On Fri, May 22, 2015 at 1:40 PM, Linus Torvalds <torva...@linux-foundation.org> wrote: > On Fri, May 22, 2015 at 7:13 AM, George Spelvin <li...@horizon.com> wrote: >> >> 1) Create a tool to canonicalize the kernel and modules, >> stripping out the signatures before comparing them. This has >> precedent in the way the prelink tool can un-prelink binaries >> so that hashes can be verified. > > So I'd obviously prefer this, so that we have just one model for verification. >
In the threat model where module signatures matter in the first place [1], this prevents reproducible builds from serving their purpose. I can build a kernel with a fresh signing key and throw away the private key. You can build a canonically identical kernel with a private key that you keep. A third party using mine is safe, but a third party using yours is unsafe, even though the whole packages canonicalize to exactly the same bytes. [1] I still think this is a silly threat model, but many people disagree with me. --Andy -- To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-kernel" in the body of a message to majord...@vger.kernel.org More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html Please read the FAQ at http://www.tux.org/lkml/
