It may happen that mm is already released, which leads to kernel panic.
This adds the NULL check for current->mm, similarly to 20afc60f892d
("x86, perf: Check that current->mm is alive before getting user
callchain").

I was getting this panic when running a profiling BPF program
(profile.py from bcc-tools):

    [26215.051935] Kernel attempted to read user page (588) - exploit attempt? 
(uid: 0)
    [26215.051950] BUG: Kernel NULL pointer dereference on read at 0x00000588
    [26215.051952] Faulting instruction address: 0xc00000000020fac0
    [26215.051957] Oops: Kernel access of bad area, sig: 11 [#1]
    [...]
    [26215.052049] Call Trace:
    [26215.052050] [c000000061da6d30] [c00000000020fc10] 
perf_callchain_user_64+0x2d0/0x490 (unreliable)
    [26215.052054] [c000000061da6dc0] [c00000000020f92c] 
perf_callchain_user+0x1c/0x30
    [26215.052057] [c000000061da6de0] [c0000000005ab2a0] 
get_perf_callchain+0x100/0x360
    [26215.052063] [c000000061da6e70] [c000000000573bc8] 
bpf_get_stackid+0x88/0xf0
    [26215.052067] [c000000061da6ea0] [c008000000042258] 
bpf_prog_16d4ab9ab662f669_do_perf_event+0xf8/0x274
    [...]

In addition, move storing the top-level stack entry to generic
perf_callchain_user to make sure the top-evel entry is always captured,
even if current->mm is NULL.

Fixes: 20002ded4d93 ("perf_counter: powerpc: Add callchain support")
Signed-off-by: Viktor Malik <[email protected]>
---
Changes in v2:
- Move call to perf_callchain_store() for the top-level stack entry to
  common perf_callchain_user (Saket)

 arch/powerpc/perf/callchain.c    | 5 +++++
 arch/powerpc/perf/callchain_32.c | 1 -
 arch/powerpc/perf/callchain_64.c | 1 -
 3 files changed, 5 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

diff --git a/arch/powerpc/perf/callchain.c b/arch/powerpc/perf/callchain.c
index 26aa26482c9a..992cc5c98214 100644
--- a/arch/powerpc/perf/callchain.c
+++ b/arch/powerpc/perf/callchain.c
@@ -103,6 +103,11 @@ perf_callchain_kernel(struct perf_callchain_entry_ctx 
*entry, struct pt_regs *re
 void
 perf_callchain_user(struct perf_callchain_entry_ctx *entry, struct pt_regs 
*regs)
 {
+       perf_callchain_store(entry, perf_arch_instruction_pointer(regs));
+
+       if (!current->mm)
+               return;
+
        if (!is_32bit_task())
                perf_callchain_user_64(entry, regs);
        else
diff --git a/arch/powerpc/perf/callchain_32.c b/arch/powerpc/perf/callchain_32.c
index ddcc2d8aa64a..0de21c5d272c 100644
--- a/arch/powerpc/perf/callchain_32.c
+++ b/arch/powerpc/perf/callchain_32.c
@@ -142,7 +142,6 @@ void perf_callchain_user_32(struct perf_callchain_entry_ctx 
*entry,
        next_ip = perf_arch_instruction_pointer(regs);
        lr = regs->link;
        sp = regs->gpr[1];
-       perf_callchain_store(entry, next_ip);
 
        while (entry->nr < entry->max_stack) {
                fp = (unsigned int __user *) (unsigned long) sp;
diff --git a/arch/powerpc/perf/callchain_64.c b/arch/powerpc/perf/callchain_64.c
index 115d1c105e8a..30fb61c5f0cb 100644
--- a/arch/powerpc/perf/callchain_64.c
+++ b/arch/powerpc/perf/callchain_64.c
@@ -77,7 +77,6 @@ void perf_callchain_user_64(struct perf_callchain_entry_ctx 
*entry,
        next_ip = perf_arch_instruction_pointer(regs);
        lr = regs->link;
        sp = regs->gpr[1];
-       perf_callchain_store(entry, next_ip);
 
        while (entry->nr < entry->max_stack) {
                fp = (unsigned long __user *) sp;
-- 
2.53.0


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