On Tue, Oct 21, 2014 at 01:21:37PM -0700, Kees Cook wrote: > From: Paul Wise <pa...@bonedaddy.net> > > This partially mitigates a common strategy used by attackers for hiding > the full contents of strings in procfs from naive sysadmins who use cat, > more or sysctl to inspect the contents of strings in procfs. > > References: > http://www.jakoblell.com/blog/2014/05/07/hacking-contest-hiding-stuff-from-the-terminal/ > Signed-off-by: Paul Wise <pa...@bonedaddy.net> > Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keesc...@chromium.org>
Acked-by: Paul E. McKenney <paul...@linux.vnet.ibm.com> > --- > kernel/sysctl.c | 2 +- > 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) > > diff --git a/kernel/sysctl.c b/kernel/sysctl.c > index 4aada6d9fe74..c34c9414caac 100644 > --- a/kernel/sysctl.c > +++ b/kernel/sysctl.c > @@ -1739,7 +1739,7 @@ static int _proc_do_string(char *data, int maxlen, int > write, > while ((p - buffer) < *lenp && len < maxlen - 1) { > if (get_user(c, p++)) > return -EFAULT; > - if (c == 0 || c == '\n') > + if (c == 0 || c == '\n' || c == '\r') > break; > data[len++] = c; > } > -- > 1.9.1 > > > -- > Kees Cook > Chrome OS Security > -- To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-kernel" in the body of a message to majord...@vger.kernel.org More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html Please read the FAQ at http://www.tux.org/lkml/