @@ -233,7 +228,7 @@ static int pkcs7_verify_sig_chain(struct pkcs7_message 
> *pkcs7,
>               return 0;
>  
>       found_issuer:
> -             pr_debug("- issuer %s\n", p->subject);
> +             pr_debug("- subject %s\n", p->subject);
>               if (p->seen) {
>                       pr_warn("Sig %u: X.509 chain contains loop\n",
>                               sinfo->index);
> @@ -304,7 +299,8 @@ int pkcs7_verify(struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7)
>               ret = x509_get_sig_params(x509);
>               if (ret < 0)
>                       return ret;
> -             pr_debug("X.509[%u] %s\n", n, x509->authority);
> +             pr_debug("X.509[%u] %*phN\n",
> +                      n, x509->authority->len, x509->authority->data);
>       }
>  
>       for (sinfo = pkcs7->signed_infos; sinfo; sinfo = sinfo->next) {
> diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_cert_parser.c 
> b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_cert_parser.c
> index ac72348c186a..96151b2b91a2 100644
> --- a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_cert_parser.c
> +++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_cert_parser.c
> @@ -46,7 +46,8 @@ void x509_free_certificate(struct x509_certificate *cert)
>               public_key_destroy(cert->pub);
>               kfree(cert->issuer);
>               kfree(cert->subject);
> -             kfree(cert->fingerprint);
> +             kfree(cert->id);
> +             kfree(cert->skid);
>               kfree(cert->authority);
>               kfree(cert->sig.digest);
>               mpi_free(cert->sig.rsa.s);
> @@ -62,6 +63,7 @@ struct x509_certificate *x509_cert_parse(const void *data, 
> size_t datalen)
>  {
>       struct x509_certificate *cert;
>       struct x509_parse_context *ctx;
> +     struct asymmetric_key_id *kid;
>       long ret;
>  
>       ret = -ENOMEM;
> @@ -89,6 +91,17 @@ struct x509_certificate *x509_cert_parse(const void *data, 
> size_t datalen)
>       if (ret < 0)
>               goto error_decode;
>  
> +     /* Generate cert issuer + serial number key ID */
> +     kid = asymmetric_key_generate_id(cert->raw_serial,
> +                                      cert->raw_serial_size,
> +                                      cert->raw_issuer,
> +                                      cert->raw_issuer_size);
> +     if (IS_ERR(kid)) {
> +             ret = PTR_ERR(kid);
> +             goto error_decode;
> +     }
> +     cert->id = kid;
> +
>       kfree(ctx);
>       return cert;
>  
> @@ -407,36 +420,34 @@ int x509_process_extension(void *context, size_t hdrlen,
>                          const void *value, size_t vlen)
>  {
>       struct x509_parse_context *ctx = context;
> +     struct asymmetric_key_id *kid;
>       const unsigned char *v = value;
> -     char *f;
>       int i;
>  
>       pr_debug("Extension: %u\n", ctx->last_oid);
>  
>       if (ctx->last_oid == OID_subjectKeyIdentifier) {
>               /* Get hold of the key fingerprint */
> -             if (vlen < 3)
> +             if (ctx->cert->skid || vlen < 3)
>                       return -EBADMSG;
>               if (v[0] != ASN1_OTS || v[1] != vlen - 2)
>                       return -EBADMSG;
>               v += 2;
>               vlen -= 2;
>  
> -             f = kmalloc(vlen * 2 + 1, GFP_KERNEL);
> -             if (!f)
> -                     return -ENOMEM;
> -             for (i = 0; i < vlen; i++)
> -                     sprintf(f + i * 2, "%02x", v[i]);
> -             pr_debug("fingerprint %s\n", f);
> -             ctx->cert->fingerprint = f;
> +             kid = asymmetric_key_generate_id(v, vlen,
> +                                              ctx->cert->raw_subject,
> +                                              ctx->cert->raw_subject_size);
> +             if (IS_ERR(kid))
> +                     return PTR_ERR(kid);
> +             ctx->cert->skid = kid;
> +             pr_debug("subjkeyid %*phN\n", kid->len, kid->data);
>               return 0;
>       }
>  
>       if (ctx->last_oid == OID_authorityKeyIdentifier) {
> -             size_t key_len;
> -
>               /* Get hold of the CA key fingerprint */
> -             if (vlen < 5)
> +             if (ctx->cert->authority || vlen < 5)
>                       return -EBADMSG;
>  
>               /* Authority Key Identifier must be a Constructed SEQUENCE */
> @@ -454,7 +465,7 @@ int x509_process_extension(void *context, size_t hdrlen,
>                           v[3] > vlen - 4)
>                               return -EBADMSG;
>  
> -                     key_len = v[3];
> +                     vlen = v[3];
>                       v += 4;
>               } else {
>                       /* Long Form length */
> @@ -476,17 +487,17 @@ int x509_process_extension(void *context, size_t hdrlen,
>                           v[sub + 1] > vlen - 4 - sub)
>                               return -EBADMSG;
>  
> -                     key_len = v[sub + 1];
> +                     vlen = v[sub + 1];
>                       v += (sub + 2);
>               }
>  
> -             f = kmalloc(key_len * 2 + 1, GFP_KERNEL);
> -             if (!f)
> -                     return -ENOMEM;
> -             for (i = 0; i < key_len; i++)
> -                     sprintf(f + i * 2, "%02x", v[i]);
> -             pr_debug("authority   %s\n", f);
> -             ctx->cert->authority = f;
> +             kid = asymmetric_key_generate_id(v, vlen,
> +                                              ctx->cert->raw_issuer,
> +                                              ctx->cert->raw_issuer_size);
> +             if (IS_ERR(kid))
> +                     return PTR_ERR(kid);
> +             pr_debug("authkeyid %*phN\n", kid->len, kid->data);
> +             ctx->cert->authority = kid;
>               return 0;
>       }
>  
> diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_parser.h 
> b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_parser.h
> index 1b76f207c1f3..0e8d59b010fb 100644
> --- a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_parser.h
> +++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_parser.h
> @@ -19,8 +19,9 @@ struct x509_certificate {
>       struct public_key_signature sig;        /* Signature parameters */
>       char            *issuer;                /* Name of certificate issuer */
>       char            *subject;               /* Name of certificate subject 
> */
> -     char            *fingerprint;           /* Key fingerprint as hex */
> -     char            *authority;             /* Authority key fingerprint as 
> hex */
> +     struct asymmetric_key_id *id;           /* Issuer + serial number */
> +     struct asymmetric_key_id *skid;         /* Subject key identifier */
> +     struct asymmetric_key_id *authority;    /* Authority key identifier */
>       struct tm       valid_from;
>       struct tm       valid_to;
>       const void      *tbs;                   /* Signed data */
> diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_public_key.c 
> b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_public_key.c
> index f3d62307e6ee..c60905c3f4d2 100644
> --- a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_public_key.c
> +++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_public_key.c
> @@ -25,7 +25,7 @@
>  #include "x509_parser.h"
>  
>  static bool use_builtin_keys;
> -static char *ca_keyid;
> +static struct asymmetric_key_id *ca_keyid;
>  
>  #ifndef MODULE
>  static int __init ca_keys_setup(char *str)
> @@ -33,10 +33,16 @@ static int __init ca_keys_setup(char *str)
>       if (!str)               /* default system keyring */
>               return 1;
>  
> -     if (strncmp(str, "id:", 3) == 0)
> -             ca_keyid = str; /* owner key 'id:xxxxxx' */
> -     else if (strcmp(str, "builtin") == 0)
> +     if (strncmp(str, "id:", 3) == 0) {
> +             struct asymmetric_key_id *p;
> +             p = asymmetric_key_hex_to_key_id(str);
> +             if (p == ERR_PTR(-EINVAL))
> +                     pr_err("Unparsable hex string in ca_keys\n");
> +             else if (!IS_ERR(p))
> +                     ca_keyid = p;   /* owner key 'id:xxxxxx' */
> +     } else if (strcmp(str, "builtin") == 0) {
>               use_builtin_keys = true;
> +     }
>  
>       return 1;
>  }
> @@ -46,31 +52,28 @@ __setup("ca_keys=", ca_keys_setup);
>  /**
>   * x509_request_asymmetric_key - Request a key by X.509 certificate params.
>   * @keyring: The keys to search.
> - * @subject: The name of the subject to whom the key belongs.
> - * @key_id: The subject key ID as a hex string.
> + * @kid: The key ID.
>   *
>   * Find a key in the given keyring by subject name and key ID.  These might,
>   * for instance, be the issuer name and the authority key ID of an X.509
>   * certificate that needs to be verified.
>   */
>  struct key *x509_request_asymmetric_key(struct key *keyring,
> -                                     const char *subject,
> -                                     const char *key_id)
> +                                     const struct asymmetric_key_id *kid)
>  {
>       key_ref_t key;
> -     size_t subject_len = strlen(subject), key_id_len = strlen(key_id);
> -     char *id;
> +     char *id, *p;
>  
> -     /* Construct an identifier "<subjname>:<keyid>". */
> -     id = kmalloc(subject_len + 2 + key_id_len + 1, GFP_KERNEL);
> +     /* Construct an identifier "id:<keyid>". */
> +     p = id = kmalloc(2 + 1 + kid->len * 2 + 1, GFP_KERNEL);
>       if (!id)
>               return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
>  
> -     memcpy(id, subject, subject_len);
> -     id[subject_len + 0] = ':';
> -     id[subject_len + 1] = ' ';
> -     memcpy(id + subject_len + 2, key_id, key_id_len);
> -     id[subject_len + 2 + key_id_len] = 0;
> +     *p++ = 'i';
> +     *p++ = 'd';
> +     *p++ = ':';
> +     p = bin2hex(p, kid->data, kid->len);
> +     *p = 0;
>  
>       pr_debug("Look up: \"%s\"\n", id);
>  
> @@ -195,11 +198,10 @@ static int x509_validate_trust(struct x509_certificate 
> *cert,
>       if (!trust_keyring)
>               return -EOPNOTSUPP;
>  
> -     if (ca_keyid && !asymmetric_keyid_match(cert->authority, ca_keyid))
> +     if (ca_keyid && !asymmetric_key_id_same(cert->authority, ca_keyid))
>               return -EPERM;
>  
> -     key = x509_request_asymmetric_key(trust_keyring,
> -                                       cert->issuer, cert->authority);
> +     key = x509_request_asymmetric_key(trust_keyring, cert->authority);
>       if (!IS_ERR(key))  {
>               if (!use_builtin_keys
>                   || test_bit(KEY_FLAG_BUILTIN, &key->flags))
> @@ -214,9 +216,11 @@ static int x509_validate_trust(struct x509_certificate 
> *cert,
>   */
>  static int x509_key_preparse(struct key_preparsed_payload *prep)
>  {
> +     struct asymmetric_key_ids *kids;
>       struct x509_certificate *cert;
> +     const char *q;
>       size_t srlen, sulen;
> -     char *desc = NULL;
> +     char *desc = NULL, *p;
>       int ret;
>  
>       cert = x509_cert_parse(prep->data, prep->datalen);
> @@ -249,19 +253,12 @@ static int x509_key_preparse(struct 
> key_preparsed_payload *prep)
>                pkey_algo_name[cert->sig.pkey_algo],
>                hash_algo_name[cert->sig.pkey_hash_algo]);
>  
> -     if (!cert->fingerprint) {
> -             pr_warn("Cert for '%s' must have a SubjKeyId extension\n",
> -                     cert->subject);
> -             ret = -EKEYREJECTED;
> -             goto error_free_cert;
> -     }
> -
>       cert->pub->algo = pkey_algo[cert->pub->pkey_algo];
>       cert->pub->id_type = PKEY_ID_X509;
>  
>       /* Check the signature on the key if it appears to be self-signed */
>       if (!cert->authority ||
> -         strcmp(cert->fingerprint, cert->authority) == 0) {
> +         asymmetric_key_id_same(cert->skid, cert->authority)) {
>               ret = x509_check_signature(cert->pub, cert); /* self-signed */
>               if (ret < 0)
>                       goto error_free_cert;
> @@ -273,31 +270,47 @@ static int x509_key_preparse(struct 
> key_preparsed_payload *prep)
>  
>       /* Propose a description */
>       sulen = strlen(cert->subject);
> -     srlen = strlen(cert->fingerprint);
> +     srlen = cert->raw_serial_size;
> +     q = cert->raw_serial;
> +     if (srlen > 1 && *q == 0) {
> +             srlen--;
> +             q++;
> +     }
> +
>       ret = -ENOMEM;
> -     desc = kmalloc(sulen + 2 + srlen + 1, GFP_KERNEL);
> +     desc = kmalloc(sulen + 2 + srlen * 2 + 1, GFP_KERNEL);
>       if (!desc)
>               goto error_free_cert;
> -     memcpy(desc, cert->subject, sulen);
> -     desc[sulen] = ':';
> -     desc[sulen + 1] = ' ';
> -     memcpy(desc + sulen + 2, cert->fingerprint, srlen);
> -     desc[sulen + 2 + srlen] = 0;
> +     p = memcpy(desc, cert->subject, sulen);
> +     p += sulen;
> +     *p++ = ':';
> +     *p++ = ' ';
> +     p = bin2hex(p, q, srlen);
> +     *p = 0;
> +
> +     kids = kmalloc(sizeof(struct asymmetric_key_ids), GFP_KERNEL);
> +     if (!kids)
> +             goto error_free_desc;
> +     kids->id[0] = cert->id;
> +     kids->id[1] = cert->skid;
>  
>       /* We're pinning the module by being linked against it */
>       __module_get(public_key_subtype.owner);
>       prep->type_data[0] = &public_key_subtype;
> -     prep->type_data[1] = cert->fingerprint;
> +     prep->type_data[1] = kids;
>       prep->payload[0] = cert->pub;
>       prep->description = desc;
>       prep->quotalen = 100;
>  
>       /* We've finished with the certificate */
>       cert->pub = NULL;
> -     cert->fingerprint = NULL;
> +     cert->id = NULL;
> +     cert->skid = NULL;
>       desc = NULL;
>       ret = 0;
>  
> +error_free_desc:
> +     kfree(desc);
>  error_free_cert:
>       x509_free_certificate(cert);
>       return ret;
> diff --git a/include/crypto/public_key.h b/include/crypto/public_key.h
> index 0d164c6af539..fa73a6fd536c 100644
> --- a/include/crypto/public_key.h
> +++ b/include/crypto/public_key.h
> @@ -15,6 +15,7 @@
>  #define _LINUX_PUBLIC_KEY_H
>  
>  #include <linux/mpi.h>
> +#include <keys/asymmetric-type.h>
>  #include <crypto/hash_info.h>
>  
>  enum pkey_algo {
> @@ -98,8 +99,8 @@ struct key;
>  extern int verify_signature(const struct key *key,
>                           const struct public_key_signature *sig);
>  
> +struct asymmetric_key_id;
>  extern struct key *x509_request_asymmetric_key(struct key *keyring,
> -                                            const char *issuer,
> -                                            const char *key_id);
> +                                            const struct asymmetric_key_id 
> *kid);
>  
>  #endif /* _LINUX_PUBLIC_KEY_H */
> 
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