The inode_setattr hook is called from notify_change(), which now holds a struct path and used to derive the idmap and dentry from it just for the hook. The other in-kernel caller, the fat and exfat attribute ioctls, already holds a struct file and can pass its f_path directly.
Convert the hook and its SELinux, Smack and EVM implementations to take a const struct path. The implementations derive the idmap and dentry they still need from the path, so this is a purely mechanical change with no behavior change. Assisted-by: opencode: glm-5.3 Signed-off-by: Cai Xinchen <[email protected]> --- fs/attr.c | 2 +- fs/exfat/file.c | 3 +-- fs/fat/file.c | 3 +-- include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h | 2 +- include/linux/security.h | 6 ++---- security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c | 7 ++++--- security/security.c | 10 ++++------ security/selinux/hooks.c | 3 ++- security/smack/smack_lsm.c | 3 ++- 9 files changed, 18 insertions(+), 21 deletions(-) diff --git a/fs/attr.c b/fs/attr.c index 8524d35421f0..3a05e50d9c51 100644 --- a/fs/attr.c +++ b/fs/attr.c @@ -518,7 +518,7 @@ static int do_notify_change(const struct path *const path, * filesystem, were already checked on the user-facing path. */ if (path) { - error = security_inode_setattr(idmap, dentry, attr); + error = security_inode_setattr(path, attr); if (error) return error; } diff --git a/fs/exfat/file.c b/fs/exfat/file.c index 1386149916bb..0d431c0b595b 100644 --- a/fs/exfat/file.c +++ b/fs/exfat/file.c @@ -551,8 +551,7 @@ static int exfat_ioctl_set_attributes(struct file *file, u32 __user *user_attr) * out the RO attribute for checking by the security * module, just because it maps to a file mode. */ - err = security_inode_setattr(file_mnt_idmap(file), - file->f_path.dentry, &ia); + err = security_inode_setattr(&file->f_path, &ia); if (err) goto out_unlock_inode; diff --git a/fs/fat/file.c b/fs/fat/file.c index d4f1b360b974..4f8dbca28667 100644 --- a/fs/fat/file.c +++ b/fs/fat/file.c @@ -92,8 +92,7 @@ static int fat_ioctl_set_attributes(struct file *file, u32 __user *user_attr) * out the RO attribute for checking by the security * module, just because it maps to a file mode. */ - err = security_inode_setattr(file_mnt_idmap(file), - file->f_path.dentry, &ia); + err = security_inode_setattr(&file->f_path, &ia); if (err) goto out_unlock_inode; diff --git a/include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h b/include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h index 98ce7c814f01..ff3dbe443007 100644 --- a/include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h +++ b/include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h @@ -142,7 +142,7 @@ LSM_HOOK(int, 0, inode_follow_link, struct dentry *dentry, struct inode *inode, bool rcu) LSM_HOOK(int, 0, inode_permission, const struct mnt_idmap *idmap, struct inode *inode, int mask) -LSM_HOOK(int, 0, inode_setattr, const struct mnt_idmap *idmap, struct dentry *dentry, +LSM_HOOK(int, 0, inode_setattr, const struct path *path, struct iattr *attr) LSM_HOOK(void, LSM_RET_VOID, inode_post_setattr, const struct mnt_idmap *idmap, struct dentry *dentry, int ia_valid) diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h index 26996f546ab2..e821adaeaf01 100644 --- a/include/linux/security.h +++ b/include/linux/security.h @@ -429,8 +429,7 @@ int security_inode_follow_link(struct dentry *dentry, struct inode *inode, bool rcu); int security_inode_permission(const struct mnt_idmap *idmap, struct inode *inode, int mask); -int security_inode_setattr(const struct mnt_idmap *idmap, - struct dentry *dentry, struct iattr *attr); +int security_inode_setattr(const struct path *path, struct iattr *attr); void security_inode_post_setattr(const struct mnt_idmap *idmap, struct dentry *dentry, int ia_valid); int security_inode_getattr(const struct path *path); @@ -1001,8 +1000,7 @@ static inline int security_inode_permission(const struct mnt_idmap *idmap, return 0; } -static inline int security_inode_setattr(const struct mnt_idmap *idmap, - struct dentry *dentry, +static inline int security_inode_setattr(const struct path *path, struct iattr *attr) { return 0; diff --git a/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c b/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c index ac8328812e6e..61460e3caedc 100644 --- a/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c +++ b/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c @@ -949,18 +949,19 @@ static int evm_attr_change(const struct mnt_idmap *idmap, /** * evm_inode_setattr - prevent updating an invalid EVM extended attribute - * @idmap: idmap of the mount - * @dentry: pointer to the affected dentry + * @path: pointer to the affected object * @attr: iattr structure containing the new file attributes * * Permit update of file attributes when files have a valid EVM signature, * except in the case of them having an immutable portable signature. */ -static int evm_inode_setattr(const struct mnt_idmap *idmap, struct dentry *dentry, +static int evm_inode_setattr(const struct path *path, struct iattr *attr) { unsigned int ia_valid = attr->ia_valid; enum integrity_status evm_status; + struct dentry *dentry = path->dentry; + const struct mnt_idmap *idmap = mnt_idmap(path->mnt); /* Policy permits modification of the protected attrs even though * there's no HMAC key loaded diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c index c9fb7c3380ad..5f2cd3e89d65 100644 --- a/security/security.c +++ b/security/security.c @@ -1891,8 +1891,7 @@ int security_inode_permission(const struct mnt_idmap *idmap, struct inode *inode /** * security_inode_setattr() - Check if setting file attributes is allowed - * @idmap: idmap of the mount - * @dentry: file + * @path: file * @attr: new attributes * * Check permission before setting file attributes. Note that the kernel call @@ -1902,12 +1901,11 @@ int security_inode_permission(const struct mnt_idmap *idmap, struct inode *inode * * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. */ -int security_inode_setattr(const struct mnt_idmap *idmap, - struct dentry *dentry, struct iattr *attr) +int security_inode_setattr(const struct path *path, struct iattr *attr) { - if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(dentry)))) + if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(path->dentry)))) return 0; - return call_int_hook(inode_setattr, idmap, dentry, attr); + return call_int_hook(inode_setattr, path, attr); } EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(security_inode_setattr); diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c index df1d0e7ce3a0..cc43e08e68c5 100644 --- a/security/selinux/hooks.c +++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c @@ -3346,10 +3346,11 @@ static int selinux_inode_permission(const struct mnt_idmap *idmap, return rc; } -static int selinux_inode_setattr(const struct mnt_idmap *idmap, struct dentry *dentry, +static int selinux_inode_setattr(const struct path *path, struct iattr *iattr) { const struct cred *cred = current_cred(); + struct dentry *dentry = path->dentry; struct inode *inode = d_backing_inode(dentry); unsigned int ia_valid = iattr->ia_valid; u32 av = FILE__WRITE; diff --git a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c index 42b028bbcd02..fdc74ca0e870 100644 --- a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c +++ b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c @@ -1272,10 +1272,11 @@ static int smack_inode_permission(const struct mnt_idmap *idmap, struct inode *i * * Returns 0 if access is permitted, an error code otherwise */ -static int smack_inode_setattr(const struct mnt_idmap *idmap, struct dentry *dentry, +static int smack_inode_setattr(const struct path *path, struct iattr *iattr) { struct smk_audit_info ad; + struct dentry *dentry = path->dentry; int rc; /* -- 2.18.0.huawei.25
