On Fri, 2007-12-14 at 16:50 -0500, Paul Moore wrote:
> Add an inet_sys_snd_skb() LSM hook to allow the LSM to provide packet level
> access control for all outbound packets. Using the existing postroute_last
> netfilter hook turns out to be problematic as it is can be invoked multiple
> times for a single packet, e.g. individual IPsec transforms, adding unwanted
> overhead and complicating the security policy.
None of the netfilter hooks works for this purpose?
Obviously this one needs to get seen on netdev.
> ---
>
> include/linux/security.h | 11 +++++++++++
> net/ipv4/ip_output.c | 7 +++++++
> net/ipv6/ip6_output.c | 5 +++++
> security/dummy.c | 8 +++++++-
> security/security.c | 6 ++++++
> 5 files changed, 36 insertions(+), 1 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h
> index db19c92..1b8d332 100644
> --- a/include/linux/security.h
> +++ b/include/linux/security.h
> @@ -876,6 +876,10 @@ struct request_sock;
> * Sets the connection's peersid to the secmark on skb.
> * @req_classify_flow:
> * Sets the flow's sid to the openreq sid.
> + * @inet_sys_snd_skb:
> + * Check permissions on outgoing network packets.
> + * @skb is the packet to check
> + * @family is the packet's address family
> *
> * Security hooks for XFRM operations.
> *
> @@ -1416,6 +1420,7 @@ struct security_operations {
> void (*inet_csk_clone)(struct sock *newsk, const struct request_sock
> *req);
> void (*inet_conn_established)(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb);
> void (*req_classify_flow)(const struct request_sock *req, struct flowi
> *fl);
> + int (*inet_sys_snd_skb)(struct sk_buff *skb, int family);
> #endif /* CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK */
>
> #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK_XFRM
> @@ -2328,6 +2333,7 @@ void security_sk_free(struct sock *sk);
> void security_sk_clone(const struct sock *sk, struct sock *newsk);
> void security_sk_classify_flow(struct sock *sk, struct flowi *fl);
> void security_req_classify_flow(const struct request_sock *req, struct flowi
> *fl);
> +int security_inet_sys_snd_skb(struct sk_buff *skb, int family);
> void security_sock_graft(struct sock*sk, struct socket *parent);
> int security_inet_conn_request(struct sock *sk,
> struct sk_buff *skb, struct request_sock *req);
> @@ -2471,6 +2477,11 @@ static inline void security_req_classify_flow(const
> struct request_sock *req, st
> {
> }
>
> +static inline int security_inet_sys_snd_skb(struct sk_buff *skb, int family)
> +{
> + return 0;
> +}
> +
> static inline void security_sock_graft(struct sock* sk, struct socket
> *parent)
> {
> }
> diff --git a/net/ipv4/ip_output.c b/net/ipv4/ip_output.c
> index fd99fbd..82a7297 100644
> --- a/net/ipv4/ip_output.c
> +++ b/net/ipv4/ip_output.c
> @@ -204,6 +204,8 @@ static inline int ip_skb_dst_mtu(struct sk_buff *skb)
>
> static int ip_finish_output(struct sk_buff *skb)
> {
> + int err;
> +
> #if defined(CONFIG_NETFILTER) && defined(CONFIG_XFRM)
> /* Policy lookup after SNAT yielded a new policy */
> if (skb->dst->xfrm != NULL) {
> @@ -211,6 +213,11 @@ static int ip_finish_output(struct sk_buff *skb)
> return dst_output(skb);
> }
> #endif
> +
> + err = security_inet_sys_snd_skb(skb, AF_INET);
> + if (err)
> + return err;
> +
> if (skb->len > ip_skb_dst_mtu(skb) && !skb_is_gso(skb))
> return ip_fragment(skb, ip_finish_output2);
> else
> diff --git a/net/ipv6/ip6_output.c b/net/ipv6/ip6_output.c
> index 6338a9c..44ddf32 100644
> --- a/net/ipv6/ip6_output.c
> +++ b/net/ipv6/ip6_output.c
> @@ -72,8 +72,13 @@ static __inline__ void ipv6_select_ident(struct sk_buff
> *skb, struct frag_hdr *f
>
> static int ip6_output_finish(struct sk_buff *skb)
> {
> + int err;
> struct dst_entry *dst = skb->dst;
>
> + err = security_inet_sys_snd_skb(skb, AF_INET6);
> + if (err)
> + return err;
> +
> if (dst->hh)
> return neigh_hh_output(dst->hh, skb);
> else if (dst->neighbour)
> diff --git a/security/dummy.c b/security/dummy.c
> index 0b62f95..384979a 100644
> --- a/security/dummy.c
> +++ b/security/dummy.c
> @@ -848,6 +848,11 @@ static inline void dummy_req_classify_flow(const struct
> request_sock *req,
> struct flowi *fl)
> {
> }
> +
> +static inline int dummy_inet_sys_snd_skb(struct sk_buff *skb, int family)
> +{
> + return 0;
> +}
> #endif /* CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK */
>
> #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK_XFRM
> @@ -1122,7 +1127,8 @@ void security_fixup_ops (struct security_operations
> *ops)
> set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, inet_csk_clone);
> set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, inet_conn_established);
> set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, req_classify_flow);
> - #endif /* CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK */
> + set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, inet_sys_snd_skb);
> +#endif /* CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK */
> #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK_XFRM
> set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, xfrm_policy_alloc_security);
> set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, xfrm_policy_clone_security);
> diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
> index 3bdcada..7f55459 100644
> --- a/security/security.c
> +++ b/security/security.c
> @@ -961,6 +961,12 @@ void security_req_classify_flow(const struct
> request_sock *req, struct flowi *fl
> }
> EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_req_classify_flow);
>
> +int security_inet_sys_snd_skb(struct sk_buff *skb, int family)
> +{
> + return security_ops->inet_sys_snd_skb(skb, family);
> +}
> +EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_inet_sys_snd_skb);
> +
> void security_sock_graft(struct sock *sk, struct socket *parent)
> {
> security_ops->sock_graft(sk, parent);
>
>
> --
> This message was distributed to subscribers of the selinux mailing list.
> If you no longer wish to subscribe, send mail to [EMAIL PROTECTED] with
> the words "unsubscribe selinux" without quotes as the message.
--
Stephen Smalley
National Security Agency
-
To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe
linux-security-module" in
the body of a message to [EMAIL PROTECTED]
More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html
