Call tpm_seal_trusted() and tpm_unseal_trusted() for TPM 2.0 chips.

Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakki...@linux.intel.com>
---
 drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-cmd.c |  2 +-
 include/linux/tpm_command.h |  1 -
 security/keys/trusted.c     | 18 ++++++++++++++----
 security/keys/trusted.h     |  7 +++++++
 4 files changed, 22 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)

diff --git a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-cmd.c b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-cmd.c
index 0986c96..0fba698 100644
--- a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-cmd.c
+++ b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-cmd.c
@@ -422,7 +422,7 @@ static int tpm2_load(struct tpm_chip *chip,
                             options->keyauth /* hmac */,
                             TPM_DIGEST_SIZE);
 
-       tpm_buf_append(&buf, payload->blob, payload->blob_len);
+       tpm_buf_append(&buf, payload->blob, blob_len);
 
        rc = tpm_transmit_cmd(chip, buf.data, TPM_BUF_SIZE, "loading blob");
        if (!rc)
diff --git a/include/linux/tpm_command.h b/include/linux/tpm_command.h
index 727512e..d7b0f82 100644
--- a/include/linux/tpm_command.h
+++ b/include/linux/tpm_command.h
@@ -22,7 +22,6 @@
 #define TPM_ORD_UNSEAL                  24
 
 /* Other constants */
-#define SRKHANDLE                       0x40000000
 #define TPM_NONCE_SIZE                  20
 
 #endif
diff --git a/security/keys/trusted.c b/security/keys/trusted.c
index c0594cb..f6557b1 100644
--- a/security/keys/trusted.c
+++ b/security/keys/trusted.c
@@ -601,7 +601,7 @@ static int tpm_unseal(struct tpm_buf *tb,
        }
 
        ordinal = htonl(TPM_ORD_UNSEAL);
-       keyhndl = htonl(SRKHANDLE);
+       keyhndl = htonl(TPM1_SRKHANDLE);
        ret = tpm_get_random(TPM_ANY_NUM, nonceodd, TPM_NONCE_SIZE);
        if (ret != TPM_NONCE_SIZE) {
                pr_info("trusted_key: tpm_get_random failed (%d)\n", ret);
@@ -867,7 +867,11 @@ static struct trusted_key_options 
*trusted_options_alloc(void)
        if (options) {
                /* set any non-zero defaults */
                options->keytype = SRK_keytype;
-               options->keyhandle = SRKHANDLE;
+
+               if (tpm_is_tpm2(TPM_ANY_NUM))
+                       options->keyhandle = TPM2_SRKHANDLE;
+               else
+                       options->keyhandle = TPM1_SRKHANDLE;
        }
        return options;
 }
@@ -937,7 +941,10 @@ static int trusted_instantiate(struct key *key,
 
        switch (key_cmd) {
        case Opt_load:
-               ret = key_unseal(payload, options);
+               if (tpm_is_tpm2(TPM_ANY_NUM))
+                       ret = tpm_unseal_trusted(TPM_ANY_NUM, payload, options);
+               else
+                       ret = key_unseal(payload, options);
                dump_payload(payload);
                dump_options(options);
                if (ret < 0)
@@ -950,7 +957,10 @@ static int trusted_instantiate(struct key *key,
                        pr_info("trusted_key: key_create failed (%d)\n", ret);
                        goto out;
                }
-               ret = key_seal(payload, options);
+               if (tpm_is_tpm2(TPM_ANY_NUM))
+                       ret = tpm_seal_trusted(TPM_ANY_NUM, payload, options);
+               else
+                       ret = key_seal(payload, options);
                if (ret < 0)
                        pr_info("trusted_key: key_seal failed (%d)\n", ret);
                break;
diff --git a/security/keys/trusted.h b/security/keys/trusted.h
index ff001a5..fc32c47 100644
--- a/security/keys/trusted.h
+++ b/security/keys/trusted.h
@@ -12,6 +12,13 @@
 #define TPM_RETURN_OFFSET              6
 #define TPM_DATA_OFFSET                        10
 
+/* Transient object handles start from 0x80000000 in TPM 2.0, which makes it
+ * a sane default.
+ */
+
+#define TPM1_SRKHANDLE 0x40000000
+#define TPM2_SRKHANDLE 0x80000000
+
 #define LOAD32(buffer, offset) (ntohl(*(uint32_t *)&buffer[offset]))
 #define LOAD32N(buffer, offset)        (*(uint32_t *)&buffer[offset])
 #define LOAD16(buffer, offset) (ntohs(*(uint16_t *)&buffer[offset]))
-- 
2.5.0

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