arch independent code calls arch_override_mprotect_pkey()
to return a pkey that best matches the requested protection.
This patch provides the implementation.
Signed-off-by: Ram Pai <linux...@us.ibm.com>
---
arch/powerpc/include/asm/mmu_context.h | 5 +++
arch/powerpc/include/asm/pkeys.h | 17 ++++++++++-
arch/powerpc/mm/pkeys.c | 47 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
3 files changed, 67 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/arch/powerpc/include/asm/mmu_context.h
b/arch/powerpc/include/asm/mmu_context.h
index c705a5d..8e5a87e 100644
--- a/arch/powerpc/include/asm/mmu_context.h
+++ b/arch/powerpc/include/asm/mmu_context.h
@@ -145,6 +145,11 @@ static inline bool arch_vma_access_permitted(struct
vm_area_struct *vma,
#ifndef CONFIG_PPC64_MEMORY_PROTECTION_KEYS
#define pkey_initialize()
#define pkey_mm_init(mm)
+
+static inline int vma_pkey(struct vm_area_struct *vma)
+{
+ return 0;
+}
#endif /* CONFIG_PPC64_MEMORY_PROTECTION_KEYS */
#endif /* __KERNEL__ */
diff --git a/arch/powerpc/include/asm/pkeys.h b/arch/powerpc/include/asm/pkeys.h
index f13e913..d2fffef 100644
--- a/arch/powerpc/include/asm/pkeys.h
+++ b/arch/powerpc/include/asm/pkeys.h
@@ -41,6 +41,16 @@ static inline u64 pkey_to_vmflag_bits(u16 pkey)
((pkey & 0x10UL) ? VM_PKEY_BIT4 : 0x0UL));
}
+#define ARCH_VM_PKEY_FLAGS (VM_PKEY_BIT0 | VM_PKEY_BIT1 | VM_PKEY_BIT2 | \
+ VM_PKEY_BIT3 | VM_PKEY_BIT4)
+
+static inline int vma_pkey(struct vm_area_struct *vma)
+{
+ if (!pkey_inited)
+ return 0;
+ return (vma->vm_flags & ARCH_VM_PKEY_FLAGS) >> VM_PKEY_SHIFT;
+}
+
#define arch_max_pkey() pkeys_total
#define AMR_RD_BIT 0x1UL
#define AMR_WR_BIT 0x2UL
@@ -142,11 +152,14 @@ static inline int execute_only_pkey(struct mm_struct *mm)
return __execute_only_pkey(mm);
}
-
+extern int __arch_override_mprotect_pkey(struct vm_area_struct *vma,
+ int prot, int pkey);
static inline int arch_override_mprotect_pkey(struct vm_area_struct *vma,
int prot, int pkey)
{
- return 0;
+ if (!pkey_inited)
+ return 0;
+ return __arch_override_mprotect_pkey(vma, prot, pkey);
}
extern int __arch_set_user_pkey_access(struct task_struct *tsk, int pkey,
diff --git a/arch/powerpc/mm/pkeys.c b/arch/powerpc/mm/pkeys.c
index 8a24983..fb1a76a 100644
--- a/arch/powerpc/mm/pkeys.c
+++ b/arch/powerpc/mm/pkeys.c
@@ -245,3 +245,50 @@ int __execute_only_pkey(struct mm_struct *mm)
mm->context.execute_only_pkey = execute_only_pkey;
return execute_only_pkey;
}
+
+static inline bool vma_is_pkey_exec_only(struct vm_area_struct *vma)
+{
+ /* Do this check first since the vm_flags should be hot */
+ if ((vma->vm_flags & (VM_READ | VM_WRITE | VM_EXEC)) != VM_EXEC)
+ return false;
+
+ return (vma_pkey(vma) == vma->vm_mm->context.execute_only_pkey);
+}
+
+/*
+ * This should only be called for *plain* mprotect calls.
+ */
+int __arch_override_mprotect_pkey(struct vm_area_struct *vma, int prot,
+ int pkey)
+{
+ /*
+ * Is this an mprotect_pkey() call? If so, never
+ * override the value that came from the user.
+ */
+ if (pkey != -1)
+ return pkey;
+
+ /*
+ * If the currently associated pkey is execute-only,
+ * but the requested protection requires read or write,
+ * move it back to the default pkey.
+ */
+ if (vma_is_pkey_exec_only(vma) &&
+ (prot & (PROT_READ|PROT_WRITE)))
+ return 0;
+
+ /*
+ * the requested protection is execute-only. Hence
+ * lets use a execute-only pkey.
+ */
+ if (prot == PROT_EXEC) {
+ pkey = execute_only_pkey(vma->vm_mm);
+ if (pkey > 0)
+ return pkey;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * nothing to override.
+ */
+ return vma_pkey(vma);
+}
--
1.7.1
