On Fri, Nov 07, 2014 at 10:11:14PM +0000, Al Viro wrote: > I'm looking through the tree right now; so far it looks like we can just > move those suckers to the point where we validate iovec and lose them > from low-level iovec and csum copying completely. I still haven't finished > tracing all possible paths for address to arrive at the points where we > currently check that stuff, but so far it looks very doable.
Definitely doable. The only remaining interesting part is drivers/vhost with the stuff it puts in vq->iov[]. If we can guarantee that it satisfies the sanity checks (access_ok() and size-related ones), we are done - making verify_iovec() use rw_copy_check_uvector() (and verify_compat_iov() use compat_rw_copy_check_uvector()) will suffice to guarantee that none of csum_partial_copy_fromiovecend memcpy_fromiovec memcpy_toiovec memcpy_toiovecend memcpy_fromiovecend skb_copy_datagram_iovec skb_copy_datagram_iter skb_copy_datagram_from_iter zerocopy_sg_from_iter skb_copy_and_csum_datagram skb_copy_and_csum_datagram_iovec csum_and_copy_from_user csum_and_copy_to_user csum_partial_copy_from_user will ever see an address that doesn't satisfy access_ok() checks. And having looked at the data flow... we definitely want to do those checks on intake of iovec - as it is, we usually repeat them quite a few times for the same iovec segment, and we practically never end up _not_ doing them for some segment of iovec, unless we hit a failure exit before we get around to copying any data at all. I'll finish RTFS drivers/vhost and if it turns out to be OK I'll post the series moving those checks to the moment of copying iovec from userland, so that kernel-side we could always rely on ->msg_iov elements having been verified. -- To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-kernel" in the body of a message to majord...@vger.kernel.org More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html Please read the FAQ at http://www.tux.org/lkml/