On Wednesday 01/14 at 18:33 +0300, Cyrill Gorcunov wrote: > On Wed, Jan 14, 2015 at 05:25:01PM +0200, Kirill A. Shutemov wrote: > ... > > > > > > This gives lsof and suchlike a way to determine the pathnames of files > > > mapped into a process without incurring the O(N^2) behavior of the > > > maps file. > > > > We already have /proc/PID/map_files/ directory which lists all mapped > > files. Should we consider relaxing permission checking there and move it > > outside CONFIG_CHECKPOINT_RESTORE instead? > > > > Restriction to CAP_SYSADMIN for follow_link is undertansble, but why do we > > restrict readdir and readlink? > > We didn't think this functionality might be needed someone but us (criu camp), > so that the rule of thumb was CONFIG_CHECKPOINT_RESTORE + CAP_SYSADMIN, until > otherwise strictly needed. So I think now we can relax security rules a bit > and allow to readdir and such for owners.
Ah, I feel silly for missing that. I'll send a patch to move map_files out from behind CONFIG_CHECKPOINT_RESTORE and change the permissions. Thanks, Calvin -- To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-kernel" in the body of a message to majord...@vger.kernel.org More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html Please read the FAQ at http://www.tux.org/lkml/
