Print a warning when overlayfs copies up a file if the process that triggered
the copy up has a R/O fd open to the lower file being copied up.

This can help catch applications that do things like the following:

        fd1 = open("foo", O_RDONLY);
        fd2 = open("foo", O_RDWR);

where they expect fd1 and fd2 to refer to the same file - which will no longer
be the case post-copy up.

With this patch, the following commands:

        bash 5</mnt/a/foo128
        6<>/mnt/a/foo128

assuming /mnt/a/foo128 to be an un-copied up file on an overlay will produce
the following warning in the kernel log:

        overlayfs: Copying up foo129, but open R/O on fd 5 which will cease to
        be coherent [pid=3818 bash]

This is enabled by setting:

        /sys/module/overlay/parameters/check_copy_up

to 1.

Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowe...@redhat.com>
---
diff --git a/fs/overlayfs/copy_up.c b/fs/overlayfs/copy_up.c
index 24f640441bd9..04f6f75ba4a9 100644
--- a/fs/overlayfs/copy_up.c
+++ b/fs/overlayfs/copy_up.c
@@ -7,6 +7,7 @@
  * the Free Software Foundation.
  */
 
+#include <linux/module.h>
 #include <linux/fs.h>
 #include <linux/slab.h>
 #include <linux/file.h>
@@ -16,10 +17,40 @@
 #include <linux/uaccess.h>
 #include <linux/sched.h>
 #include <linux/namei.h>
+#include <linux/fdtable.h>
 #include "overlayfs.h"
 
 #define OVL_COPY_UP_CHUNK_SIZE (1 << 20)
 
+static bool __read_mostly ovl_check_copy_up;
+module_param_named(check_copy_up, ovl_check_copy_up, bool,
+                  S_IWUSR | S_IRUGO);
+MODULE_PARM_DESC(ovl_check_copy_up,
+                "Warn on copy-up when causing process also has a R/O fd open");
+
+static int ovl_check_fd(const void *data, struct file *f, unsigned fd)
+{
+       const struct dentry *dentry = data;
+
+       if (f->f_path.dentry == dentry)
+               pr_warn("overlayfs: Warning: Copying up %pD, but open R/O on fd 
%u which will cease to be coherent [pid=%d %s]\n",
+                       f, fd, current->pid, current->comm);
+       return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Check the fds open by this process and warn if something like the following
+ * scenario is about to occur:
+ *
+ *     fd1 = open("foo", O_RDONLY);
+ *     fd2 = open("foo", O_RDWR);
+ */
+static void ovl_do_check_copy_up(struct dentry *dentry)
+{
+       if (ovl_check_copy_up)
+               iterate_fd(current->files, 0, ovl_check_fd, dentry);
+}
+
 int ovl_copy_xattr(struct dentry *old, struct dentry *new)
 {
        ssize_t list_size, size;
@@ -299,6 +330,8 @@ int ovl_copy_up_one(struct dentry *parent, struct dentry 
*dentry,
        struct cred *override_cred;
        char *link = NULL;
 
+       ovl_do_check_copy_up(lowerpath->dentry);
+
        ovl_path_upper(parent, &parentpath);
        upperdir = parentpath.dentry;
 
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