While creating a temporary list of new rules, the ima_appraise flag is
updated, but not reverted on failure to append the new rules to the
existing policy. This patch defines temp_ima_appraise flag. Only when
the new rules are appended to the policy is the flag updated.
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zo...@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
---
security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c | 7 +++++--
1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
index 2f4e0f5..ba5d2fc 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
@@ -40,6 +40,7 @@
#define AUDIT 0x0040
int ima_policy_flag;
+static int temp_ima_appraise;
#define MAX_LSM_RULES 6
enum lsm_rule_types { LSM_OBJ_USER, LSM_OBJ_ROLE, LSM_OBJ_TYPE,
@@ -370,6 +371,7 @@ void ima_update_policy_flag(void)
ima_policy_flag |= entry->action;
}
+ ima_appraise |= temp_ima_appraise;
if (!ima_appraise)
ima_policy_flag &= ~IMA_APPRAISE;
}
@@ -757,9 +759,9 @@ static int ima_parse_rule(char *rule, struct ima_rule_entry
*entry)
if (!result && (entry->action == UNKNOWN))
result = -EINVAL;
else if (entry->func == MODULE_CHECK)
- ima_appraise |= IMA_APPRAISE_MODULES;
+ temp_ima_appraise |= IMA_APPRAISE_MODULES;
else if (entry->func == FIRMWARE_CHECK)
- ima_appraise |= IMA_APPRAISE_FIRMWARE;
+ temp_ima_appraise |= IMA_APPRAISE_FIRMWARE;
audit_log_format(ab, "res=%d", !result);
audit_log_end(ab);
return result;
@@ -821,6 +823,7 @@ void ima_delete_rules(void)
struct ima_rule_entry *entry, *tmp;
int i;
+ temp_ima_appraise = 0;
list_for_each_entry_safe(entry, tmp, &ima_temp_rules, list) {
for (i = 0; i < MAX_LSM_RULES; i++)
kfree(entry->lsm[i].args_p);
--
2.1.0
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