Currently, readlink() and follow_link() for the symbolic links in
/proc/<pid>/fd/* will return -EACCES in the case where looking up the
task finds that it does not exist.
This patch inlines the logic from proc_fd_access_allowed() into these
two functions such that they will return -ESRCH if the lookup in /proc
races with the task exiting. Since those were the only two callers of
that helper function, it also removes it.
Signed-off-by: Calvin Owens <calvinow...@fb.com>
---
fs/proc/base.c | 47 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++---------------------
1 file changed, 26 insertions(+), 21 deletions(-)
diff --git a/fs/proc/base.c b/fs/proc/base.c
index 3f3d7ae..308fcbd 100644
--- a/fs/proc/base.c
+++ b/fs/proc/base.c
@@ -485,23 +485,6 @@ static int proc_pid_syscall(struct seq_file *m, struct
pid_namespace *ns,
/* Here the fs part begins */
/************************************************************************/
-/* permission checks */
-static int proc_fd_access_allowed(struct inode *inode)
-{
- struct task_struct *task;
- int allowed = 0;
- /* Allow access to a task's file descriptors if it is us or we
- * may use ptrace attach to the process and find out that
- * information.
- */
- task = get_proc_task(inode);
- if (task) {
- allowed = ptrace_may_access(task, PTRACE_MODE_READ);
- put_task_struct(task);
- }
- return allowed;
-}
-
int proc_setattr(struct dentry *dentry, struct iattr *attr)
{
int error;
@@ -1375,10 +1358,21 @@ static void *proc_pid_follow_link(struct dentry
*dentry, struct nameidata *nd)
{
struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode;
struct path path;
- int error = -EACCES;
+ int error = -ESRCH;
+ int allowed = 0;
+ struct task_struct *task;
/* Are we allowed to snoop on the tasks file descriptors? */
- if (!proc_fd_access_allowed(inode))
+ task = get_proc_task(inode);
+ if (task) {
+ allowed = ptrace_may_access(task, PTRACE_MODE_READ);
+ put_task_struct(task);
+ } else {
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ error = -EACCES;
+ if (!allowed)
goto out;
error = PROC_I(inode)->op.proc_get_link(dentry, &path);
@@ -1417,12 +1411,23 @@ static int do_proc_readlink(struct path *path, char
__user *buffer, int buflen)
static int proc_pid_readlink(struct dentry * dentry, char __user * buffer, int
buflen)
{
- int error = -EACCES;
+ int error = -ESRCH;
+ int allowed = 0;
+ struct task_struct *task;
struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode;
struct path path;
/* Are we allowed to snoop on the tasks file descriptors? */
- if (!proc_fd_access_allowed(inode))
+ task = get_proc_task(inode);
+ if (task) {
+ allowed = ptrace_may_access(task, PTRACE_MODE_READ);
+ put_task_struct(task);
+ } else {
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ error = -EACCES;
+ if (!allowed)
goto out;
error = PROC_I(inode)->op.proc_get_link(dentry, &path);
--
1.8.1
--
To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-kernel" in
the body of a message to majord...@vger.kernel.org
More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html
Please read the FAQ at http://www.tux.org/lkml/
