As the ICANN board starts considering the proposals for Supporting
Organizations today, they must return to basic principles to evaluate each
suggestion for structure and membership. One cannot consider structure and
membership without determining the powers of the SOs. And in this regard
ICANN suffers from a vagueness of mission that I've never heard resolved in
the meetings I've attended or in online discussion.
ICANN bylaws include the following descriptions of SOs:
* The Supporting Organizations shall serve
as advisory bodies to the Board...
(Article VI, Section 1(a))
* The Supporting Organizations shall be
delegated the primary responsibility
for developing and recommending
substantive policies and procedures...
(Article VI, Section 1(c))
Could I really be the only person in the world who sees an ambiguity -- if
not an outright contradition -- in those statements?
To me, an advisory body provides information that aids the parent
organization in making decisions. This is particularly true if the advisory
body consists of technical experts, which is what I've heard was the
original impetus behind creating Supporting Organizations.
Of course, the SO can recommend policy, but it is really up to the larger
community to decide what it wants.
I will repeat the example I used at the Cambridge meeting last November 14,
because I think readers will find it helpful. The Internet community (which
it seems will be represented by ICANN, regardless of all the controversy
over its foundation) might set the following policy: "The means of
assigning domain names will minimize the chance that two applicants will
vie over the same name." ICANN could then hand that policy to the DNSO and
ask it come up with the technical means of achieving that policy.
Centralizing policy in the parent ICANN could be considered one pole of
possibilities. At the other pole, ICANN could be simply a vessel, handling
messy financial and other logistics and leaving all substantial decisions
up to the SOs (although ICANN would also function as a court of last resort).
I think the formulators of the ICANN bylaws envisaged something between
these two poles, but closer to the view of SOs as substantial
policy-makers. The structure of the final ICANN board (where half of the
members will be appointed by SOs) reinforces my assessment. On the other
hand, their December 21, 1998 call for proposals emphasizes that SOs are
organizationally separate, so I am left with conflicting impressions.
I wish the ICANN board would clarify their view, and even amend the bylaws
to make roles clear. Then there could be more constructive discussion over
the structure and membership of SOs.
If the SOs are advisory, the rather complicated dnso.org or AIP proposals
make sense. They deliberately give more weight to registrars and registries
that have to implement policies. ICANN can set policy and the
registrars/registries implement it. I'm not convinced there's any reason to
give extra weight to ISPs, "infrastructure providers," or "connectivity
providers" -- are the authors of the bylaws worried that bad DNS policies
will increase general Internet traffic? If not, why should DNSO policies
affect these companies more than anybody else trying to resolve a domain name?
I'm also glad the dnso.org and AIP proposals gave room for end-users of
various types. As many have pointed out on the IFWP list, extra weight has
been given to trademark holders and their representatives, and you can
guess my feelings about that. I am sure trademark holders will invest
plenty of resources in making sure they are represented in the DNSO; I
would rather see the structure compensate by giving extra weight to their
potential adversaries than to reinforce the dominance of the trademark
holders.
But the preceding paragraphs assume ICANN treats the SOs as advisory. If
the SOs are primary policy makers, they must be broader and should
definitively weaken the role of tchnical experts. For such an organization
the ORSC proposal is more suited than the others. The simple, flat "one
SLD, one vote" structure is democratic, although I wish there were a way to
represent people and organizations that don't have an SLD.
We can dismiss decisively the notion that an SO consists of technical
experts but makes policy. The success of IETF has rendered such a notion
attractive, but there are many reasons it won't work here, which have been
amply discussed on the IFWP list. The whole history of the domain-name
dispute and the White Paper reinforces the philosophy that non-technical
people have a stake in decision-making, notwithstanding ICANN's statement
in the December 21 call that "putting policy development and
recommendations organizationally closer to working professionals will
produce a better result for the entire community."
I'll finish by offering my thanks to all of you who have been trying to
interpret the ICANN call and develop meaningful proposals.
Disclaimer 1: While I have represented Computer Professionals for Social
Responsibility on the domain name issue, I had no time to get approval for
this message before submitting it, so it represents my opinions alone. I
don't represent my employer either.
Disclaimer 2: I will read anything sent to the IFWP list with the subject
line I assigned, or anything sent to me personally. But I can't guarantee
I'll read all mailing list items submitted under other subject lines.
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Andy Oram O'Reilly & Associates, Inc. email: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Editor 90 Sherman Street phone: (617) 499-7479
Cambridge, MA 02140-3233 fax: (617) 661-1116
USA http://www.oreilly.com/~andyo/
Stories at Web site: The Bug in the Seven Modules, Code the Obscure
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