Serge E. Hallyn wrote: > Quoting Stephen Smalley ([EMAIL PROTECTED]): > >> I agree with this part - we don't want people to have to choose between >> using containers and using selinux, so if hijack is going to be a >> requirement for effective use of containers, then we need to make them >> work together. >> > Absolutely, we just need to decide how to properly make it work with > selinux. Maybe we check for > > allow (current_domain):(hijacked_process_domain) hijack > type_transition hijacked_process_domain \ > vserver_enter_binary_t:process vserver1_hijack_admin_t; > Is there to be an LSM hook, so that modules can decide on an arbitrary decision of whether to allow a hijack? So that this "do the right SELinux" thing can be generalized for all LSMs to do the right thing.
Crispin -- Crispin Cowan, Ph.D. http://crispincowan.com/~crispin CEO, Mercenary Linux http://mercenarylinux.com/ Itanium. Vista. GPLv3. Complexity at work - To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-security-module" in the body of a message to [EMAIL PROTECTED] More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html
