On Fri, 2015-09-11 at 15:16 +0100, Julien Grall wrote: > When Xen is copyin data to/from the guest it will check if the kernel
"copying" > has the right to do the access. If not, the hypercall will return an > error. > > After the commit a5e090acbf545c0a3b04080f8a488b17ec41fe02 "ARM: > software-based priviledged-no-access support", the kernel can't access "privileged" > anymore the user space by default. This will result to fail on every "any more" (or "any longer") > hypercall made by the userspace (i.e via privcmd). > > We have to enable the userspace access and then restore the correct > permission everytime the privmcd is used to made an hypercall. "every time" and "privcmd" > HYPERCALL1(tmem_op); > HYPERCALL2(multicall); > > -ENTRY(privcmd_call) > +ENTRY(__privcmd_call) arch/arm/include/asm/assembler.h seems to contain uaccess_* macros which could be used right here directly I think? That would be preferable to wrapping I think. Ian. -- To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-kernel" in the body of a message to majord...@vger.kernel.org More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html Please read the FAQ at http://www.tux.org/lkml/