On Mon, Mar 9, 2015 at 6:13 PM, Casey Schaufler <ca...@schaufler-ca.com> wrote: > Subject: [PATCH 0/7 v21] LSM: Multiple concurrent LSMs > > Replace the current ad hoc stacking of the capabilities > and Yama security modules with a generalized stacking scheme. > > The old structure had a single set of module hooks contained > in a security_operations structure. This structure was initialized > with a set of stubs referred to as the "capabilities" module. > In fact only a few of these hooks actually did anything useful. > When a module replaced the capabilities module the entries > supplied replaced those from the capabilities module. The > new hook was expected to call the replaced capability code > if "stacking" was desired, which it usually was. Yama stacking > is done by ifdefs in the security infrastructure. > > The new structure provides a list of module hooks for each > interface. The non-trivial functions from the capabilities > module are add to the list first. If Yama stacking is configured > the Yama functions are added next. If a module is specified as > the "default" module, or is specified on the command line, it > is added next. > > Functions are called in the order added to the list. The > security interfaces stop when a function indicates an access > denial. It is possible for a list to be empty. That is treated > as a success in most cases. > > Each security module provides an array of function list entries. > This is initialized with the information needed to properly add > the entries to the function lists. > > The sheer size of this patch set is somewhat frightening. This > is an artifact of the number of security interfaces involved and > except for a few cases the changes are mechanical in nature. > Except for the removal of some information specific to the security > module infrastructure itself, the change is transparent to the rest > of the kernel. > > This is going to break out-of-tree security modules. It's easy to > update a module to the new scheme, and I'd be happy to do it for > any module I know about, but if it isn't in the tree, I don't know > about it. > > The stacking of modules that use the security blob pointers > cred->security, inode->i_security, etc has not been addressed. > That is future work with a delightful set of issues. > > This patch set is based on James Morris' security-next tree, > which is itself based on Linus' 4.0-rc1. It reflects the 11 > patches of v20. > > Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <ca...@schaufler-ca.com>
Looks great to me! Acked-by: Kees Cook <keesc...@chromium.org> -Kees > --- > include/linux/lsm_hooks.h | 1872 > ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ > include/linux/security.h | 1613 +------------------------------------- > security/Makefile | 2 +- > security/apparmor/domain.c | 4 +- > security/apparmor/lsm.c | 131 ++-- > security/capability.c | 1164 --------------------------- > security/commoncap.c | 36 +- > security/security.c | 979 ++++++++++++++++------- > security/selinux/hooks.c | 477 +++++------ > security/smack/smack.h | 4 +- > security/smack/smack_lsm.c | 305 ++++---- > security/smack/smackfs.c | 2 +- > security/tomoyo/tomoyo.c | 72 +- > security/yama/yama_lsm.c | 60 +- > 14 files changed, 3071 insertions(+), 3650 deletions(-) > -- Kees Cook Chrome OS Security -- To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-kernel" in the body of a message to majord...@vger.kernel.org More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html Please read the FAQ at http://www.tux.org/lkml/