Quoting Andrew Morgan ([EMAIL PROTECTED]): > -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- > Hash: SHA1 > > Serge, > > Here is a more fully formed 64-bit capabilities patch than the one I > sent you last week. Its still subject to a bunch of testing. > > [The patch is against Linus' v2.6.24-rc1 tree.]
Hi Andrew, thanks for sending this. I assume you've made some changes by now so I just looked it over rather than testing now. A few comments inline, but the only fundamental question I'd have is would this in fact become cleaner using a generic bitmap? I have no particular attachment to my own implementation, so you want to keep working with and pushing this one that's fine with me :) Let me know when you're considering it close to done, and I'll do some testing on architectures i have available. My main motivation for this is to request some sort of CAP_NS_OVERRIDE capability, so it's not urgent, but I would like to be able to ask for it sometimes this year. thanks, -serge > Cheers > > Andrew > -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- > Version: GnuPG v1.2.6 (GNU/Linux) > > iD8DBQFHJYUfQheEq9QabfIRArD0AJ0adXWTSaOBYWhHfzqUqWzbtilnpACfeLc6 > i2yeS9ECRNhZyrFxXc07YME= > =LgZV > -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- > >From f1e1bab2a71854b4224d3b6f3f3ca187584893e3 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 > From: Andrew Morgan <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> > Date: Sun, 28 Oct 2007 23:36:08 -0700 > Subject: [PATCH] This patch adds 64-bit capability support to the kernel. > > The patch has supports legacy (32-bit) capability use, and where > possible translates 32-bit capabilities from userspace and the VFS > to kernel space. > --- > fs/nfsd/auth.c | 8 +- > fs/proc/array.c | 18 +++-- > include/linux/capability.h | 191 > ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-------------- > kernel/capability.c | 81 +++++++++++++++++-- > mm/oom_kill.c | 5 +- > security/commoncap.c | 92 +++++++++++++-------- > security/dummy.c | 13 ++- > 7 files changed, 284 insertions(+), 124 deletions(-) > > diff --git a/fs/nfsd/auth.c b/fs/nfsd/auth.c > index 2192805..3504093 100644 > --- a/fs/nfsd/auth.c > +++ b/fs/nfsd/auth.c > @@ -11,8 +11,6 @@ > #include <linux/nfsd/nfsd.h> > #include <linux/nfsd/export.h> > > -#define CAP_NFSD_MASK (CAP_FS_MASK|CAP_TO_MASK(CAP_SYS_RESOURCE)) > - > int nfsexp_flags(struct svc_rqst *rqstp, struct svc_export *exp) > { > struct exp_flavor_info *f; > @@ -69,10 +67,10 @@ int nfsd_setuser(struct svc_rqst *rqstp, struct > svc_export *exp) > ret = set_current_groups(cred.cr_group_info); > put_group_info(cred.cr_group_info); > if ((cred.cr_uid)) { > - cap_t(current->cap_effective) &= ~CAP_NFSD_MASK; > + cap_drop_nfsd_cap(current->cap_effective); > } else { > - cap_t(current->cap_effective) |= (CAP_NFSD_MASK & > - current->cap_permitted); > + cap_raise_nfsd_cap(current->cap_effective, > + current->cap_permitted); > } > return ret; > } > diff --git a/fs/proc/array.c b/fs/proc/array.c > index 63c95af..eb9c274 100644 > --- a/fs/proc/array.c > +++ b/fs/proc/array.c > @@ -288,12 +288,18 @@ static inline char *task_sig(struct task_struct *p, > char *buffer) > > static inline char *task_cap(struct task_struct *p, char *buffer) > { > - return buffer + sprintf(buffer, "CapInh:\t%016x\n" > - "CapPrm:\t%016x\n" > - "CapEff:\t%016x\n", > - cap_t(p->cap_inheritable), > - cap_t(p->cap_permitted), > - cap_t(p->cap_effective)); > +#if _LINUX_CAPABILITY_U32S != 2 > +# error The following code expects 64-bit capabilities > +#endif > + return buffer + sprintf(buffer, "CapInh:\t%08x%08x\n" > + "CapPrm:\t%08x%08x\n" > + "CapEff:\t%08x%08x\n", > + p->cap_inheritable.cap[1], > + p->cap_inheritable.cap[0], > + p->cap_permitted.cap[1], > + p->cap_permitted.cap[0], > + p->cap_effective.cap[1], > + p->cap_effective.cap[0]); > } > > static inline char *task_context_switch_counts(struct task_struct *p, > diff --git a/include/linux/capability.h b/include/linux/capability.h > index bb017ed..786aaa7 100644 > --- a/include/linux/capability.h > +++ b/include/linux/capability.h > @@ -29,7 +29,14 @@ struct task_struct; > library since the draft standard requires the use of malloc/free > etc.. */ > > -#define _LINUX_CAPABILITY_VERSION 0x19980330 > +#define _LINUX_CAPABILITY_VERSION_1 0x19980330 > +#define _LINUX_CAPABILITY_U32S_1 1 > + > +#define _LINUX_CAPABILITY_VERSION_2 0x20071026 > +#define _LINUX_CAPABILITY_U32S_2 2 > + > +#define _LINUX_CAPABILITY_VERSION _LINUX_CAPABILITY_VERSION_2 > +#define _LINUX_CAPABILITY_U32S _LINUX_CAPABILITY_U32S_2 > > typedef struct __user_cap_header_struct { > __u32 version; > @@ -42,41 +49,42 @@ typedef struct __user_cap_data_struct { > __u32 inheritable; > } __user *cap_user_data_t; > > + > #define XATTR_CAPS_SUFFIX "capability" > #define XATTR_NAME_CAPS XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX XATTR_CAPS_SUFFIX > > -#define XATTR_CAPS_SZ (3*sizeof(__le32)) > #define VFS_CAP_REVISION_MASK 0xFF000000 > +#define VFS_CAP_FLAGS_MASK ~VFS_CAP_REVISION_MASK > +#define VFS_CAP_FLAGS_EFFECTIVE 0x000001 > + > #define VFS_CAP_REVISION_1 0x01000000 > +#define VFS_CAP_U32_1 1 > +#define XATTR_CAPS_SZ_1 (sizeof(__le32)*(1 + 2*VFS_CAP_U32_1)) > > -#define VFS_CAP_REVISION VFS_CAP_REVISION_1 > +#define VFS_CAP_REVISION_2 0x02000000 > +#define VFS_CAP_U32_2 2 > +#define XATTR_CAPS_SZ_2 (sizeof(__le32)*(1 + 2*VFS_CAP_U32_2)) > + > +#define XATTR_CAPS_SZ XATTR_CAPS_SZ_2 > +#define VFS_CAP_U32 VFS_CAP_U32_2 > +#define VFS_CAP_REVISION VFS_CAP_REVISION_2 > > -#define VFS_CAP_FLAGS_MASK ~VFS_CAP_REVISION_MASK > -#define VFS_CAP_FLAGS_EFFECTIVE 0x000001 > > struct vfs_cap_data { > - __u32 magic_etc; /* Little endian */ > - __u32 permitted; /* Little endian */ > - __u32 inheritable; /* Little endian */ > + __le32 magic_etc; /* Little endian */ > + struct { > + __le32 permitted; /* Little endian */ > + __le32 inheritable; /* Little endian */ > + } data[VFS_CAP_U32]; > }; > > #ifdef __KERNEL__ > > -/* #define STRICT_CAP_T_TYPECHECKS */ Bold :) I'm not opposed, but we'll have to do a great deal of testing on lots of architectures with lots of .configs. > - > -#ifdef STRICT_CAP_T_TYPECHECKS > - > typedef struct kernel_cap_struct { > - __u32 cap; > + __u32 cap[_LINUX_CAPABILITY_U32S]; > } kernel_cap_t; > > -#else > - > -typedef __u32 kernel_cap_t; > - > -#endif > - > -#define _USER_CAP_HEADER_SIZE (2*sizeof(__u32)) > +#define _USER_CAP_HEADER_SIZE (sizeof(struct __user_cap_header_struct)) > #define _KERNEL_CAP_T_SIZE (sizeof(kernel_cap_t)) > > #endif > @@ -119,10 +127,6 @@ typedef __u32 kernel_cap_t; > > #define CAP_FSETID 4 > > -/* Used to decide between falling back on the old suser() or fsuser(). */ > - > -#define CAP_FS_MASK 0x1f > - > /* Overrides the restriction that the real or effective user ID of a > process sending a signal must match the real or effective user ID > of the process receiving the signal. */ > @@ -145,8 +149,12 @@ typedef __u32 kernel_cap_t; > ** Linux-specific capabilities > **/ > > -/* Transfer any capability in your permitted set to any pid, > - remove any capability in your permitted set from any pid */ > +/* Without VFS support for capabilities: > + * Transfer any capability in your permitted set to any pid, > + * remove any capability in your permitted set from any pid > + * With VFS support for capabilities (neither of above, but) > + * Add any capability to the current process' inheritable set > + */ > > #define CAP_SETPCAP 8 > > @@ -313,64 +321,127 @@ typedef __u32 kernel_cap_t; > * Internal kernel functions only > */ > > -#ifdef STRICT_CAP_T_TYPECHECKS > +#define CAP_TO_INDEX(x) ((x) >> 5) /* 1 << 5 == bits in __u32 */ > +#define CAP_TO_MASK(x) (1 << ((x) & 31)) What is the purpose of the &31 here? > > -#define to_cap_t(x) { x } > -#define cap_t(x) (x).cap > +#define CAP_FS_MASK_0 (CAP_TO_MASK(CAP_CHOWN) \ > + |CAP_TO_MASK(CAP_DAC_OVERRIDE) \ > + |CAP_TO_MASK(CAP_DAC_READ_SEARCH) \ > + |CAP_TO_MASK(CAP_FOWNER) \ > + |CAP_TO_MASK(CAP_FSETID)) > +#define CAP_NFSD_MASK_0 > (CAP_FS_MASK_0|CAP_TO_MASK(CAP_SYS_RESOURCE)) > > -#else > +#define CAP_FS_MASK_1 0 > +#define CAP_NFSD_MASK_1 CAP_FS_MASK_1 Hmm, calling these _LO and _HI would be clearer now, but of course throws off your 96-bit plans. But it took me a moment to figure out what you were doing here especially with the last two lines. How about CAP_FS_MASK_B0 and CAP_FS_MASK_B1 for block0 and block1? > > -#define to_cap_t(x) (x) > -#define cap_t(x) (x) > +#if _LINUX_CAPABILITY_U32S != 2 > +# error Fix up hand-coded capability manipulation macros > +#else /* HAND-CODED capability manipulation macros */ Ok so why not fix it up now, maybe using generic bitmaps like Chris suggested, and using static inlines in place of the #defines? > > -#endif > +# define CAP_EMPTY_SET {{ 0, 0 }} > +# define CAP_FULL_SET {{ ~0, ~0 }} > +# define CAP_INIT_EFF_SET {{ ~CAP_TO_MASK(CAP_SETPCAP), ~0 }} > +# define cap_clear(c) do { (c).cap[0] = 0; (c).cap[1] = 0; } while(0) > +# define cap_set_full(c) do { (c).cap[0] = ~0; (c).cap[1] = ~0; } > while(0) > +# define cap_set_init_eff(c) do { (c).cap[0] = ~CAP_TO_MASK(CAP_SETPCAP); \ > + (c).cap[1] = ~0; } while(0) > +# define cap_isclear(c) ( !((c).cap[0] | (c).cap[1]) ) > > -#define CAP_EMPTY_SET to_cap_t(0) > -#define CAP_FULL_SET to_cap_t(~0) > -#define CAP_INIT_EFF_SET to_cap_t(~0 & ~CAP_TO_MASK(CAP_SETPCAP)) > -#define CAP_INIT_INH_SET to_cap_t(0) > +/* Used to decide between falling back on the old suser() or fsuser(). */ > > -#define CAP_TO_MASK(x) (1 << (x)) > -#define cap_raise(c, flag) (cap_t(c) |= CAP_TO_MASK(flag)) > -#define cap_lower(c, flag) (cap_t(c) &= ~CAP_TO_MASK(flag)) > -#define cap_raised(c, flag) (cap_t(c) & CAP_TO_MASK(flag)) > +# define cap_is_fs_cap(flag) \ > +(CAP_TO_MASK(flag) & (CAP_TO_INDEX(flag) ? CAP_FS_MASK_1:CAP_FS_MASK_2)) > + > +# define cap_raise_non_fs_cap(c,pcaptoo) do { > \ Egads, pcaptoo? :) These probably should become inline functions rather than #defines. > + (c).cap[0] |= ~(CAP_FS_MASK_0|((pcaptoo)?CAP_TO_MASK(CAP_SETPCAP):0));\ > + (c).cap[1] |= ~CAP_FS_MASK_1; \ > +} while (0) > + > +# define cap_drop_fs_cap(c) do { \ > + (c).cap[0] &= ~CAP_FS_MASK_0; \ > + (c).cap[1] &= ~CAP_FS_MASK_1; \ > +} while (0) > + > +# define cap_raise_fs_cap(c) do { \ > + (c).cap[0] |= CAP_FS_MASK_0; \ > + (c).cap[1] |= CAP_FS_MASK_1; \ > +} while (0) > + > +# define cap_raise_permitted_fs_cap(c,p) do { \ > + (c).cap[0] |= (p).cap[0] & CAP_FS_MASK_0; \ > + (c).cap[1] |= (p).cap[1] & CAP_FS_MASK_1; \ > +} while (0) > + > +# define cap_drop_nfsd_cap(c) do { \ > + (c).cap[0] &= ~CAP_NFSD_MASK_0; \ > + (c).cap[1] &= ~CAP_NFSD_MASK_1; \ > +} while (0) > + > +# define cap_raise_nfsd_cap(c,p) do { \ > + (c).cap[0] |= (p).cap[0] & CAP_NFSD_MASK_0; \ > + (c).cap[1] |= (p).cap[1] & CAP_NFSD_MASK_1; \ > +} while (0) > + > +#endif /* _LINUX_CAPABILITY_U32S != 2 */ > + > +#define CAP_INIT_INH_SET CAP_EMPTY_SET > + > +#define cap_raise(c,flag) ((c).cap[CAP_TO_INDEX(flag)] |= CAP_TO_MASK(flag)) > +#define cap_lower(c,flag) ((c).cap[CAP_TO_INDEX(flag)] &= > ~CAP_TO_MASK(flag)) > +#define cap_raised(c,flag) ((c).cap[CAP_TO_INDEX(flag)] & CAP_TO_MASK(flag)) > + > +#define CAP_BOP_ALL(c, a, b, OP) \ > +do { \ > + int __capi; \ > + for (__capi=0; __capi<_LINUX_CAPABILITY_U32S; ++__capi) { \ > + c.cap[__capi] = a.cap[__capi] OP b.cap[__capi]; \ > + } \ > +} while (0) > + > +#define CAP_UOP_ALL(c, a, OP) \ > +do { \ > + int __capi; \ > + for (__capi=0; __capi<_LINUX_CAPABILITY_U32S; ++__capi) { \ > + c.cap[__capi] = OP a.cap[__capi]; \ > + } \ > +} while (0) > > static inline kernel_cap_t cap_combine(kernel_cap_t a, kernel_cap_t b) > { > - kernel_cap_t dest; > - cap_t(dest) = cap_t(a) | cap_t(b); > - return dest; > + kernel_cap_t dest; > + CAP_BOP_ALL(dest, a, b, |); > + return dest; > } > > static inline kernel_cap_t cap_intersect(kernel_cap_t a, kernel_cap_t b) > { > - kernel_cap_t dest; > - cap_t(dest) = cap_t(a) & cap_t(b); > - return dest; > + kernel_cap_t dest; > + CAP_BOP_ALL(dest, a, b, &); > + return dest; > } > > static inline kernel_cap_t cap_drop(kernel_cap_t a, kernel_cap_t drop) > { > - kernel_cap_t dest; > - cap_t(dest) = cap_t(a) & ~cap_t(drop); > - return dest; > + kernel_cap_t dest; > + CAP_BOP_ALL(dest, a, drop, &~); > + return dest; > } > > static inline kernel_cap_t cap_invert(kernel_cap_t c) > { > - kernel_cap_t dest; > - cap_t(dest) = ~cap_t(c); > - return dest; > + kernel_cap_t dest; > + CAP_UOP_ALL(dest, c, ~); > + return dest; > } > > -#define cap_isclear(c) (!cap_t(c)) > -#define cap_issubset(a,set) (!(cap_t(a) & ~cap_t(set))) > - > -#define cap_clear(c) do { cap_t(c) = 0; } while(0) > -#define cap_set_full(c) do { cap_t(c) = ~0; } while(0) > -#define cap_mask(c,mask) do { cap_t(c) &= cap_t(mask); } while(0) > +static inline int cap_issubset(kernel_cap_t a, kernel_cap_t set) > +{ > + kernel_cap_t dest; > + dest = cap_drop(a, set); > + return cap_isclear(dest); > +} > > -#define cap_is_fs_cap(c) (CAP_TO_MASK(c) & CAP_FS_MASK) > +#define cap_mask(c, mask) do { c = cap_intersect(c, mask); } while(0) > > int capable(int cap); > int __capable(struct task_struct *t, int cap); > diff --git a/kernel/capability.c b/kernel/capability.c > index efbd9cd..e60b487 100644 > --- a/kernel/capability.c > +++ b/kernel/capability.c > @@ -38,16 +38,31 @@ static DEFINE_SPINLOCK(task_capability_lock); > */ > asmlinkage long sys_capget(cap_user_header_t header, cap_user_data_t dataptr) > { > + static int warned = 0; > int ret = 0; > pid_t pid; > __u32 version; > struct task_struct *target; > - struct __user_cap_data_struct data; > + unsigned tocopy; > + kernel_cap_t pE, pI, pP; > > if (get_user(version, &header->version)) > return -EFAULT; > > - if (version != _LINUX_CAPABILITY_VERSION) { > + switch (version) { > + case _LINUX_CAPABILITY_VERSION_1: > + if (warned < 5) { > + warned++; > + printk(KERN_INFO > + "warning: process `%s' gets w/ old libcap\n", > + current->comm); > + } > + tocopy = _LINUX_CAPABILITY_U32S_1; > + break; > + case _LINUX_CAPABILITY_VERSION_2: > + tocopy = _LINUX_CAPABILITY_U32S_2; > + break; > + default: > if (put_user(_LINUX_CAPABILITY_VERSION, &header->version)) > return -EFAULT; > return -EINVAL; > @@ -71,14 +86,34 @@ asmlinkage long sys_capget(cap_user_header_t header, > cap_user_data_t dataptr) > } else > target = current; > > - ret = security_capget(target, &data.effective, &data.inheritable, > &data.permitted); > + ret = security_capget(target, &pE, &pI, &pP); > > out: > read_unlock(&tasklist_lock); > spin_unlock(&task_capability_lock); > > - if (!ret && copy_to_user(dataptr, &data, sizeof data)) > - return -EFAULT; > + if (!ret) { > + struct __user_cap_data_struct kdata[_LINUX_CAPABILITY_U32S]; > + unsigned i; > + > + for (i=0; i<tocopy; i++) { > + kdata[i].effective = pE.cap[i]; > + kdata[i].permitted = pP.cap[i]; > + kdata[i].inheritable = pP.cap[i]; > + } > + while (i<_LINUX_CAPABILITY_U32S) { > + if (pE.cap[i] || pP.cap[i] || pP.cap[i]) { > + /* Cannot represent w/ legacy structure */ > + return -EINVAL; > + } > + i++; > + } > + > + if (copy_to_user(dataptr, kdata, tocopy > + * sizeof(struct __user_cap_data_struct))) { > + return -EFAULT; > + } > + } The function definately needs to be reworked to clean up the flow at this point, but it looks correct. In my own version I got it wrong at least twice before it worked :) > > return ret; > } > @@ -167,6 +202,9 @@ static inline int cap_set_all(kernel_cap_t *effective, > */ > asmlinkage long sys_capset(cap_user_header_t header, const cap_user_data_t > data) > { > + static int warned = 0; > + struct __user_cap_data_struct kdata[_LINUX_CAPABILITY_U32S]; > + unsigned i, tocopy; > kernel_cap_t inheritable, permitted, effective; > __u32 version; > struct task_struct *target; > @@ -176,7 +214,20 @@ asmlinkage long sys_capset(cap_user_header_t header, > const cap_user_data_t data) > if (get_user(version, &header->version)) > return -EFAULT; > > - if (version != _LINUX_CAPABILITY_VERSION) { > + switch (version) { > + case _LINUX_CAPABILITY_VERSION_1: > + if (warned < 5) { > + warned++; > + printk(KERN_INFO > + "warning: process `%s' sets w/ old libcap\n", > + current->comm); > + } > + tocopy = _LINUX_CAPABILITY_U32S_1; > + break; > + case _LINUX_CAPABILITY_VERSION_2: > + tocopy = _LINUX_CAPABILITY_U32S_2; > + break; > + default: > if (put_user(_LINUX_CAPABILITY_VERSION, &header->version)) > return -EFAULT; > return -EINVAL; > @@ -188,10 +239,22 @@ asmlinkage long sys_capset(cap_user_header_t header, > const cap_user_data_t data) > if (pid && pid != task_pid_vnr(current) && !capable(CAP_SETPCAP)) > return -EPERM; > > - if (copy_from_user(&effective, &data->effective, sizeof(effective)) || > - copy_from_user(&inheritable, &data->inheritable, > sizeof(inheritable)) || > - copy_from_user(&permitted, &data->permitted, sizeof(permitted))) > + if (copy_from_user(&kdata, data, tocopy > + * sizeof(struct __user_cap_data_struct))) { > return -EFAULT; > + } > + > + for (i=0; i<tocopy; i++) { > + effective.cap[i] = kdata[i].effective; > + permitted.cap[i] = kdata[i].permitted; > + inheritable.cap[i] = kdata[i].inheritable; > + } > + while (i<_LINUX_CAPABILITY_U32S) { > + effective.cap[i] = 0; > + permitted.cap[i] = 0; > + inheritable.cap[i] = 0; > + i++; > + } > > spin_lock(&task_capability_lock); > read_lock(&tasklist_lock); > diff --git a/mm/oom_kill.c b/mm/oom_kill.c > index 91a081a..8791c26 100644 > --- a/mm/oom_kill.c > +++ b/mm/oom_kill.c > @@ -125,8 +125,7 @@ unsigned long badness(struct task_struct *p, unsigned > long uptime) > * Superuser processes are usually more important, so we make it > * less likely that we kill those. > */ > - if (cap_t(p->cap_effective) & CAP_TO_MASK(CAP_SYS_ADMIN) || > - p->uid == 0 || p->euid == 0) > + if (__capable(p, CAP_SYS_ADMIN) || p->uid == 0 || p->euid == 0) > points /= 4; > > /* > @@ -135,7 +134,7 @@ unsigned long badness(struct task_struct *p, unsigned > long uptime) > * tend to only have this flag set on applications they think > * of as important. > */ > - if (cap_t(p->cap_effective) & CAP_TO_MASK(CAP_SYS_RAWIO)) > + if (__capable(p, CAP_SYS_RAWIO)) > points /= 4; > > /* > diff --git a/security/commoncap.c b/security/commoncap.c > index bf67871..b97da15 100644 > --- a/security/commoncap.c > +++ b/security/commoncap.c > @@ -1,4 +1,4 @@ > -/* Common capabilities, needed by capability.o and root_plug.o > +/* Common capabilities, needed by capability.o and root_plug.o > * > * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify > * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by > @@ -87,9 +87,9 @@ int cap_capget (struct task_struct *target, kernel_cap_t > *effective, > kernel_cap_t *inheritable, kernel_cap_t *permitted) > { > /* Derived from kernel/capability.c:sys_capget. */ > - *effective = cap_t (target->cap_effective); > - *inheritable = cap_t (target->cap_inheritable); > - *permitted = cap_t (target->cap_permitted); > + *effective = target->cap_effective; > + *inheritable = target->cap_inheritable; > + *permitted = target->cap_permitted; > return 0; > } > > @@ -191,28 +191,51 @@ int cap_inode_killpriv(struct dentry *dentry) > } > > static inline int cap_from_disk(struct vfs_cap_data *caps, > - struct linux_binprm *bprm, > - int size) > + struct linux_binprm *bprm, unsigned size) > { > __u32 magic_etc; > + unsigned tocopy, i; > > - if (size != XATTR_CAPS_SZ) > + if (size < sizeof(magic_etc)) { > return -EINVAL; > + } > > - magic_etc = le32_to_cpu(caps->magic_etc); > + magic_etc = le32_to_cpu(caps.magic_etc); > > switch ((magic_etc & VFS_CAP_REVISION_MASK)) { > - case VFS_CAP_REVISION: > - if (magic_etc & VFS_CAP_FLAGS_EFFECTIVE) > - bprm->cap_effective = true; > - else > - bprm->cap_effective = false; > - bprm->cap_permitted = to_cap_t(le32_to_cpu(caps->permitted)); > - bprm->cap_inheritable = > to_cap_t(le32_to_cpu(caps->inheritable)); > - return 0; > + case VFS_CAP_REVISION_1: > + if (size != XATTR_CAPS_SZ_1) { > + return -EINVAL; > + } > + tocopy = VFS_CAP_U32_1; > + break; > + case VFS_CAP_REVISION_2: > + if (size != XATTR_CAPS_SZ_2) { > + return -EINVAL; > + } > + tocopy = VFS_CAP_U32_2; > + break; > default: > return -EINVAL; > } > + > + if (magic_etc & VFS_CAP_FLAGS_EFFECTIVE) { > + bprm->cap_effective = true; > + } else { > + bprm->cap_effective = false; > + } > + > + for (i=0; i<tocopy; ++i) { > + bprm->cap_permitted[i] = le32_to_cpu(caps.data[i].permitted); > + bprm->cap_inheritable[i] = > + le32_to_cpu(caps.data[i].inheritable); > + } > + for (i=tocopy; i<VFS_CAP_U32; ++i) { > + bprm->cap_permitted[i] = 0; > + bprm->cap_inheritable[i] = 0; > + } > + > + return 0; > } > > /* Locate any VFS capabilities: */ > @@ -220,7 +243,7 @@ static int get_file_caps(struct linux_binprm *bprm) > { > struct dentry *dentry; > int rc = 0; > - struct vfs_cap_data incaps; > + struct vfs_cap_data vcaps; > struct inode *inode; > > if (bprm->file->f_vfsmnt->mnt_flags & MNT_NOSUID) { > @@ -233,14 +256,8 @@ static int get_file_caps(struct linux_binprm *bprm) > if (!inode->i_op || !inode->i_op->getxattr) > goto out; > > - rc = inode->i_op->getxattr(dentry, XATTR_NAME_CAPS, NULL, 0); > - if (rc > 0) { > - if (rc == XATTR_CAPS_SZ) > - rc = inode->i_op->getxattr(dentry, XATTR_NAME_CAPS, > - &incaps, XATTR_CAPS_SZ); > - else > - rc = -EINVAL; > - } > + rc = inode->i_op->getxattr(dentry, XATTR_NAME_CAPS, &vcaps, > + XATTR_CAPS_SZ); > if (rc == -ENODATA || rc == -EOPNOTSUPP) { > /* no data, that's ok */ > rc = 0; > @@ -249,7 +266,7 @@ static int get_file_caps(struct linux_binprm *bprm) > if (rc < 0) > goto out; > > - rc = cap_from_disk(&incaps, bprm, rc); > + rc = cap_from_disk(vcaps, bprm, rc); > if (rc) > printk(KERN_NOTICE "%s: cap_from_disk returned %d for %s\n", > __FUNCTION__, rc, bprm->filename); > @@ -344,8 +361,11 @@ void cap_bprm_apply_creds (struct linux_binprm *bprm, > int unsafe) > * capability rules */ > if (!is_global_init(current)) { > current->cap_permitted = new_permitted; > - current->cap_effective = bprm->cap_effective ? > - new_permitted : 0; > + if (bprm->cap_effective) { > + current->cap_effective = new_permitted; > + } else { > + cap_clear(current->cap_effective); > + } > } > > /* AUD: Audit candidate if current->cap_effective is set */ > @@ -467,13 +487,13 @@ int cap_task_post_setuid (uid_t old_ruid, uid_t > old_euid, uid_t old_suid, > > if (!issecure (SECURE_NO_SETUID_FIXUP)) { > if (old_fsuid == 0 && current->fsuid != 0) { > - cap_t (current->cap_effective) &= > - ~CAP_FS_MASK; > + cap_drop_fs_cap( > + current->cap_effective); > } > if (old_fsuid != 0 && current->fsuid == 0) { > - cap_t (current->cap_effective) |= > - (cap_t (current->cap_permitted) & > - CAP_FS_MASK); > + cap_raise_permitted_fs_cap( > + current->cap_effective, > + current->cap_permitted); > } > } > break; > @@ -564,9 +584,9 @@ int cap_task_kill(struct task_struct *p, struct siginfo > *info, > > void cap_task_reparent_to_init (struct task_struct *p) > { > - p->cap_effective = CAP_INIT_EFF_SET; > - p->cap_inheritable = CAP_INIT_INH_SET; > - p->cap_permitted = CAP_FULL_SET; > + cap_set_init_eff(p->cap_effective); > + cap_clear(p->cap_inheritable); > + cap_set_full(p->cap_permitted); > p->keep_capabilities = 0; > return; > } > diff --git a/security/dummy.c b/security/dummy.c > index 6d895ad..e55069c 100644 > --- a/security/dummy.c > +++ b/security/dummy.c > @@ -36,14 +36,17 @@ static int dummy_ptrace (struct task_struct *parent, > struct task_struct *child) > static int dummy_capget (struct task_struct *target, kernel_cap_t * > effective, > kernel_cap_t * inheritable, kernel_cap_t * permitted) > { > - *effective = *inheritable = *permitted = 0; > + cap_clear(*effective); > + cap_clear(*inheritable); > + cap_clear(*permitted); > + > if (target->euid == 0) { > - *permitted |= (~0 & ~CAP_FS_MASK); > - *effective |= (~0 & ~CAP_TO_MASK(CAP_SETPCAP) & ~CAP_FS_MASK); > + cap_raise_non_fs_cap(*permitted, 1); > + cap_raise_non_fs_cap(*effective, 0); 1 and 0 need to be replaced with understandable #defines, maybe WITH_PCAP and WITHOUT_PCAP. > } > if (target->fsuid == 0) { > - *permitted |= CAP_FS_MASK; > - *effective |= CAP_FS_MASK; > + cap_raise_fs_cap(*permitted); > + cap_raise_fs_cap(*effective); > } > return 0; > } > -- > 1.5.1.3 > - To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-security-module" in the body of a message to [EMAIL PROTECTED] More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html