On Mon, Aug 27, 2007 at 10:28:17AM -0500, Serge E. Hallyn wrote: > Quoting Adrian Bunk ([EMAIL PROTECTED]): > > On Mon, Aug 27, 2007 at 10:09:42AM -0500, Serge E. Hallyn wrote: > > > Quoting Adrian Bunk ([EMAIL PROTECTED]): > > > > On Fri, Aug 24, 2007 at 08:50:10PM -0700, Andrew Morgan wrote: > > > > > > > > > > FWIW, in the mm kernel, I've actually already removed them when one > > > > > configures without capabilities. > > > > > > > > > > http://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/kernel/people/akpm/patches/2.6/2.6.23-rc3/2.6.23-rc3-mm1/broken-out/v3-file-capabilities-alter-behavior-of-cap_setpcap.patch > > > > > > > > > > Other than writing a custom module, so far as I can tell, there is/was > > > > > no way to set them anyway. > > > > > > > > > > I'd obviously prefer to wait for the mm-merge process to complete and > > > > > minimize the churn in this area, but I basically agree that the bits > > > > > as > > > > > implemented are pretty useless in their current form. In a per-process > > > > > mode (with filesystem capability support) they are much more useful... > > > > > > > > It was in the tree for nine years (sic) without a single user... > > > > > > That's because without file capabilities there was no way for a process > > > to retain capabilities across exec, so not having a privileged root user > > > was simply not workable. > > > > > > > Are you only improving a dead horse, or do you also have a rider for > > > > the > > > > improved dead horse? > > > > > > It will allow process trees to run with strict capabilities, without a > > > root user which automatically gains full capabilities. That wasn't > > > possible without file capabilities, since there was no way for processes > > > to retain capabilities across exec. Now that we have file capabilities, > > > it is feasible, and it certainly is useful. > > > > I didn't question that the dead horse gets improved, but where's the > > rider? > > > > A user of the improved securebits has to be submitted for inclusion in > > the kernel. > > The user would be userspace... > > Unless by 'the user' you actually mean the patch itself which will allow > the setting of secure_noroot per-process. I don't know for sure, but > suspect Andrew might like to wait until file capabilities make it into > and stabilize in Linus' tree before going on with that.
That's what I am talking about. This patch should be submitted and discussed together with the changes Andrew has for securebits. > -serge cu Adrian -- "Is there not promise of rain?" Ling Tan asked suddenly out of the darkness. There had been need of rain for many days. "Only a promise," Lao Er said. Pearl S. Buck - Dragon Seed - To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-security-module" in the body of a message to [EMAIL PROTECTED] More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html