On 01/19/2015 11:37 AM, Theodore Ts'o wrote: > On Mon, Jan 19, 2015 at 09:57:23AM -0500, Peter Hurley wrote: >> >> This reader set EOL2 to DISABLED_CHAR earlier, and left EOL unchanged. >> I have seen userspace code that expects a line to be no longer than 4096 >> chars. > > Userspace code that does this is going to be very fragile. Input from > the tty really should be considered completely untrustworthy.
Should and do are different modal verbs. > For example, what if, while the tty is in canonical (ICANON) mode, an > attacker sets PARMRK and clears IGNPAR, IGNBRK, and BRKINT on the tty > and then proceeds to send a large number of breaks or parity errors > down the tty? The input path limits _all_ canonical lines to 4096 chars. Input beyond that is discarded until a newline is received. I know this because I broke it and just recently fixed it. > That will certainly cause a buffer overflow of said > userspace process. So if there is *any* setuid program which isn't > defensively checking for buffer overruns it's kind of screwed anyway. > >>>> 4. ioctl(TIOCSIG) can send _any_ signal to a different process without >>>> permission checks. That's not good. >>> >>> It can only send to the pty slave. Permissions were already checked when >>> the pty master was opened. >> >> Still not ok. > > Interestingly, TIOCSIG is supported by FreeBSD *and* OpenBSD, and > without any kind of checks. That being said, I can certainly think of > potential security threats that could happen if a malicious program > were to run a setuid program (say, /bin/passwd) under a pty, and then > proceeded to send it a one or more of non-trappable signals -- for > example, either SIGKILL or SIGSTOP -- to either widen the window for a > race condition, or to kill a setuid program at a particularly > inconvenient time. I hadn't considered that possibility. > It might be interesting to see if someone could figure out an attack > that utilized this ioctl, and then demonstrated it on OpenBSD. :-) I don't need that reputation :) >>> What further checks do you think are needed? You think it should >>> be limited to tty-specific signals: INT, QUIT, CONT, TSTP, TTIN, >>> TTOU, WINCH? > > Definitely, and we should do this sooner rather than later IMHO. > Preferably before someone figures out whether or not it's possible to > attack OpenBSD and FreeBSD using this ioctl, and requests a CVE. :-) I'm on it. Regards, Peter Hurley -- To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-kernel" in the body of a message to majord...@vger.kernel.org More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html Please read the FAQ at http://www.tux.org/lkml/
