On 03/14/2012 11:47 AM, Nicolas Ferre wrote: ... > I do have the will to avoid the treats of memory corruption in case of > malformed DT data, as Stephen was saying. But, on the other hand I do > not know really if this can happen: if the .xlate() function which is > provided by the DMA controller is well written, it should check for > proper args_count or maximum string size. I do not have the feeling that > adding an enum will enforce the security here. > > Do you know a way to enforce security of this "void *" parameter or the > check of number of cells + the due diligence of .xlate() function > writers will be enough?
I guess if the only source of the data is a driver's of_xlate function, and it's only being passed back to that same driver and never interpreted elsewhere, then its probably reasonable to assume that's enough for safety. -- To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-omap" in the body of a message to majord...@vger.kernel.org More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html
