3.18-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Andrey Ryabinin <a.ryabi...@samsung.com>

commit 6d1cff2a885850b78b40c34777b46cf5da5d1050 upstream.

We hit use after free on dereferncing pointer to task_smack struct in
smk_of_task() called from smack_task_to_inode().

task_security() macro uses task_cred_xxx() to get pointer to the task_smack.
task_cred_xxx() could be used only for non-pointer members of task's
credentials. It cannot be used for pointer members since what they point
to may disapper after dropping RCU read lock.

Mainly task_security() used this way:
        smk_of_task(task_security(p))

Intead of this introduce function smk_of_task_struct() which
takes task_struct as argument and returns pointer to smk_known struct
and do this under RCU read lock.
Bogus task_security() macro is not used anymore, so remove it.

KASan's report for this:

        AddressSanitizer: use after free in smack_task_to_inode+0x50/0x70 at 
addr c4635600
        
=============================================================================
        BUG kmalloc-64 (Tainted: PO): kasan error
        
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------

        Disabling lock debugging due to kernel taint
        INFO: Allocated in new_task_smack+0x44/0xd8 age=39 cpu=0 pid=1866
                kmem_cache_alloc_trace+0x88/0x1bc
                new_task_smack+0x44/0xd8
                smack_cred_prepare+0x48/0x21c
                security_prepare_creds+0x44/0x4c
                prepare_creds+0xdc/0x110
                smack_setprocattr+0x104/0x150
                security_setprocattr+0x4c/0x54
                proc_pid_attr_write+0x12c/0x194
                vfs_write+0x1b0/0x370
                SyS_write+0x5c/0x94
                ret_fast_syscall+0x0/0x48
        INFO: Freed in smack_cred_free+0xc4/0xd0 age=27 cpu=0 pid=1564
                kfree+0x270/0x290
                smack_cred_free+0xc4/0xd0
                security_cred_free+0x34/0x3c
                put_cred_rcu+0x58/0xcc
                rcu_process_callbacks+0x738/0x998
                __do_softirq+0x264/0x4cc
                do_softirq+0x94/0xf4
                irq_exit+0xbc/0x120
                handle_IRQ+0x104/0x134
                gic_handle_irq+0x70/0xac
                __irq_svc+0x44/0x78
                _raw_spin_unlock+0x18/0x48
                sync_inodes_sb+0x17c/0x1d8
                sync_filesystem+0xac/0xfc
                vdfs_file_fsync+0x90/0xc0
                vfs_fsync_range+0x74/0x7c
        INFO: Slab 0xd3b23f50 objects=32 used=31 fp=0xc4635600 flags=0x4080
        INFO: Object 0xc4635600 @offset=5632 fp=0x  (null)

        Bytes b4 c46355f0: 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a  
ZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZ
        Object c4635600: 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b  
kkkkkkkkkkkkkkkk
        Object c4635610: 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b  
kkkkkkkkkkkkkkkk
        Object c4635620: 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b  
kkkkkkkkkkkkkkkk
        Object c4635630: 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b a5  
kkkkkkkkkkkkkkk.
        Redzone c4635640: bb bb bb bb                                      ....
        Padding c46356e8: 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a  
ZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZ
        Padding c46356f8: 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a                          
ZZZZZZZZ
        CPU: 5 PID: 834 Comm: launchpad_prelo Tainted: PBO 3.10.30 #1
        Backtrace:
        [<c00233a4>] (dump_backtrace+0x0/0x158) from [<c0023dec>] 
(show_stack+0x20/0x24)
         r7:c4634010 r6:d3b23f50 r5:c4635600 r4:d1002140
        [<c0023dcc>] (show_stack+0x0/0x24) from [<c06d6d7c>] 
(dump_stack+0x20/0x28)
        [<c06d6d5c>] (dump_stack+0x0/0x28) from [<c01c1d50>] 
(print_trailer+0x124/0x144)
        [<c01c1c2c>] (print_trailer+0x0/0x144) from [<c01c1e88>] 
(object_err+0x3c/0x44)
         r7:c4635600 r6:d1002140 r5:d3b23f50 r4:c4635600
        [<c01c1e4c>] (object_err+0x0/0x44) from [<c01cac18>] 
(kasan_report_error+0x2b8/0x538)
         r6:d1002140 r5:d3b23f50 r4:c6429cf8 r3:c09e1aa7
        [<c01ca960>] (kasan_report_error+0x0/0x538) from [<c01c9430>] 
(__asan_load4+0xd4/0xf8)
        [<c01c935c>] (__asan_load4+0x0/0xf8) from [<c031e168>] 
(smack_task_to_inode+0x50/0x70)
         r5:c4635600 r4:ca9da000
        [<c031e118>] (smack_task_to_inode+0x0/0x70) from [<c031af64>] 
(security_task_to_inode+0x3c/0x44)
         r5:cca25e80 r4:c0ba9780
        [<c031af28>] (security_task_to_inode+0x0/0x44) from [<c023d614>] 
(pid_revalidate+0x124/0x178)
         r6:00000000 r5:cca25e80 r4:cbabe3c0 r3:00008124
        [<c023d4f0>] (pid_revalidate+0x0/0x178) from [<c01db98c>] 
(lookup_fast+0x35c/0x43y4)
         r9:c6429efc r8:00000101 r7:c079d940 r6:c6429e90 r5:c6429ed8 r4:c83c4148
        [<c01db630>] (lookup_fast+0x0/0x434) from [<c01deec8>] 
(do_last.isra.24+0x1c0/0x1108)
        [<c01ded08>] (do_last.isra.24+0x0/0x1108) from [<c01dff04>] 
(path_openat.isra.25+0xf4/0x648)
        [<c01dfe10>] (path_openat.isra.25+0x0/0x648) from [<c01e1458>] 
(do_filp_open+0x3c/0x88)
        [<c01e141c>] (do_filp_open+0x0/0x88) from [<c01ccb28>] 
(do_sys_open+0xf0/0x198)
         r7:00000001 r6:c0ea2180 r5:0000000b r4:00000000
        [<c01cca38>] (do_sys_open+0x0/0x198) from [<c01ccc00>] 
(SyS_open+0x30/0x34)
        [<c01ccbd0>] (SyS_open+0x0/0x34) from [<c001db80>] 
(ret_fast_syscall+0x0/0x48)
        Read of size 4 by thread T834:
        Memory state around the buggy address:
         c4635380: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
         c4635400: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
         c4635480: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
         c4635500: 00 00 00 00 00 fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
         c4635580: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
        >c4635600: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
                   ^
         c4635680: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
         c4635700: 00 00 00 00 04 fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
         c4635780: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
         c4635800: 00 00 00 00 00 00 04 fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
         c4635880: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
        ==================================================================

Signed-off-by: Andrey Ryabinin <a.ryabi...@samsung.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gre...@linuxfoundation.org>

---
 security/smack/smack.h     |   10 ++++++++++
 security/smack/smack_lsm.c |   24 +++++++++++++-----------
 2 files changed, 23 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-)

--- a/security/smack/smack.h
+++ b/security/smack/smack.h
@@ -298,6 +298,16 @@ static inline struct smack_known *smk_of
        return tsp->smk_task;
 }
 
+static inline struct smack_known *smk_of_task_struct(const struct task_struct 
*t)
+{
+       struct smack_known *skp;
+
+       rcu_read_lock();
+       skp = smk_of_task(__task_cred(t)->security);
+       rcu_read_unlock();
+       return skp;
+}
+
 /*
  * Present a pointer to the forked smack label entry in an task blob.
  */
--- a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
+++ b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
@@ -43,8 +43,6 @@
 #include <linux/binfmts.h>
 #include "smack.h"
 
-#define task_security(task)    (task_cred_xxx((task), security))
-
 #define TRANS_TRUE     "TRUE"
 #define TRANS_TRUE_SIZE        4
 
@@ -119,7 +117,7 @@ static int smk_bu_current(char *note, st
 static int smk_bu_task(struct task_struct *otp, int mode, int rc)
 {
        struct task_smack *tsp = current_security();
-       struct task_smack *otsp = task_security(otp);
+       struct smack_known *smk_task = smk_of_task_struct(otp);
        char acc[SMK_NUM_ACCESS_TYPE + 1];
 
        if (rc <= 0)
@@ -127,7 +125,7 @@ static int smk_bu_task(struct task_struc
 
        smk_bu_mode(mode, acc);
        pr_info("Smack Bringup: (%s %s %s) %s to %s\n",
-               tsp->smk_task->smk_known, otsp->smk_task->smk_known, acc,
+               tsp->smk_task->smk_known, smk_task->smk_known, acc,
                current->comm, otp->comm);
        return 0;
 }
@@ -344,7 +342,8 @@ static int smk_ptrace_rule_check(struct
                saip = &ad;
        }
 
-       tsp = task_security(tracer);
+       rcu_read_lock();
+       tsp = __task_cred(tracer)->security;
        tracer_known = smk_of_task(tsp);
 
        if ((mode & PTRACE_MODE_ATTACH) &&
@@ -364,11 +363,14 @@ static int smk_ptrace_rule_check(struct
                                  tracee_known->smk_known,
                                  0, rc, saip);
 
+               rcu_read_unlock();
                return rc;
        }
 
        /* In case of rule==SMACK_PTRACE_DEFAULT or mode==PTRACE_MODE_READ */
        rc = smk_tskacc(tsp, tracee_known, smk_ptrace_mode(mode), saip);
+
+       rcu_read_unlock();
        return rc;
 }
 
@@ -395,7 +397,7 @@ static int smack_ptrace_access_check(str
        if (rc != 0)
                return rc;
 
-       skp = smk_of_task(task_security(ctp));
+       skp = smk_of_task_struct(ctp);
 
        rc = smk_ptrace_rule_check(current, skp, mode, __func__);
        return rc;
@@ -1825,7 +1827,7 @@ static int smk_curacc_on_task(struct tas
                                const char *caller)
 {
        struct smk_audit_info ad;
-       struct smack_known *skp = smk_of_task(task_security(p));
+       struct smack_known *skp = smk_of_task_struct(p);
        int rc;
 
        smk_ad_init(&ad, caller, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_TASK);
@@ -1878,7 +1880,7 @@ static int smack_task_getsid(struct task
  */
 static void smack_task_getsecid(struct task_struct *p, u32 *secid)
 {
-       struct smack_known *skp = smk_of_task(task_security(p));
+       struct smack_known *skp = smk_of_task_struct(p);
 
        *secid = skp->smk_secid;
 }
@@ -1985,7 +1987,7 @@ static int smack_task_kill(struct task_s
 {
        struct smk_audit_info ad;
        struct smack_known *skp;
-       struct smack_known *tkp = smk_of_task(task_security(p));
+       struct smack_known *tkp = smk_of_task_struct(p);
        int rc;
 
        smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_TASK);
@@ -2039,7 +2041,7 @@ static int smack_task_wait(struct task_s
 static void smack_task_to_inode(struct task_struct *p, struct inode *inode)
 {
        struct inode_smack *isp = inode->i_security;
-       struct smack_known *skp = smk_of_task(task_security(p));
+       struct smack_known *skp = smk_of_task_struct(p);
 
        isp->smk_inode = skp;
 }
@@ -3199,7 +3201,7 @@ unlockandout:
  */
 static int smack_getprocattr(struct task_struct *p, char *name, char **value)
 {
-       struct smack_known *skp = smk_of_task(task_security(p));
+       struct smack_known *skp = smk_of_task_struct(p);
        char *cp;
        int slen;
 


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