On Wed, Apr 29, 2026, Michael Roth wrote: > On Fri, Apr 24, 2026 at 12:08:45PM -0700, Ackerley Tng wrote: > > Michael Roth <[email protected]> writes: > > > > Thank you for your patches! > > > > > > > > [...snip...] > > > > > >> > > >> I also did some minor updates (prefixed with a "[squash]" tag) to > > >> advertise > > >> the KVM_SET_MEMORY_ATTRIBUTES2_PRESERVED flag so it can be used by > > > > > > Though I'm not sure how we deal with it if SNP/TDX at some point become > > > capable of using the PRESERVED flag *after* populate... but maybe that's > > > too unlikely to worry about? If we wanted to address it though, we could > > > have both PRESERVED and PRESERVED_BEFORE_LAUNCH so they can be > > > enumerated separately from the start. > > > > > > > Not sure how likely it is, but if SNP and TDX can honor PRESERVE > > semantics after populate, I think we could implement support under a new > > flag like CIPHER. > > That works, but it still makes things *slightly* awkward due to special-casing > the PRESERVE semantics for 1 guest type vs. another.
Summarizing this week's PUCK call[*]: Scrap PRESERVE and ZERO, and simply rely on vendor specific semantics. My desire to enforce PRESERVE and ZERO semantics and avoid relying on vendor specific behavior (i.e. on trusted firmware semantics) is a pipe dream. Unless KVM does a truly insane amount of per-gfn tracking, KVM can't know the state of memory for a given page, and so can't guarantee PRESERVE or ZERO will be honored. If userspace requests PRESERVE, just because it's _possible_ to preserve contents (e.g. during the pre-boot phase on TDX), doesn't mean the contents are _guaranteed_ to be preserved. If userspace doesn't actually ADD the memory to the guest's initial image, then the contents won't be preserved. Ditto for SNP. To guarantee PRESERVE, KVM would need to track per-gfn information to know if the memory was actually preserved. And enforcing PRESERVE would be all kinds of crazy; KVM would have to kill the VM or something? And that would still require userspace to be aware of vendor specific details. The same holds true for ZERO. On a private=>shared conversion, KVM can't guarantee the memory is zeroed by trusted firmware unless KVM tracks, per-gfn, whether or not the memory was actually fully assigned to the guest. E.g. if userspace does shared=>private and then private=>shared(ZERO), without the memory being faulted into the guest, then the TDX-Module won't have "seen" the page and so wont' have zeroed it on the private=>shared conversion. And trying to special case SNP's "validated CPUID" behavior, where memory can be preserved on private=>shared after a failed shared=>private, would also require tracking that the page was never actually converted to private. Note, regarding ZERO, someone (Mike? Ackerley?) pointed out that userspace typically doesn't rely on the kernel to zero memory, and so supporting ZERO for private=>shared isn't really all that valuable in the first place. [*] https://drive.google.com/file/d/1w0ifzh5PmNViJ1SKru9jK9x52MybXSNa/view?usp=drive_link
