On 15/08/06, Paul Moore wrote: > On August 6, 2015 5:11:50 PM Steve Grubb <sgr...@redhat.com> wrote: > > >On Thursday, August 06, 2015 04:24:58 PM Paul Moore wrote: > >> On Wednesday, August 05, 2015 04:29:38 PM Richard Guy Briggs wrote: > >> > This adds the ability to audit the actions of children of a > >> > not-yet-running > >> > process. > >> > > >> > > >> > > >> > This is a split-out of a heavily modified version of a patch originally > >> > submitted by Eric Paris with some ideas from Peter Moody. > >> > > >> > > >> > > >> > Cc: Peter Moody <pe...@hda3.com> > >> > Cc: Eric Paris <epa...@redhat.com> > >> > Signed-off-by: Richard Guy Briggs <r...@redhat.com> > >> > --- > >> > > >> > include/uapi/linux/audit.h | 1 + > >> > kernel/auditfilter.c | 5 +++++ > >> > kernel/auditsc.c | 11 +++++++++++ > >> > 3 files changed, 17 insertions(+), 0 deletions(-) > >> > >> I'm still not really comfortable with that loop and since there hasn't been > >> a really convincing use case I'm going to pass on this patch for right > >> now. If someone comes up with a *really* compelling case in the future > >> I'll reconsider it. > > > >Its the same reason strace has a -f option. Sometimes you need to also see > >what the children did. For example, maybe you want to audit file access to a > >specific directory and several cgi-bin programs can get there. You could > >write > >a rule for apache and be done. Or maybe, you have an app that lets people > >have > >shell access and you need to see files accessed or connections opened. Or > >maybe > >its a control panel application with helper scripts and you need to see > >changes that its making. Or maybe you have a program that is at risk of being > >compromised and you want to see if someone gets a shell from it. There are a > >lot of cases where it could be useful. > > > >-Steve > > > >-- > >Linux-audit mailing list > >linux-au...@redhat.com > >https://www.redhat.com/mailman/listinfo/linux-audit > > I guess what I'm saying is that I'm not currently convinced that > there is enough value in this to offset the risk I feel the loop > presents. I understand the use cases that you are mentioning, the > are the same as the last time we discussed this, but I'm going to > need something better than that.
Can you better describe the loop that concerns you? I don't quite see it. > paul moore - RGB -- Richard Guy Briggs <rbri...@redhat.com> Senior Software Engineer, Kernel Security, AMER ENG Base Operating Systems, Red Hat Remote, Ottawa, Canada Voice: +1.647.777.2635, Internal: (81) 32635, Alt: +1.613.693.0684x3545 -- To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-kernel" in the body of a message to majord...@vger.kernel.org More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html Please read the FAQ at http://www.tux.org/lkml/