On 06/18/2015 09:32 AM, David Howells wrote:
> Provide stubs for union/overlay copy-up handling. The xattr copy up stub
> discards lower SELinux xattrs rather than letting them be copied up so that
> the security label on the copy doesn't get corrupted.
>
> Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowe...@redhat.com>
> ---
>
> security/selinux/hooks.c | 16 ++++++++++++++++
> 1 file changed, 16 insertions(+)
>
> diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c
> index ffa5a642629a..c5d893e2ff23 100644
> --- a/security/selinux/hooks.c
> +++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c
> @@ -3200,6 +3200,20 @@ static void selinux_inode_getsecid(const struct inode
> *inode, u32 *secid)
> *secid = isec->sid;
> }
>
> +static int selinux_inode_copy_up(struct dentry *src, struct dentry *dst)
> +{
> + return 0;
> +}
> +
> +static int selinux_inode_copy_up_xattr(struct dentry *src, struct dentry
> *dst,
> + const char *name, void *value,
> + size_t *size)
> +{
> + if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX) == 0)
> + return 1; /* Discard */
> + return 0;
> +}
> +
(expanded cc list)
I'm not sure we never want to copy up the SELinux attribute. See my
other email about ecryptfs and supporting per-file labeling and
consistent access control over the upper and lower inodes.
> /* file security operations */
>
> static int selinux_revalidate_file_permission(struct file *file, int mask)
> @@ -5917,6 +5931,8 @@ static struct security_operations selinux_ops = {
> .inode_setsecurity = selinux_inode_setsecurity,
> .inode_listsecurity = selinux_inode_listsecurity,
> .inode_getsecid = selinux_inode_getsecid,
> + .inode_copy_up = selinux_inode_copy_up,
> + .inode_copy_up_xattr = selinux_inode_copy_up_xattr,
>
> .file_permission = selinux_file_permission,
> .file_alloc_security = selinux_file_alloc_security,
>
>
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