On 01/22/2015 03:44 AM, Ethan Zhao wrote:
On Wed, Jan 21, 2015 at 1:30 PM, Manfred Spraul
<manf...@colorfullife.com> wrote:
On 01/21/2015 04:53 AM, Ethan Zhao wrote:
On Tue, Jan 20, 2015 at 10:10 PM, Stephen Smalley <s...@tycho.nsa.gov>
wrote:
On 01/20/2015 04:18 AM, Ethan Zhao wrote:
sys_semget()
->newary()
->security_sem_alloc()
->sem_alloc_security()
selinux_sem_alloc_security()
->ipc_alloc_security() {
->rc = avc_has_perm()
if (rc) {
ipc_free_security(&sma->sem_perm);
return rc;
We free the security structure here to avoid a memory leak on a
failed/denied semaphore set creation. In this situation, we return an
error to the caller (ultimately to newary), it does an
ipc_rcu_putref(sma, ipc_rcu_free), and it returns an error to the
caller. Thus, it never calls ipc_addid() and the semaphore set is not
created. So how then can you call semtimedop() on it?
Seems it wouldn't happen after commit
e8577d1f0329d4842e8302e289fb2c22156abef4 ?
That was my first guess when I read the bug report - but it can't be the
fix, because security_sem_alloc() is before the ipc_addid(), with or without
the patch.
thread A:
thread B:
semtimedop()
-> sem_obtain_object_check()
semctl(IPC_RMID)
-> freeary()
-> ipc_rcu_putref()
-> call_rcu()
-> somehow a grace period
-> sem_rcu_free()
-> security_sem_free()
Perhaps: modify ipc_free_security() to hexdump perm and a few more bytes if
the pointer is NULL?
I tried to ask for vmcore and do more analysis, basically, the race condition
still exists and open a hole to be DoS.
Is the issue reproducable?
If yes, can you try something like the attached patch?
--- a/security/selinux/hooks.c
+++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c
@@ -5129,6 +5129,8 @@ static int ipc_has_perm(struct kern_ipc_perm
*ipc_perms,
u32 sid = current_sid();
isec = ipc_perms->security;
+ if (!isec)
+ return -EACCES;
ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC;
ad.u.ipc_id = ipc_perms->key;
ipc_has_perm() runs without any spinlocks/semaphores, only rcu_read_lock().
Testing for ipc_perms->security!=NULL does solve the issue that
ipc_perm->key could be an access to kfree'd memory: Nothing prevents
that the kfree could happen just after the test.
I.e.: The patch can't be the right solution.
--
Manfred
diff --git a/ipc/sem.c b/ipc/sem.c
index 6115146..80371dc 100644
--- a/ipc/sem.c
+++ b/ipc/sem.c
@@ -248,6 +248,7 @@ static void sem_rcu_free(struct rcu_head *head)
struct ipc_rcu *p = container_of(head, struct ipc_rcu, rcu);
struct sem_array *sma = ipc_rcu_to_struct(p);
+pr_info("sem_rcu_free: sma %p\n",sma);
security_sem_free(sma);
ipc_rcu_free(head);
}
@@ -529,6 +530,7 @@ static int newary(struct ipc_namespace *ns, struct
ipc_params *params)
sma->sem_nsems = nsems;
sma->sem_ctime = get_seconds();
+pr_info("newary: sma %p becomes visible\n",sma);
id = ipc_addid(&sem_ids(ns), &sma->sem_perm, ns->sc_semmni);
if (id < 0) {
ipc_rcu_putref(sma, sem_rcu_free);
@@ -1118,6 +1120,7 @@ static void freeary(struct ipc_namespace *ns, struct
kern_ipc_perm *ipcp)
/* Remove the semaphore set from the IDR */
sem_rmid(ns, sma);
+pr_info("freeary: sma %p unlinked\n",sma);
sem_unlock(sma, -1);
rcu_read_unlock();
@@ -1860,6 +1863,9 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE4(semtimedop, int, semid, struct sembuf
__user *, tsops,
if (ipcperms(ns, &sma->sem_perm, alter ? S_IWUGO : S_IRUGO))
goto out_rcu_wakeup;
+ if (sma->sem_perm.security == NULL) {
+ pr_info("sma %p: sem_perm.security == NULL\n", sma);
+ }
error = security_sem_semop(sma, sops, nsops, alter);
if (error)
goto out_rcu_wakeup;
diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c
index 6da7532..1499787 100644
--- a/security/selinux/hooks.c
+++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c
@@ -5088,6 +5088,7 @@ static int ipc_alloc_security(struct task_struct *task,
isec->sclass = sclass;
isec->sid = sid;
perm->security = isec;
+pr_info("ipc_alloc_security for perm %p.\n", perm);
return 0;
}
@@ -5096,6 +5097,7 @@ static void ipc_free_security(struct kern_ipc_perm *perm)
{
struct ipc_security_struct *isec = perm->security;
perm->security = NULL;
+pr_info("ipc_free_security for perm %p.\n", perm);
kfree(isec);
}
@@ -5129,6 +5131,12 @@ static int ipc_has_perm(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipc_perms,
u32 sid = current_sid();
isec = ipc_perms->security;
+ if (isec == NULL) {
+ struct sem_array *sma = container_of(ipc_perms, struct
sem_array, sem_perm);
+
+ pr_info("sma %p, sem_base %p, deleted %d with NULL isec\n",
+ sma, sma->sem_base,
sma->sem_perm.deleted);
+ }
ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC;
ad.u.ipc_id = ipc_perms->key;
