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unfortunately, trying to have a debate with you is like talking to a wall.
Or maybe like the Queen in Alice in Wonderland:  it means what I say it
means.  Nevertheless, I will try one more time.





Various parts of your response have been snipped to save space
                                                                 
                                                                 
                                                                 



In theory, nearly everything is reversible.

But, in practice, very little is reversible.

The reason for this is that ICANN's board, a board which has zero members
elected by anyone, has taken upon itself to establish structures (such as
the internal structure of constituencies in the DNSO) which are heavily
biased towards certain points of view.

the internal structures of the DNSO have little if anything to do with the
ability of future Boards to reverse actions of this Board; at best, the
DNSO will contribute 3 of 19 Board members.

For instance, the DNSO's constituency structure is so heavily weighted
in favor of large scale commercial interests (especially since the board
explicitly rejected any form of meaningful individual and non-commercial
participation) that there is very little reason to believe that the WIPO
report will be subject to more than mild questions before its adoption.

It is unlikely that the later introduction of token representation from
non-commercial and individual interests will be able to have any impact on
the decisions not being made.

so I take it all the hullabaloo on this is a waste of time, and the only
acceptable approach to you would be to make it so the "large scale
commercial interests" were the ones with "token" representation?  The fact
is that there are many interests with legitimate roles here, and whether
you agree or not, that includes all the groups that the Board asked to form
constituencies, including non-commercial interests.  The issue of an
individual constituency in the DNSO is a legitimate one, but it raises
questions about the relationship of that to the At Large membership, and
the appropriateness of changing what was essentially the consensus of the
vast majority of the community on the composition of the DNSO.  The fact
that there are some -- it seems obvious a realtively small number -- in the
community that would do it a different way should certainly not be allowed
to override the consensus structure, at least without allowing the
community to comment.  There was no opportunity for notice and comment
before the Berlin meeting, but I am sure there will be before the Santiago
meeting.  If this is too slow for you, I'm sorry, but since you were one of
the major proponents of the extensive notice and comment procedures we
have, you will have to take the credit or blame, such as it is, for the
speed at which ICANN can operate.

As for the $1 tax on domain name.  Yes, it will be reduced when ICANN's
board imposes a similar tax on IP addresses.

But will the revenue needs of ICANN be reduced?  Not with a proposed
budget of several million dollars and more than a dozen employees.

ICANN is rapidly becoming a bloated bureaucracy.

Thank you for your financial analysis.  Would you like to examine the
budget and tell us where we can cut expenses and still undertake the (1)
global outreach, (2) extensive due process and (3) administrative oversight
that we have been charged with?  Since the budget details are available,
all substantive comments and suggestions are welcome.  Simply saying you
think it is too much is not very helpful, nor  for that matter very
persuasive.

> ....  The only thing you
> mention that might not be reversible is the establishment of a mechanism
> for the election of nine Board members by an At Large membership; if done
> badly, and the result is capture by an economic or philosophical (or for
> that matter religious or just mischeivous) minority

What you are espousing is a rejection of democracy.

If there were enough votes in an ungerrymandered ICANN to elect a majority
of board members, then who are we to say that the election is
illegitimate, religious, or mischevious?

So let me get this straight:  if a not carefully thought out election
process produces a Board that is not capable or interested in maintaining
the operational stability of the Internet, that's ok with you because that
is the democratic way?  You may be prepared to risk this, but I doubt that
the majority of the community is.  The notion that pure democracy -- and
immediate at that -- is a value higher than the operational stability of
the net is a view, but I would suspect it is a very distinctly minority
view.  It is a view that only those with no responsibility for the result
have the luxury of holding.

> A diverse
> Membership Advisory Committee spent several months studying this issue
very
> closely, and came up with its best suggestions on how the At Large
> Directors should be elected; those recommendations are now being
evaluated
> to see how they can be implemented, and more action will take place
before
> and at Santiago.  Thus, if you are serious about this issue, it is
> irresponsible to assert that it is not being given both the attention and
> the care that it obviously deserves.

You say that the General Membership is being studied with all deliberate
speed.

Yet, it is odd that, by contrast, the board is racing forward, creating
structures like the DNSO, that are already making permanent decisions
(such as adoption of WIPO), before there is even a single person on the
board who has been elected by an outsider.

The net effect is, of course, that by the time there is a General
Membership, the DNSO will have made most of the significant and
substantive choices.

Thus the elective board (which, by the way, will be but a minority even
were they to act in unity) will have no way to act except to overturn the
DNSO's choices.

And as you well know the language of the ICANN by-laws prohibits the board
from initiating action to overturn a DNSO initiative already adopted by a
previous board.

I don't understand this point at all.  The Board is free to make any
decision that it thinks is"necessary or appropriate to further the
interests of the Corporation."  See Article VI, Section 2(g).  Obviously,
it could do so only after proper notice and comment, and only upon a proper
showing that meets this standard, but the fact that a previous Board had
come to a contrary decision would certainly not prevent this standard from
being met.

May I suggest that your fear is not necessary.

This board has already established its place in the memory of man as "the
board that never held an open meeting".

You can protest all you want that the board is doing wonderful and great
things.  Perhaps it is.  But nobody on the outside knows.

All we see are the results.

May I suggest you reread the passages immediately above.  How does "nobody
on the outside knows' jibe with "All we see is the results"?  In fact, the
only thing you don't see is the discussion; you immediately see all the
results.  The fact of the matter is that this open meeting stuff is
philosophy, not substance; you and some others seem to think you have an
inherent right to be in every conversation, listen to every phone call, and
certainly to sit and watch every meeting, no matter how that would affect
the efficiency or the efficacy of those events.  Most others in the
community, who do not share this view, would rather see things get done as
quickly and effectively as possible, and recognize the value of not having
to worry about making a politically incorrect statement during a
substantive discussion.


> The mechanics of the membership issue are probably the
> toughest problem the Board has faced, and nonetheless, it is highly
likely
> there will be a membership process in place less than nine months after
the
> Board began work.

That would mean in about ten days from now.

But once more you indicate a flawed process.

The General Membership committee made its report.  And the next thing you
expect to happen is a fully formed General Membership structure emerging
from the Board, like Venus emerging fully grown from the sea shell.

What ever happened to well-accepted procedures, like having the board post
notice of its proposed actions during a notice-and-comment period.

What ever happened to exposure of the decision making process used by the
board so that those who comment can constructively address the defects
perceived by the board or respond to mis-understandings that the board may
have?

maybe you know something I don't; I fully expect the Board to ask for
comments on any implementation plan it considers before it adopts it, as
required by the bylaws.


> It seems to me, given the other organizational midwiving
> it had to do (the SOs)

"midwiving"?  May I suggest that ICANN is acting more like father, mother,
grandparents, and midwife.

The constituency structure was an contested idea. Yet, the board took
those disputed notions, closeted itself in Singapore, and came forth, like
Moses on the Mount, proclaiming, by fiat, a final design that was nothing
less than the board's own notion of constituencies.  And the board
entombed this into the ICANN bylaws without benefit of meaningful minutes,
without public notice of the proposed action, and without public comment.

The notion that the DNSO would "self-organize" was changed by the board
into "self-organize, but we reserve the right to rework the whole thing".

And I may say, that the board undertook to "re-organize" the DNSO into its
own image with a speed unheard of among those who care about other
matters, such as the General Membership.

Now I am really confused.  After several months of back and forth, the
Board was presented with two competing proposals whose supporters had not
been able to compromise.  Given this state of affairs, the Board adopted
some principles, put out for comment proposed bylaws implementing those
principles, and subsequently adopted a DNSO structure that was very similar
to the compromise proposal submitted by CENTRE in Singapore.  What exactly
was wrong with that process?


> 2.  It seemed to me that a little sarcasm was an appropriate response

A little sarcasm is OK.  Humor is OK.

Besmirching those who may have objections as a "religious or just
mischeivous) minority" is not funny.

Repeatedly calling those who have legitimate concerns "arrogant juveniles"
is neither sarcasm nor humor.

We have a very serious issue here -- the fact that the first experiement
in Internet Governance is moving on a path that is increasingly looking
like it is leading to something that looks more like Bismarck's Germany
than the fair democracy envisioned by the White Paper.

I guess I was wrong; you do think this is so serious that you have no sense
of humor.  I'm sorry to see that, but se la vie.

          --karl--








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