On Thu, 2007-09-06 at 16:27 +0900, Yuichi Nakamura wrote:
> Hello.
>
> As I posted before in selinux list,
> I found big overhead of SELinux in read/write on some CPUs,
> and trying tuning.
> There were discussion in previous threads.
> Part 1:
> http://marc.info/?t=118845343400001&r=1&w=2
> Part 2:
> http://marc.info/?t=118880749800004&r=1&w=2
>
> I would like to RFC again about this topic.
Thanks for your work on this, as this is clearly an important area to
improve.
> 1. Background
> Look at benchmark result below.
> lmbench simple read/write.
> Big overhead exists especially on SH(SuperH) arch.
>
> 1) Result for x86(Pentium 4 2.6Ghz), kernel 2.6.22
> Base SELinux Overhead(%)
> Simple read 1.10 1.24 12.3
> Simple write 1.00 1.14 14.0
> * Base: kernel compiled without SELinux support
>
> 2) Result for SH(SH4, SH7751R), kernel 2.6.22
> Base SELinux Overhead(%)
> Simple read 2.39 5.49 130.5
> Simple write 2.07 5.10 146.6
> # This result is a little different from previous threads,
> # because I changed some kernel configs.
>
> Overhead more than 100%
> I also found about 70-90% overhead in ARM.
>
> 2. About patch
> I found a overhead in selinux_file_permission function.
> This is a function that is called in read/write calls,
> and does SELinux permission check.
> SELinux checks permission both in open and read/write time.
> Stephen Smalley sugessted that we can usually skip permission check
> in selinux_file_permission.
> By this patch,
> permission check in selinux_file_permssion is done only when
> - sid of task has changed after file open
> - sid of inode has changed after file open
> - policy load or boolean change happen after file open
>
> To detect these changes,
> I added entries in file_security struct and saving these values at file open.
>
> And to save sid of inode at the time of file open,
> I had to add new LSM hook in __dentry_open function.
>
> 3. Benchmark after applying this patch
> 1) Result for x86(Pentium 4 2.6Ghz), kernel 2.6.22
> Base SELinux Overhead(%)
> Simple read 1.10 1.12 1.6(Before 12.3)
> Simple write 1.00 1.03 3.6(Before 14.0)
>
> 2) Result for SH(SH4, SH7751R), kernel 2.6.22
> Base SELinux Overhead(%)
> Simple read 2.39 2.65 11.1(Before 130.5)
> Simple write 2.07 2.28 10.5(Before 146.6)
>
> Performance has improved a lot.
> I want comments from community.
>
> Signed-off-by: Yuichi Nakamura<[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
> ---
> fs/open.c | 5 +++
> include/linux/security.h | 11 +++++++
> security/selinux/avc.c | 5 ++-
> security/selinux/hooks.c | 54
> +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-
> security/selinux/include/objsec.h | 3 ++
> 5 files changed, 76 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
> diff -purN -X linux-2.6.22/Documentation/dontdiff
> linux-2.6.22.orig/security/selinux/avc.c linux-2.6.22/security/selinux/avc.c
> --- linux-2.6.22.orig/security/selinux/avc.c 2007-07-09 08:32:17.000000000
> +0900
> +++ linux-2.6.22/security/selinux/avc.c 2007-09-06 14:33:35.000000000
> +0900
> @@ -123,6 +123,7 @@ DEFINE_PER_CPU(struct avc_cache_stats, a
> #endif
>
> static struct avc_cache avc_cache;
> +u32 policy_seqno = 0;
> static struct avc_callback_node *avc_callbacks;
> static struct kmem_cache *avc_node_cachep;
>
> @@ -431,8 +432,10 @@ static int avc_latest_notif_update(int s
> ret = -EAGAIN;
> }
> } else {
> - if (seqno > avc_cache.latest_notif)
> + if (seqno > avc_cache.latest_notif) {
> avc_cache.latest_notif = seqno;
> + policy_seqno = seqno;
> + }
I would have just provided an avc interface for obtaining the seqno,
e.g.
u32 avc_policy_seqno(void)
{
return avc_cache.latest_notif;
}
> }
> spin_unlock_irqrestore(¬if_lock, flag);
>
> diff -purN -X linux-2.6.22/Documentation/dontdiff
> linux-2.6.22.orig/security/selinux/hooks.c
> linux-2.6.22/security/selinux/hooks.c
> --- linux-2.6.22.orig/security/selinux/hooks.c 2007-07-09
> 08:32:17.000000000 +0900
> +++ linux-2.6.22/security/selinux/hooks.c 2007-09-06 16:08:36.000000000
> +0900
> @@ -84,6 +84,7 @@
> extern unsigned int policydb_loaded_version;
> extern int selinux_nlmsg_lookup(u16 sclass, u16 nlmsg_type, u32 *perm);
> extern int selinux_compat_net;
> +extern u32 policy_seqno;
I think that they frown upon extern declarations in .c files (versus
in .h files), so we don't want to add more - we ultimately should clean
up what we presently have.
>
> #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DEVELOP
> int selinux_enforcing = 0;
> @@ -220,6 +221,8 @@ static int file_alloc_security(struct fi
>
> fsec->file = file;
> fsec->sid = tsec->sid;
> + fsec->tsid = tsec->sid;
I'm not sure why we need the separate field here, as fsec->sid already
holds the allocating task SID and doesn't change.
> + fsec->pseqno = policy_seqno;
Not sure that you want to set the seqno here versus from your new hook,
as it could conceivably change in between.
> fsec->fown_sid = tsec->sid;
> file->f_security = fsec;
>
> @@ -2458,7 +2461,7 @@ static int selinux_inode_listsecurity(st
>
> /* file security operations */
>
> -static int selinux_file_permission(struct file *file, int mask)
> +static int do_selinux_file_permission(struct file *file, int mask)
Might want to rename for clarity, e.g.
selinux_revalidate_file_permission or
selinux_file_permission_slow (slow path) or
something similar.
> {
> int rc;
> struct inode *inode = file->f_path.dentry->d_inode;
> @@ -2480,6 +2483,43 @@ static int selinux_file_permission(struc
> return selinux_netlbl_inode_permission(inode, mask);
> }
>
> +static int selinux_file_permission(struct file *file, int mask)
> +{
> + struct inode *inode = file->f_path.dentry->d_inode;
> + struct task_security_struct *tsec = current->security;
> + struct file_security_struct *fsec = file->f_security;
> + struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
> +
> + if (!mask) {
> + /* No permission to check. Existence test. */
> + return 0;
> + }
> +
> + if (tsec->sid != fsec->tsid) {
> + if (tsec->sid != fsec->sid) {
> + struct vfsmount *mnt = file->f_path.mnt;
> + struct dentry *dentry = file->f_path.dentry;
> + struct avc_audit_data ad;
> + int rc;
> + AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
> + ad.u.fs.mnt = mnt;
> + ad.u.fs.dentry = dentry;
> + rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, fsec->sid,
> + SECCLASS_FD,
> + FD__USE,
> + &ad);
> + if (rc)
> + return rc;
> + }
Why inline the FD_USE check here given that you are falling back to the
full function call anyway? I also don't see why you separate this from
the rest of the comparison - I'd just make it something like:
if (tsec->sid == fsec->sid && isec->sid == fsec->isid &&
avc_seqno() == fsec->seqno)
return selinux_netlbl_inode_permission(inode, mask);
return selinux_revalidate_file_permission(file, mask);
> static int selinux_file_alloc_security(struct file *file)
> {
> return file_alloc_security(file);
> @@ -2715,6 +2755,16 @@ static int selinux_file_receive(struct f
> return file_has_perm(current, file, file_to_av(file));
> }
>
> +static int selinux_dentry_open(struct file *file, int flags)
> +{
> + struct file_security_struct *fsec;
> + struct inode_security_struct *isec;
> + fsec = file->f_security;
> + isec = file->f_path.dentry->d_inode->i_security;
> + fsec->isid = isec->sid;
Set the seqno here too. Ideally, it would come straight from the AVC
entry that was used for the open-time check, but that is a bit more
invasive and there will always be a small window there.
> diff -purN -X linux-2.6.22/Documentation/dontdiff
> linux-2.6.22.orig/security/selinux/include/objsec.h
> linux-2.6.22/security/selinux/include/objsec.h
> --- linux-2.6.22.orig/security/selinux/include/objsec.h 2007-07-09
> 08:32:17.000000000 +0900
> +++ linux-2.6.22/security/selinux/include/objsec.h 2007-09-06
> 14:58:11.000000000 +0900
> @@ -53,6 +53,9 @@ struct file_security_struct {
> struct file *file; /* back pointer to file object */
> u32 sid; /* SID of open file description */
> u32 fown_sid; /* SID of file owner (for SIGIO) */
> + u32 tsid; /* SID of task at the time of file open*/
> + u32 isid; /* SID of inode at the time of file open */
> + u32 pseqno; /* Policy seqno at the time of file open */
No need for tsid above I think.
> diff -purN -X linux-2.6.22/Documentation/dontdiff
> linux-2.6.22.orig/include/linux/security.h
> linux-2.6.22/include/linux/security.h
> --- linux-2.6.22.orig/include/linux/security.h 2007-07-09
> 08:32:17.000000000 +0900
> +++ linux-2.6.22/include/linux/security.h 2007-09-06 15:22:39.000000000
> +0900
> @@ -503,6 +503,11 @@ struct request_sock;
> * @file contains the file structure being received.
> * Return 0 if permission is granted.
> *
> + * Security hook for dentry
> + *
> + * @dentry_open
> + * Check permission or get additional information before opening dentry.
> + *
> * Security hooks for task operations.
> *
> * @task_create:
> @@ -1253,6 +1258,7 @@ struct security_operations {
> int (*file_send_sigiotask) (struct task_struct * tsk,
> struct fown_struct * fown, int sig);
> int (*file_receive) (struct file * file);
> + int (*dentry_open) (struct file *file, int flags);
>
> int (*task_create) (unsigned long clone_flags);
> int (*task_alloc_security) (struct task_struct * p);
> @@ -1854,6 +1860,11 @@ static inline int security_file_receive
> return security_ops->file_receive (file);
> }
>
> +static inline int security_dentry_open (struct file *file, int flags)
> +{
> + return security_ops->dentry_open (file, flags);
> +}
> +
> static inline int security_task_create (unsigned long clone_flags)
> {
> return security_ops->task_create (clone_flags);
Need to also provide the stub definition in the #else case (SECURITY=n)
and a stub function for the dummy security module.
Thanks.
--
Stephen Smalley
National Security Agency
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