Hi Greg,
On Mon, May 13, 2019 at 03:06:16PM +1000, Greg Ungerer wrote:
> Hi Angelo,
> 
> On 12/5/19 5:59 pm, Angelo Dureghello wrote:
> > Hi all,
> > 
> > resending this in the proper mailing (sent to lkml for error).
> > 
> > Just rebased to master right now, so @ > 5.1.1,
> > nommu boot works, mmu boot hangs without any message.
> > 
> > Before rebase i was near 5.1-rc1 but lost the log, unfortunately.
> > 
> > I am booting linux passing a ramfs address of a ramfs loaded
> > in memory from u-boot.
> > 
> > After some investigations, just found this:
> > - without passing the ramfs, kernel boots.
> > - with ramfs, adding some low level traces, i get:
> > 
> > 5Linux version 5.1.0stmark2-001-09826-gd881126bf3f8-dirty (angelo@box)
> > (gcc version 5.2.0 (crosstools-sysam-2016.04.16))
> > #221 Sun May 12 00:31:57 CEST 2019
> > 
> > initrd at 0x47d33000:0x47d85e44
> > overlap at 1073741889 for chunk 0
> > overlap at 1073746160 for chunk 0
> > overlap at 1073746719 for chunk 0
> > overlap at 1073746720 for chunk 0
> > overlap at 1073746721 for chunk 0
> > overlap at 1073746722 for chunk 0
> 
> Can you git bisect to find which commit breaks it?
> 

Sure. I bisect-ed.
The offending commit is:

d55535232c3dbde9a523a9d10d68670f5fe5dec3 is the first bad commit
commit d55535232c3dbde9a523a9d10d68670f5fe5dec3
Author: Kees Cook <keesc...@chromium.org>
Date:   Fri Apr 19 23:27:05 2019 -0400

    random: move rand_initialize() earlier
    
    Right now rand_initialize() is run as an early_initcall(), but it only
    depends on timekeeping_init() (for mixing ktime_get_real() into the
    pools). However, the call to boot_init_stack_canary() for stack canary
    initialization runs earlier, which triggers a warning at boot:
    
    random: get_random_bytes called from start_kernel+0x357/0x548 with 
crng_init=0
    
    Instead, this moves rand_initialize() to after timekeeping_init(), and moves
    canary initialization here as well.
    
    Note that this warning may still remain for machines that do not have
    UEFI RNG support (which initializes the RNG pools during setup_arch()),
    or for x86 machines without RDRAND (or booting without "random.trust=on"
    or CONFIG_RANDOM_TRUST_CPU=y).
    
    Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keesc...@chromium.org>
    Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <ty...@mit.edu>



> Regards
> Greg
> 
> 

Regards,
Angelo

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